

R 157116

JPRS-WER-85-039

18 April 1985

West Europe Report

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18 April 1985

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

AUSTRIA

STEYRER, WALDHEIM TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 16/17 Feb 85 p 1

[Article: "Duel for Kirchsclaeger's Succession Is Firmed Up: Steyrer Challenges Waldheim"]

[Text] Vienna--The great duel which will determine the individual who will serve as the next federal president will probably be fought between present Minister of Health Kurt Steyrer and former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. Waldheim's nomination as a candidate by the OeVP [Austrian People's Party] was decided on long ago; it appears that a decision has now been reached by the SPOe [Socialist Party of Austria] also. Official announcements of the nominations by the major parties are not expected until spring.

In the OeVP it has been known for about one year that 66-year old Waldheim is the chosen candidate. The popularity of the former minister for foreign affairs (in the OeVP one-party Klaus administration 1968-1970) and later UN secretary general (1971-1981), confirmed by opinion polls, is such that no serious consideration was given to nominating anyone else. Nevertheless, Waldheim is not entirely above controversy in some sections of the opposition party, e.g., in the Vienna branch of the OeVP.

As to the socialists, their selection process provided a bit more suspense. First, there was a delay until former chancellor Kreisky had declined several times. About 13 months ago, party chief Sinowatz approached the president of the Austrian Trade Union Federation, Benya. The latter was greatly honored, but at age 73 he did not feel able to cope with the stresses involved. Finally the choice came down to three valid candidates: Foreign Minister Gratz, Vienna Mayor Zilk and Health Minister Steyrer. The remarkable part of this was that 6 months ago Steyrer had given strong indications of wishing to resign from any further political activity.

Gratz is likely to have requested that he not be nominated. In the "duel" between Zilk and Steyrer, it is probable that one strong argument weighed against the mayor and one in favor of the minister. In the SPOe there is talk that Zilk must be kept available for possibly succeeding Sinowatz as federal chancellor, especially as head of government of a possible SPOe-OeVP coalition after the next National Council elections. As to Steyrer, the SPOe leadership

started to prevail upon him when immediately after the "Hainburg" events the popularity polls of the "Greens" shot up like spikes on a fever chart. During the last 2 years the physician and health minister had publicly concerned himself with environmental matters almost exclusively and had come to be regarded as a "red Green."

Some additional candidates will likely be nominated for election to the office of federal chancellor in May 1986, though their prospects are limited. The FPÖe [Austrian Liberal Party] has not yet decided whether it should nominate one of its own members; one woman, "pasture protectrix" Freda Meissner-Blau is the subject of much discussion; and on the extreme right, Norbert Burger might try to find out whether the amazing number of 140,000 votes which he received in 1980 were a mere accident.

Frau Meissner-Blau, were she to become a candidate, would almost certainly bring about a second ballot. Such a runoff would take place between the two top votegetters, if none of the candidates receives more than 50 percent of the votes on the first ballot.

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CSO: 3620/291

POLITICAL

FINLAND

CP MINORITY WING LEADER JOKINEN ON PARTY SPLIT

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 22 Feb 85 p 30

[Commentary by Vesa Oittinen: "About the Heart of the SKP's Problems"]

[Text] Much has been written about the SKP's [Finnish Communist Party] problems, but nonetheless a comprehensive general review of the reasons for the party dispute and its history has been lacking. Published a short time ago, former TIEDONANTAJA chief editor Urho Jokinen's slim volume "The Struggle for the SKP Main Line" has notably removed this deficiency.

The book is divided into three chapters. In the first the reasons leading to the division in the SKP are discussed, in the second the notoriously doleful 20th Congress and in the third the situation since then.

Although the time between 1956 and the 14th Congress in 1966 and the present is a long one, we may nevertheless say that the basic pattern of the SKP's problems has remained largely the same. "What happened in those years and decades is mirrored so demonstrably and exactly in present-day affairs that it is even difficult to apply the concept of history to this process," Jokinen says.

What then is at the heart of the SKP's problems?

It becomes clear if we compare the experiences we had with the party's policy in the 1940's and 1950's with the present situation.

The heart of the matter lies in the fact that "the workers have not always been convinced that certain Communist policies should rely on the actions of the masses." The SKP lost their confidence particularly between 1966 and 1970 and 1975 and 1984, the years of weak government policy and coexistence with the Social Democrats.

"This, and this alone, is the main reason for the Communists' continual losses over the past few years," Jokinen summed it up. The SKP's chief problem is conservative opportunism, which leads to neglect of mass efforts and underestimation of the importance of mass movements.

Opportunism and Revisionism

As we well know, SKP differences of opinion have always been characterized as differences of "ideological policy" right up to the official declaration level.

While experience has demonstrated the validity of this definition, the relationship between "ideology" and "policy" has, nevertheless, relatively rarely been considered. Especially "reformers" have often striven to depict the situation the party is in in such a way that there is alleged to be a powerful faction in the SKP that stubbornly adheres to "old" ideas, one that does not agree with the modernization and "broadening" of the party's ideological image.

The best contribution of Jokinen's book is that it demonstrates the untenableness of this "reformer-conservative" antithesis. The question of ideological and political relations is in fact the same as the question of the relation between conservative opportunism and conservative revisionism that is traditionally posed in a theoretical form by the communist movement.

While these two grow out of the same root, they are nevertheless not quite the same. Conservative opportunism above all means going along with bourgeois policy, whereas conservative revisionism is, on the other hand, a phenomenon of the ideological level.

Conservative opportunism is as a phenomenon more fundamental. Through it it can be said that the different kinds of ideological "openings to the Right" engaged in in the SKP and the revisionist efforts of Leninism go back to the need to find ideological arguments to defend the conservative opportunist policy that is already being pursued. In seeking the essential factor in the way it pursues its policy, Jokinen thus strikes at the heart of the party's problems.

And when matters are viewed in this way, the legendary "reformer-conservative" configuration is also placed in an entirely new light. We can scarcely say that some dogmatic faction that has tooth and nail opposed the penetration of Marxist-Leninism and its creative application to new developments has influenced the party.

In speaking of the big changes that occurred in Finnish society in the 1960's — sociologists prefer to use the term "structural change" — Jokinen notes that "they demand of the SKP the adoption of a new attitude that responds to these changes. They also demand of the SKP the strengthening of its ideological foundation so that new problems can be analyzed and resolved on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles."

The SKP has not, unfortunately, been capable of operating in this way as a whole. "It did happen that, when it had to change its attitude, the party's principles themselves began to change." The alignment that led to the threat of a split in the SKP was complete.

At times one gets the impression that Jokinen does not clearly enough distinguish conservative opportunism and revisionism from one another in his book.

It would, however, be important to do so because the pattern of conservative opportunism in the business of practical politics often pursued under the protective cover of "orthodox" Marxist-Leninist phraseology has in many respects made it much more difficult to understand the SKP situation, which is a consequence of a certain "asymmetry in terms of levels" between opportunism and revisionism and between policy and ideology.

In other words, the conservative deviation has appeared much more clearly in the business of practical politics than on the ideological levels. Jokinen too certainly draws attention to this fact in averring that "serious attempts to change the Marxist-Leninist character of the SKP in decisions and position papers have only rarely been made."

Sometimes, however, the temple curtain is torn down from top to bottom -- as, say, when Arvo Aalto published his famous article "on historical compromise." As Jokinen asserts, Aalto's theory is no more than an attempt to get SKP ideology to correspond to the already existing opportunist practice. It is as far from the application of creative Marxist-Leninism as heaven is from earth.

SKP Factions

Jokinen's appraisals of the different factions that have influenced the SKP make for interesting reading. In the 1960's the "Stalinists" and "reformers" opposed one another, as well as the latter's fellow travelers, the "sacrificers," according to whom the situation in the party could be pacified if only those "Stalinists" regarded as the worst -- for example, then chairman Aimo Aaltonen -- were to be replaced by new men.

This basic pattern remained very largely the same over the following decades. Thus, according to Jokinen, hard-line opposition by threatening the positions of the class-based forces in the party is characteristic of the "third-line movement."

While Jokinen's appraisal of the "third-line movement's" political role is correct, as I see it, there is reason to complete it with an ideological appraisal as well. Typical of many of the leading figures of the so-called third line is the fact that they later completely abandoned their Marxist principles and devoted themselves to following the Greens, for example. Thus ideologically they have removed themselves even farther from the party than the conservative opportunists. In connection with this, it is incorrect to brand the forces for unity that have grouped themselves behind Jouko Kajanoja "third-liners," as KANSAN UUTISET does.

The hard line is in many respects a problematic phenomenon. There is, of course, not the slightest doubt as to its political nature -- it is an instrument in the hands of the Aalto faction to crush the party's Marxist-Leninist forces.

On the other hand, Jokinen asserts that "the hard line is the sum total of many factors." On the one hand, the hard line (or its leadership) is with its presence trying to conceal the real roots "of a faulty, antiworker policy"

while, on the other, the rise of the hard line is in a certain cause-and-effect relation with changes in the social foundation of our society and the increase in people's feeling of insecurity. I would interpret these cautious formulations of Jokinen's as indicating that the hard line represents the instinctive tendencies of a certain portion of the SKP membership, tendencies which the current conservative opportunist leadership is exploiting.

What about the situation now, since the 20th Congress? Will the SKP split up or not?

Jokinen does not answer this question. It would indeed be premature to do so. In short, Jokinen assesses the present situation thus: "The party is being disciplined and organized in order to resolve its administrative problems in accordance with Aalto's objectives."

The situation in the SKP is a really grim one. When things go badly, the leadership is not replaced. Just the opposite — the current leadership is literally replacing members and organizations....

11466

CSO: 3617/89

POLITICAL

FINLAND

DIVIDED COMMUNISTS NOW MUST ELECT SECRETARY TO REPLACE AITAMURTO

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Feb 85 p 10

[Commentary by Kyosti Karvonen]

[Text] The Finnish Communist Party (SKP) has a burning urgency to elect a new general secretary. It is expected that a decision will be made around 10 March after the delegates to the extraordinary congress have thrashed out their choice.

The SKP's majority leadership does not intend to make its own proposal for a new general secretary, but will leave the election to the congress delegates and the election committee of the congress.

The election of a new general secretary became timely when Aarno Aitamurto, the present number two man, announced on Wednesday that he will return to his post as chairman of the SAK [Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions] affiliated Construction Workers' Union immediately after the extraordinary congress to be held on 23 March.

On Thursday Aitamurto emphasized that the situation in the party had been clarified to such a point that the election of a new general secretary is no longer a policy question, but, above all, a personality question.

Aitamurto said that he received the final confirmation for his decision to resign last Monday when it became officially clear that the Taistoite [Stalinist] minority does not intend to participate in the extraordinary congress.

"On Monday it became certain that the minority has decided to remain outside of the leadership work of the party," stated Aitamurto.

Vainionpaa at the Top of the List

On Thursday the SKP's leaders were closed mouthed about successor candidates to Aitamurto, among whom not one, of course, will officially aspire to the vacancy.

The strongest candidate in the estimate of all the factions is Politburo Member Esko Vainionpaa, who is one of the strongest supporters of Chairman Arvo Aalto.

Vainionpaa directs the SKP's international division, which was under the direction of minority leader Taisto Sinisalo before the 20th Congress.

Former District Secretary Raimo Ahoniemi of the SKP's Satakunta District, who recently transferred to the party's organization section, has been mentioned as a possibility. However, it was clearly stated at the last meeting of the Central Committee that Ahoniemi is slated to replace SKP Trade Union Secretary Yrjo Tirri, who is retiring.

The plans for a new general secretary are still, nevertheless, in the initial stages. Aitamurto's supporters will in any case most likely need to find an opposing candidate to the "Aaltoite" Vainionpaa.

Organization Man Did Not Waste Any Time

General Secretary Aarno Aitamurto, who is leaving the SKP, has become accustomed to disciplining the Taistoites. Chairman Arvo Aalto, who dawdled with the minority for more than 10 years during his term as general secretary, did not have the same skill, desire, or even power.

Under Aitamurto's leadership the destruction of the Taistoites raged for a number of years in the Construction Workers' Union. The same maneuver succeeded in less than a year in the SKP.

When it is said that Aalto's skull contains political brains, Aitamurto's brains are most likely full of organizational plans. A princely politician and a taciturn organization man do not get along well once the "dirty" work is done.

During Aitamurto's term the SKP made the necessary organizational decisions after which the channel should finally be open for Aalto's political work. Pointedly stated, Aarno has done his job and can now leave as he himself wants to do.

A standard majority explanation was heard on Thursday that an agreement had already been reached on Aitamurto's short term last spring just before the 20th Congress. According to Aitamurto's own assessment, he had a "small compulsion" to go along with it. In this situation it was agreed in the Construction Workers' Union that a short term as general secretary would be suitable as long as it does not become overextended.

The rather standard explanation was that politics is not part of the departure. Nevertheless, credibility is given to the majority assessment that political reasons did not influence "this decision even though there were some "differences of opinion" and that conjectures about Aalto's and Aitamurto's poor relations were not merely taken from the wind.

The CPSU's anger caused by the present course of the SKP will not subside with Aitamurto's departure since among the party's leaders his relations with the Soviets are among the best. Therefore, his continued membership in the Politburo and his possible ascendancy to the SKP's vice-chairmanship are not without significance.

Indeed, Aitamurto was not among those chosen to meet CPSU representatives a few weeks ago. At that time it is said the meetings with the majority took place in a spirit slightly changed from before even though the agenda had not changed.

In spite of many contradictory interpretations, there is hardly a question of "desertion" from the line chosen by the majority with respect to Aitamurto's departure. In any case the parade will go on without Aitamurto even if the dogs continue to bark.

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CSO: 3617/82

18 April 1985

POLITICAL

FINLAND

TURNED BACK SOVIET DEFECTOR ATTACKS FINNISH POLICY FROM SWEDEN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Feb 85 p 8

[Article by Vesa Santavuori: "Swedish TV Criticized Return of Defector 20 Years Ago, Soviet Defector Accuses Finland"]

[Text] Stockholm--A Finnish-language program on Swedish Television presented a bad image of the legal position of Soviet defectors in Finland with its broadcast on Thursday about the story of Georgi Ivanov, who was returned to the Soviet Union. Georgi was returned to the Soviet Union even though he had requested permission from the Finnish police to seek asylum in the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki.

The return took place when Georgi was taken back to the border and was forced to show the exact spot at which he crossed the border. Later an electric barbed-wire fence was installed in the same spot on the Soviet side, stated Georgi. The incident took place in 1967, but it was not made public until Thursday.

Georgi attempted to flee again into Finland at the same point immediately after he was declared to be "normal" in a mental examination conducted in the Soviet Union after the first attempt to defect. Such a declaration by Soviet authorities meant a relatively light sentence to forced labor.

However, the electric barbed-wire fence delayed Georgi's attempt to flee so that he was forced to wait four nights and days with only one chocolate bar for nourishment until the alertness of the border guards began to flag. As it happened, he swam across the border and past the barbed wire while the Soviet guards were going to the bathroom.

The program poses the question as to whether Finland does, indeed, in practice observe the Geneva Convention on refugees, to which Western countries generally refer in granting asylum. Swedish Television does not allege that Finland is doing anything wrong. Moreover, credibility in the authenticity of Georgi's story is based on the program producers' assumption that this devoutly religious man is incapable of lying.

Finland Does Not Admit Incident To Be True

In Sweden it is believed that this is a question of the first description by a defector himself of how the Finnish police have treated refugees who have come

from behind Finland's eastern border. However, Finnish authorities did not admit knowing anything about this incident at least on Thursday. Also Finnish Amnesty had no knowledge of the Georgi incident. Amnesty, however, states that incidents similar to the Georgi incident become known to the organization about once a year on the average. Risto Veijalainen, chief of the alien section of the Finnish Internal Affairs Ministry, neither confirms nor denies the incident.

He, for his part, states in the program that all matters involving foreigners in Finland are handled secretly as far as the official records are concerned.

Veijalainen sharply rejects the allegation that all Soviet defectors are "automatically returned from Finland according to a secret agreement". According to Veijalainen, to his knowledge there is no such agreement.

"It is not automatic. There is also no agreement which obligates this. The fact that we investigate each refugee incident regardless of whether the individual requesting asylum is from the East or the West, is in my opinion a mere demonstration of neutrality," stated Veijalainen.

Information on Defectors Is Secret

When he is asked about precise statistics on how many defectors have come to Finland seeking asylum, how many have received such asylum, and from what countries they have come, Veijalainen answers that such information is not made public in Finland.

The answer sounds surprising in Sweden where similar information is made public. In 1984 approximately 10,000 refugees arrived in Sweden to request asylum. Of this number 5,000 also received asylum. According to official information, 17 applicants came to Finland and two received asylum.

Georgi himself, however, appears completely openly in the interview conducted by Swedish Television. He states that he fled the Soviet Union a total of three times. The first time he was caught by a Soviet border guard when he was suspected of intending to cross in the Karelian Isthmus.

On the second attempt he ended up under the protection of the Finnish police, to whom his story of a stint behind Finnish bars has drawn attention. On the third try he succeeded in defecting to Sweden after obtaining expert information and a little traveling money from the West German Embassy in Helsinki.

Defectors Fear Deportation from Finland

The story in itself is old. Georgi attempted to come to Finland in 1967. Finland's attitude in practice toward refugees coming from the USSR thus may have changed. Eye-witness accounts are, however, lacking since there has been only one other incident after the Georgi affair in which a refugee from the Soviet Union was returned to the Soviet Union from Finland. This is the so-called Che-repanov incident, which was reported in large headlines even in the Finnish

press a few years ago. Since then the incident involving Leila Miller and Valdo Randpere has inflamed the refugee question in Sweden. Particularly since these Estonians stated that the danger of Finland as a destination for defecting is generally known in the Soviet Union. One must secretly attempt to get to Sweden from Finland if one wants to avoid being returned to the Soviet Union, said Valdo Randpere.

The allegations caused even Finnish officials to react. Helsinki first stated officially that no one is deported from Finland if it is a question of defection. Amnesty International leaked the Cherepanov incident to the public at the time. Cherepanov was "maltreated" under the protection of Finnish officials, after which he was deported to the Soviet Union, alleges Amnesty.

However, indisputable confirmation was not obtained since Cherepanov himself could not be interviewed. Therefore, Georgi Ivanov's story from years back is now the first proof of what has happened at least once under the protection of the Finnish police in questions concerning Soviet refugees. Unless Ivanov is lying, think the gloomiest doubters in Sweden.

The authenticity of the Georgi incident has, however, been verified with the help of the best available sources, argues Swedish Television. Ivanov himself also appears in the program and his immigration papers are most likely in the possession of Swedish officials.

Georgi was taken into the custody of the Finnish police after fleeing from the Soviet Union. After two weeks of investigation and without legal assistance and other more accurate clarification he was driven back to Finland's eastern border.

In the car the Finnish police merely showed Georgi where he is now from a map and where he will be taken. No other explanations were offered.

After being returned to the Soviet Union Georgi suffered a few years of imprisonment. After that he obtained better information about a route across Finland to Sweden where he subsequently received asylum. He is now a Swedish citizen.

10576

CSO: 3617/82

POLITICAL

FINLAND

CP MINORITY NEWSPAPER ON AITAMURTO'S DECISION TO LEAVE

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 22 Feb 85 p 5

[Article: "Was the Opposition Force Surprised? Aitamurto Is Leaving the SKP"]

[Text] After a brisk start, the path toward a party split followed by the conservative SKP [Finnish Communist Party] leadership is getting rockier. Even in those districts controlled by the conservative leadership, party members have particularly lackluster interest in the approaching special congress. First secretary Aarno Aitamurto has announced that he will give up his duties as first secretary. The party's international relations are bogged down. In Finland the current leadership is even "leprous" in comparison with those of the other parties.

Aitamurto Is Leaving

On Wednesday first secretary Aarno Aitamurto announced at an SKP Politburo meeting that he was giving up his duties as first secretary and returning to his position as chairman of the Construction Workers Union. Aitamurto publicly announced that he felt that the time has now come for "a natural return" to the Construction Workers Union.

This is not the first time Aitamurto has been in a situation in which some position other than head of the SKP seemed to be a better alternative. Before the special SKP congress in 1982 — at which Jouko Kajanoja was elected chairman — Aitamurto at first evinced interest in the post of party leader, but at that time announced in KANSAN UUTISET that being chairman of the SKP, whose future prospects were uncertain, was not in keeping with "his political image."

At the next one, the 20th Congress, Aitamurto made a really serious effort to become chairman of the SKP, but lost to Arvo Aalto at internal meetings of the party's conservative wing that preceded the congress. On that occasion Aitamurto had to be satisfied with the post of first secretary.

In the fall what had for some time been clear to even observers outside the SKP also began to be evident to Aitamurto: Aalto was unscrupulously using Aitamurto "as a Mauri [a pawn]" who got to do the dirty work in dividing the SKP. And when the job was done, Mauri could leave. TIEDONANTAJA was the only

newspaper that could anticipate Aitamurto's resignation at that time. At KANSAN UUTISET the claim was denied as being "provocative."

"Natural Time"

Aitamurto now states that he was getting ready to return to the union leadership as early as last spring when he accepted the post of first secretary. "Now that the special congress is in the offing and the congress delegates will be discussing the composition of the leadership, the natural time has arrived for my return to that post, which I feel to be an important one."

Only a month ago, however, the idea did not seem to be as natural as all that to Aitamurto. This is how Aitamurto retorted in a HELSINGIN SANOMAT interview on 30 January in answer to the question as to whether he would accept the post of chairman if it were offered him:

"It would be frustrating for those who are chosen to be congress delegates if I were to announce my position now when the matter has not even been discussed in the Politburo or with Aalto.

"I don't know whether some changes in Stalinist attitude would produce some new patterns. I wish that the Stalinists would make a complete turnabout. Then we would, of course, have to look at the situation again."

The chairman situation?

"Yes, the whole situation, the whole party leadership. We have, however, assumed that candidate issues would not even be discussed in January and February."

Therefore, only a month ago Aitamurto had not even excluded the possibility that he would be ready to, as he put it, "at the natural time" run as a candidate for the office of chairman. Now he is giving up the post of first secretary.

Opposition

There are certainly no profound ideological differences with chairman Aalto behind Aitamurto's resignation. However, as an experienced party whip, he certainly knows better than Aalto how far KANSAN UUTISET's success propaganda is from the truth about the SKP today among the rank and file.

The eight SKP district organizations in which the divisive actions have been concentrated have not yielded even an inch of ground in their activities on behalf of party unity, on the contrary.

At the same time preparations for the party congress are becoming more and more ineffective. The eight district organizations have announced that they will not participate in the congress at all, will not nominate candidates and will therefore not in any way participate in the party congress elections either.

Former SKP chairman Jouko Kajanoja and many other supporters of party unity have also announced that they refuse to take part in the preparations for a divisive congress.

But also in the nine districts controlled by the party leadership the preparations for the congress are moving more listlessly than ever before in the history of the SKP. A large number of cells have announced that they will not participate in the congress preparations. In the Lapland, Satakunta, Vaasa and Jakobstad district organizations they have had to make deals with candidates because there are not enough people willing to run until the elections.

Candidate elections will be held in only SKP district organizations. In fully six of them puppet district organizations were recently established. In a seventh, Etela-Savo, they did not even find enough candidates to be able to hold an election. Noticeably fewer candidates than usual have been nominated in the five "old" SKP district areas in which elections are to be held. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the percentage of participation in the candidate elections will drop below that of any ever experienced in the SKP.

When even in the Social Democratic organ, considered to be "an ally," they write about the party leaders' "leprous" hands which the other parties do not want to take hold of, it is no wonder that the "party whip" is returning to a post that feels more comfortable while it is still possible to do so.

11466

CSO: 3617/89

18 April 1985

POLITICAL

GREECE

POLITICAL BALANCE SEEN SWINGING TO RIGHT

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 24-25 Mar 85 p 7

/Article by Giannis Agorianitis/

/Text/ The elections of 1974, 1977 and 1981 (parliamentary) as well as those of 1984 (Euro-parliamentary) cover the entire 1974-1984 decade and are consequently appropriate for a long-term review of the evolutionary change as far as the correlation of political forces are concerned. These evolutionary changes, resulting from changes in the electoral strength of the major political parties taking part in elections, are shown (in thousands of votes and in percentages) in Diagram 1. Details in this diagram help us to remember the following facts:

1. ND, following that unrepeated 54 percent that it obtained in the first post-dictatorship elections, won the 1977 elections with 42 percent of the vote. In the next two elections it fell back to second place. It reached its lowest electoral point in the 1981 parliamentary elections when it picked up 2,035,000 votes, or 36 percent. However, it came back a bit in the 1984 Euro-elections when it obtained 2,250,000 votes, or 38 percent.
2. During the same period, PASOK showed an impressive gain. Between 1974 and 1984, the Movement succeeded in absorbing EDIK /Democratic Center Union/ entirely, in attracting the overwhelming majority of young voters (at that time some 762,000 voters were added to the electorate) and in winning over a large number of ND voters. It thus reached its highest electoral strength point in the 1981 parliamentary elections when it obtained 2,725,000 votes, or 48 percent, compared to 666,000 votes, or 13 percent, it had in 1974. It subsequently fell back to 2,456,000 votes, or 42 percent, in the Euro-elections of 1984.
3. Corresponding evolutionary changes with regard to the smaller political parties were less impressive. Their prime characteristic was the almost complete neutralization of EDIK in two stages. The Left (united in 1974 --KKE and KKE (Int.) increased its overall strength from 465,000 votes, or 9.5 percent, in 1974, to 696,000 votes, or 12.2 percent, in the 1981 parliamentary elections and to 888,000 votes, or 15 percent, in the 1984 Euro-elections. On the other hand, the extreme Right, changing its name each time, succeeded in showing appreciable electoral strength only in 1977 (350,000 votes, or 6.8 percent).

The Electoral Balance

One could now assume that the results of the 1981 parliamentary elections (PASOK 48 percent and ND 36 percent) constitute one more extreme result of the political tug-of-war that ensued from the 1974 results (ND 54 percent and EK /Center Union/-ND together with PASOK 39 percent). This conjecture means that with the 1981 parliamentary elections the course of the political balance toward the Left was completed and as the 1984 Euro-elections at least showed, the course toward the opposite direction had already begun.

Indeed, in these latter elections, PASOK lost 6.5 percentage points of those it had gained in the 1981 parliamentary elections. Of the overall 5,907,000 votes, these 6.5 percentage points represent 385,000 voters. Of these, approximately half remained in the broader area of the Left while the other half went back over to the Right.

From an overall viewpoint, however, it is of interest for one to see the scope of the opposite movement in 1984 Euro-elections in each of the major geographic divisions of the country. The relative analysis is based on numbers but for reasons of more convenient observation these figures are reproduced in Diagram 2. The following is of interest:

1. In the 1984 Euro-elections, the percentage of PASOK's electoral strength diminished in every single geographic division but the decrease was not uniform. There was a big decrease in Attiki Nome (9.1 percentage points) and in Salonica Nome (7.6 percentage points). These two nomes represent one-third of the overall electorate. Also, an exceptionally big decrease was noted in Thraki (9.6 percentage points) and a big decrease in the remainder of mainland Greece and Evvoia (6.8 percentage points), Ipeiros (6.2 percentage points), Peloponnisos (5.5 percentage points) and Thessalia (5 percentage points). On the other hand, the drop in PASOK's electoral percentage in the Greek islands, Crete and Western Makedonia was small. In the latter, however, PASOK's percentage was already low in the 1981 parliamentary elections.
2. In no geographic division is PASOK's percentage drop reflected in an equivalent rise in ND's percentage. This means that other parties, except ND, had a slice of the votes, primarily the KKE (Int.). Nevertheless, ND revealed that it was a big factor "in picking up" disillusioned PASOK members in Attiki and Salonica Nomes (around 65 percent) and, exceptionally, in Crete (86 percent) and Thraki (82 percent). In the remaining geographic divisions, this factor fluctuated at low levels, something that is due to the fact that at the same time there was a significant loss of ND members to the extreme Right. For that same reason, moreover, in certain geographic divisions (Western Makedonia, Ipeiros, Thessalia and Peloponnisos), a further drop in ND's percentage was observed in comparison with the 1981 parliamentary elections.
3. Despite its drop in the 1984 Euro-elections, PASOK held on to first place in all of Attiki Nome (however, no longer in the First Electoral District of Athens, the First Electoral District of Piraeus and in the remainder of the nome), in the remainder of mainland Greece and Evvoia, in the Aegean and Ionian Islands, in Crete, as well as in the rest of Central Makedonia, Ipeiros and Peloponnisos, with, however,

a very slight difference vis-a-vis ND. Nevertheless, it lost its dominance in Thraki, Eastern Makedonia (it did not even have it in the 1981 parliamentary elections) and in all of Salonica NOME. It should also be noted that in two regions, Crete and Thraki, ND managed in the 1984 Euro-elections to surpass the limited percentage of electoral strength it had in 1977 (when it won the elections with a national 42 percent) and to get rather close to it in the First Electoral District of Athens and in Central Makedonia.

4. Finally, it is noted that PASOK's victory over ND in the 1984 Euro-elections (41.6 percent as against 38.1 percent respectively on a national level) is due exclusively to the exceptional superiority it had and to its having succeeded in holding on in these elections to one relatively small geographic region (Second Electoral District of Athens and Piraeus and island Greece). Here, PASOK got 44.6 percent as compared to ND's 30.9 percent (corresponding percentages in the 1981 parliamentary elections: 50.8 percent as against 27.8 percent). In all of the remaining divisions, ND prevailed, with a small difference, while in two of these areas, the First Electoral District of Athens and Thraki, it succeeded in reversing the previous electoral result to its benefit.

Following the above analysis, the question that is raised is whether the movement of the political balance toward the opposite direction that was manifested in the 1984 Euro-elections will continue into the next parliamentary elections and, above all, whether it will have the intensity needed to upset the present correlation of political forces.

Undoubtedly, the answer to this question can be found only in the hands of the Greek people when they are called on to cast their vote. Nevertheless, certain evaluations can be made for a "minimum" of conditions needed so that ND may once again be in the limelight.

In a previous article (I KATHIMERINI of 13 February 1985) we had made the following observations:

1. In the next elections, the figure 42 percent may be a critical percentage because it represents half of the overall percentage (84 percent) that the two major political parties together (i.e. what they obtained in the 1981 parliamentary elections) must be expected to get, under the influence of the reinforced proportional electoral system, leaving 16 percent for all the other parties. This means that the party that surpasses 42 percent will be the number one party since the other party will get less than 42 percent.

2. On the basis of the 1984 Euro-election results and with certain conjectures over the reasonable number of voters that each of the two major parties would be expected to entice from smaller ones, it has been estimated that PASOK's predominance vis-a-vis ND is not more than 3.5 percentage points, or 207,000 votes. Consequently, a further turnabout of 104,000 votes from PASOK to ND would suffice for the latter to become the number one party with 42 percent and something, compared to 42 percent minus something for PASOK, thus winning the prize of the third apportionment. It is self-evident that these estimates do not take into consideration the possibility that there might be, directly or indirectly, a large-scale subsidization of PASOK by the two communist parties for the reason that they evidently do not want to commit suicide.

3. Finally, it has been estimated that there are at present in the Movement's ranks some 200,000 old ND followers, among those who had repudiated ND in the 1981 parliamentary elections and who still had not returned to the fold in the 1984 Euro-elections. It is conjectured that these voters constitute a potential reserve for strengthening even further ND's electoral strength in the next elections, far and beyond the prospects for attracting traditional centrists.

The "Time Capsule" of History

In the preceding analysis, the evolutionary changes in the correlation of political forces during the 1974-1984 decade were outlined, the differences in PASOK and ND election results between the 1981 parliamentary elections and the 1984 Euro-elections were noted, both on national and regional levels, and mention made on the "minimum" conditions needed for ND to become the number one party in the next elections. The general impression one gets is that in the 1981 parliamentary elections, the oscillation of the electoral balance toward the Left had been completed and that the movement toward the opposite direction had already begun. It was also noted that this opposite movement was more strongly manifested in the big urban centers and it now remains to be seen to what extent, in a second phase, the movement's strength will be manifested in provincial areas. Even though, with regard to this matter, there is experience from a series of previous elections, according to which the movement of the political balance toward the opposite direction, slow at first, acquires speed during its course and ends up with the upsetting of the previous correlation of political forces.

Therefore, all those who have a clear political memory would be able to reflect that in free and democratic countries there are no "time capsules" so that opposing political forces may remain shut up in them when the latter are gradually developing into a majority. Moreover, in truly progressive societies, the desire of the citizenry for change is constant, it does not necessarily have a predetermined direction and its implementation is not intended once and forever because in such a case it is in danger of degenerating into an established fact and of hindering progress.

And the last question is: what category of citizens causes the oscillation of the electoral balance, thus anticipating the complete destruction of the political party that is in power and opening once again the road for a new change and a continuation of economic and social progress? Assuredly, partisan vassals do not belong to this category. Those citizens who consider themselves as citizens first of all and afterwards as party members do belong. In 1981, change was not brought about by the 25 percent of the electorate that belonged to PASOK but by voters who came from other parties, even from the Right.


It is obvious that in free societies the mechanism of change operates with the vote of thinking and well-informed citizens who are the first to be suspicious of the inconsistency and deception of every political party that is in power and they do not hesitate in overthrowing it, changing the correlation of political forces on which it is based. These citizens rarely go far from the Center (from the crossroads, according to Kh. Karanikas) and they are the ones that the Gallop pollsters usually categorize as "undecided." For that reason the increase in the percentage of undecideds in a pre-electoral period constitutes, as a rule, a presage of change.

DIAGRAM 1

Evolution of Party Electoral Strength: 1974, 1977, 1981 Parliamentary Elections and 1984 Euro-Elections

(in thousands of votes)

(percentage)




Key:

1. 1981 Parliamentary elections
2. 1984 Euro-elections
3. ND
4. PASOK
5. EDIK /Democratic Center Union/
6. EA /United Left/
7. EDE /National Democratic Union/

8. EP /Unifying Faction/
9. Alliance
10. KKE
11. KKE (Int.)
12. EPEN /National Political Union/
13. KP /Progressive Party/

DIAGRAM 2

Fluctuation of PASOK's and ND's Electoral Strength Percentage
by Geographic Division. Elections of 1977, 1981
Parliamentary Elections and 1984 Euro-elections



Key:

1. 1981 Parliamentary elections
2. 1984 Euro-elections
3. PASOK
4. ND
5. All of Attiki Nome
6. First Electoral District of Athens
7. Second " " "
8. First Electoral District of Piraeus
9. Second " " "
10. Remainder of Attiki Nome
11. All of Salonica Nome
12. First Electoral District of Salonica
13. Remainder of country (except for Attiki and Salonica Nomes)
14. Thraki
15. Eastern Makedonia
16. Second Electoral District of Salonica
17. Central Makedonia (except for Salonica Nome)
18. Western Makedonia
19. Ipeiros
20. Thessalia
21. Mainland Greece and Evvoia (except for Attiki Nome)
22. Peloponnisos
23. Aegean and Ionian Islands
24. Crete
25. Overall country
26. Second Electoral District of Athens
" " " Piraeus
Ionian Islands
Aegean Islands
Crete
27. First Electoral District of Athens
Thraki
28. Remaining regions of country

5671

CSO: 3521/225

18 April 1985

POLITICAL

GREECE

SCENARIOS FOR POST-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS PASOK BEHAVIOR

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 14 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by K. Kolmer: "PASOK in Danger of Losing Elections"]

[Excerpts] The consequences of Mr Papandreou's irresponsibility may awaken mistrust among the Greek people not only toward his party, but also vis-a-vis the prime minister himself. And this is a new element he has brought to the political picture.

It is possible, however, that Mr Papandreou himself had in mind his beloved slogan "all or nothing." It is reported that, aware of the economic impasse resulting from his policies, he had stated to someone: "Even if I lose, I'll be back in 6 months!" He probably meant that the economic chaos that will succeed him will lead to self-destruction one way (a worsening situation) or the other (unpopular measures). However, the key to developments remains the election of a president by the present Chamber of Deputies.

If the chamber succeeds in electing a president in the third round, then these are the probable scenarios for Mr Papandreou to remain in power (and this seems to be the only thing that interests him):

1. The maintenance of a superficial democratic feeling and political normalcy until the October 1985 elections, in hopes that public opinion will forget the fraud against Mr Karamanlis.
2. The changing of the electoral law and the return to a simple proportional system, or--more probably--the enshrinement of the system of the two (Sunday) rounds, when the governing party hopes to garner all the leftist votes.
3. A blunting of public dissatisfaction over the summer (when the DEI [Public Power Corporation] will stop skinning people alive, tomatoes are cheap and the provinces brim with tourist exchange).
4. In the last instance, if polls don't reflect it, the "public consensus" will be mobilized through some foreign fireworks, at which time the government will ask for the "support of the people" for the "rescue of national independence," etc, etc.

Unique Opportunity

If, however, a president is not elected by the present Chamber of Deputies, and if the failure results from absolutely democratic procedures, then it is certain that Mr Papandreou risks losing the parliamentary elections.

At any rate, the ND's "list" will play a large part. Because if its leadership perceives the tremendous opportunity and constitutes a united anti-marxist front, choosing as candidates:

--not relatives and friends,

--not lawyers only, but workers, farmers, successful businessmen,

--not scarecrows and relics from a political era of the past,

then it is almost certain that elections will be won with the simple slogan
"Hands off our values!"

Because Mr Papandreou is no longer threatening our freedoms, but also our values, as he recently demonstrated with such gusto.

CSO: 3521/229

POLITICAL

GREECE

PASOK PREEMPTS BOTH KKE'S POSITIONS ON LEFT

Athens ENA in Greek 21 Mar 85 p 13

[Text] The communist parties expected electoral advantages from the initial decision by the PASOK to nominate President Karamanlis. They were criticizing from a secure position and were competing to attract the largest part of the ruling party's left wing. However, Andreas Papandreou's movement set itself against Mr Karamanlis and confirmed an old "karamanlist" saying: it proved itself to be the "left of the left," to the left's chagrin.

A little after the end of the PASOK Central Committee meeting, the slogan was heard: "The people don't forget what the right means."

A PASOK minister who was present confided at that moment to some friendly newsmen that the leader of the movement had succeeded, with his decision not to nominate Mr Karamanlis, in giving a renewed meaning to this slogan which, even he understood had lost some of its punch.

In the eyes of the left, this slogan--which symbolizes the most polarizing electoral confrontation of the last two decades--has a peculiar interpretation: when "the people don't forget what the right means," they surely forget also "what the left means."

The KKE leadership attempted at first to counter-attack, maintaining that the PASOK "was compelled to oppose a Karamanlis reelection after it understood the reaction of the KKE and of the members and cadre of the PASOK itself."

The KKE Central Committee's evaluation of the situation includes a request for the adoption of the simple proportional electoral system. However, the request is expressed with singularly weak expectations, because the bargaining power of the KKE has been reduced to a minimum. If the KKE had conditioned its support to the investigator of the Lambrakis case upon the adoption of the simple proportional system, it would have faced problems from its own grassroots. Traditional leftists may have been concerned with the news of the Karamanlis dumping, but this does not mean that the person of Mr Sartzetakis does not touch their inner feelings. Many of the KKE followers still bear the title of member of the Lambrakis Youth.

The KKE cannot negotiate for the support of the PASOK candidate. But even if it could, it would not, given the fact that if Mr Sartzetakis is not elected, new elections would immediately be proclaimed, in which both the presidency of the republic and the government would be at stake. The KKE would be disarmed both politically and ideologically in such elections, because it would stand with the PASOK through the force of circumstances, giving its support to the candidate of the governing party, while the chances of gaining votes by acting as the opposition would be reduced to a minimum.

On the other hand, the electoral law and the unprecedented polarization that would follow would be a double loss for the KKE: it would not elect party deputies and it would support the same president as the PASOK.

The KKE (Int)'s position is just as difficult from a political point of view. It was in the vanguard of the anti-Karamanlis struggle, but saw with considerable concern the PASOK adhere to its own "line." The difficulties of this small party of the left are multiplying because of size. At the cost of a lot of efforts, the KKE (Int) had succeeded in differentiating itself to a significant degree from the PASOK, attracting customers from the PASOK left wing, as was shown in the Europarlimentary elections.

Mr Papandreou's maneuver took away from the left a large part of its argumentation. The leadership of the two parties on the left is anxiously seeking a position to the left of the PASOK. But this is very difficult, since Mr Papandreou has returned to the time when it used to be called "the left of the left."

CSO: 3521/229

POLITICAL

GREECE

PRO-PASOK DAILY: 180 VOTES MAY GIVE RISE TO CRITICISM

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 17 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Giorgis Massavetas: "Common Responsibility for Institutions"]

[Excerpts] In reality, the survival of institutions is not founded on the letter of any constitutional provision. It is found, rather, in the will of the various parties to enshrine them, to protect them, to defend them, to re-inforce them.

The parties which, in 1980, did not support the candidacy of Constantine Karamanlis--the PASOK, the EDIK [Democratic Center Union], the KKE, the KODISO [Social Democratic Party], the EDA [United Democratic Left] and the KKE (Int), as well as Mr G. Mavros--had every right to "contest" his election, since they had maintained even earlier that the Chamber of Deputies could not elect a president. And they were asking for elections before the election of the president. However, they did accept the results.

The ND has not contested the right of this chamber to elect a president and has not asked for previous elections. As a result, it will be inconsistent with itself and with its attitude thus far if it contests the elections after the fact.

The only instance that would allow the ND to create a problem would be if the president is elected with only 180 votes, including the ballot of the president of the Chamber of Deputies who is now acting president. That is why the majority must see to it that the presidential election is conducted in an irreproachable manner that does not provide any element for criticism.

CSO: 3521/229

POLITICAL

GREECE

DAILY'S QUESTIONS ON SARTZETAKIS BACKGROUND UNANSWERED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 29 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] Avoiding a direct answer, the government ignored 4 timely questions posed by the newspaper I VRADYNI about the present candidate to the presidency of the republic, Mr Kh. Sartzetakis.

Specifically, the newspaper revealed that:

--Mr Sartzetakis' father-in-law, Mr K. Argyriou, a retired OTE [Greek Telecommunications Organization] technician and sometime special KYP [Central Intelligence Service] employee, was used by the PASOK to install listening devices on telephones belonging to its opponents.

According to the newspaper, Mr Argyriou had cooperated closely with Mr Tombras from 1965 on, and had been a defense witness for him in the ASPIDA trial regarding the bugging of telephones.

--In the process of being admitted to the bar in 1955 at the Court of First Instance in Salonica, he did not pass the examination together with his colleagues, but did so under the category of the "fighters against communism."

A law was in effect at that time, which provided for an exception of Law No 3026/54 regulating the obtaining of a law degree, according to which certain persons passed the examination under a provision covering those who had been "drafted and had participated in the operations against the communists." This legislation was aimed at favoring those who had fought against the communists during the 1946-1949 period. However, a view of Mr Sartzetakis' military service documents shows that he entered the army on 7 July 1951, 2 whole years after the end of the guerrilla war.

Lawyers' Reaction

--As a member of the legal branch, Mr Sartzetakis was transferred from Agrinio, where he served from 1958 to 1962, to Salonica. The same newspaper notes that a question arises from the fact that 18 lawyers from Agrinio have reacted to his nomination, sending a telegram to the prime minister, the temporary president of the Chamber of Deputies, the chairman of the ND and Mr Sartzetakis himself, in which they ask:

"The president of the republic should not be elected by illegal and anti-constitutional means, and Mr Sartzetakis should not accept the election because he cannot convince the Greek people that he possesses the guarantees of a democratic citizen worthy of the supreme office."

--As a member of the Athens Court of Appeals in 1976, Mr Sartzetakis had ruled that terrorist Ralph Pole [phonetic spelling], who was sought by German police--he had been arrested in Greece on the request of INTERPOL--could not be extradited to Germany because the crimes of the terrorist group to which he belonged were of a political nature. As is known, this erroneous opinion was reversed by the Areios Pagos [Supreme Court] and Pole was turned over to the German authorities.

Government's Reply

The government spokesman made the following statement in regard to the article published in I VRADYNI:

"I consider this article totally unacceptable. Mr Sartzetakis needs no credentials. He possesses these from his scientific and legal career and from his import vis-a-vis the people for his courageous and impartial actions."

CSO: 3521/228

POLITICAL

GREECE

PAPANDREOU'S LIFELONG PSYCHOLOGICAL MAKE-UP QUESTIONED

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 15-21 Mar 85 p 23

[Article by Gerasimos K. Apostolatos: "The Comrades' Fate"]

[Excerpts] Andreas Papandreou's last week's acrobatics will go down in the annals of politics as a unique example of amorality and malevolent impulsiveness.

A lot of ink will be used by political observers to explain the psychological make-up of the PASOK chairman.

Of a man whose inner feelings seal his childhood: his malevolence toward his father and his first political adventure, the abandonment of his comrades --the Trotskyite group--to the tender mercies of the minister of public order in the 4 August dictatorship.

He isolated himself from all these hard experiences of his youth for a full 20-year period in the huge emptiness of the North American country. Like thousands of other travelers of yesteryear, he takes refuge where the old Andreas can be forgotten, cutting off any link with the past and with the colleagues who were left behind to continue the struggle for the ideology in which they believed.

Indifferent and untroubled by what he left behind for all these years, he is assimilated into a new country which receives him in its liberal environment, to become a university professor and a contributor to American science.

He does not present himself during this period as a simple philhellene --as did millions of Americans with demonstrations in favor of our country, with requests for funds, with conferences, with visits to hard-hit areas, with local demonstrations.

No one ever remembers Andreas in a simple gathering of compatriots during these two decades.

But lo and behold, his childhood years are resurrected: he returned to Greece in order to satisfy his persistent malevolence toward his father's personality. At the same time, he brings back with him a passionate hatred

against the country that welcomed him, gave him a new national identity and honored him.

Thus, he was transformed into a daily concern for his father, the prime minister. The great troublemaker for the government of the center. The country's adventures start from his first appearance in the political arena.

He is the cause for the breakdown of the government coalition. His own father accuses him of being the person mainly responsible for the events that led to the 21 April 1967 coup d'etat.

He repeats the 1939 escape and leaves behind his colleagues in the dictators' jails and places of exile. His adopted country, which he had, meanwhile, renounced and hated--again takes him in.

In 1975, with a "people's tribunal" kind of decision, he expels from the party the most noted resistance fighters and denies them political activity.

He simultaneously puts himself at the head of international anti-americanism. His blind, unexplained hatred toward his adopted country leads him to the incomprehensible justification of the downing of the KAL jet and of the murder of hundreds of innocent people.

The youthful psychological complex against the father figure is revived vis-a-vis another benefactor and protector, the person who brought him back to Greece and who makes him an advisor to the Bank of Greece with a fat salary.

His old malevolence against his father is transferred to his protector. On 9 March 1985, it expresses itself through an explosion of amorality and ingratitude.

But at the same time, Andreas makes his own government comrades, his party's officials and the pro-government press look ridiculous.

Of whom should the PASOK leader think first? Of the comrades of his youth in the first Trotskyite group? Of his close collaborators during the 20-year period in U.S. universities? Of his anti-dictatorial friends?

In the regime of the Third Reich, there was a "Night of the Long Knives".

In Andreas' life, there are many nights of the long knives for his comrades, his collaborators, his protectors and his colleagues. The case should be of interest to the international bibliography on psychiatry and psychology.

CSO: 3521/227-P

POLITICAL

GREECE

COMMENTS ON PROPOSAL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

Athens ENA in Greek 21 Mar 85 p 14

[Article by Giorgis Massavetas from the "Why, Please?" column]

[Text] [Why, please] Dear unknown gentleman, who counseled the prime minister on the revision of Article 110 of the constitution, did you lure the head of the government the PASOK central committee and the entire parliamentary group--which approved the request for revision--to such an improvised initiative?

Our political leadership thus shows that it first decides on, and brings to the Chamber of Deputies such a weighty proposal, and only later consults the constitutional experts. Only to end up withdrawing the proposal. Naturally, this is not designed to benefit the import of the government's decisions, because it presents them to the public as not-well-thought-out initiatives. Just in the sector to which the utmost attention must be devoted.

Whichever simple citizen wishes to change a contract---or enter into a new one---first hastens to consult the legal experts. And he does not use criminal experts for civil questions and labor lawyers for inheritance issues. And here we are faced with a government which could have called upon an army of constitutional experts for advice before making a decision, and instead appears to have proceeded without previous study.

This government is now being criticized by both friends and enemies. It is obvious that at some leve, the capabilities---if not the competence as well---of an otherwise dedicated collaborator were significantly overestimated.

CSO: 3521/228

POLITICAL

GREECE

KARAMANLIS URGED TO ENTER FRAY ON ND SIDE

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 15-21 Mar 85 pp 50-51

[Article by Dim. S. Athanasopoulos: "Even at the Last Minute"]

[Excerpts] Present events provide a profusion of stimuli. Everything must now be set aside and we must concentrate on one issue alone: what we can do to save whatever democracy we still have and to create the proper conditions for its genuine development. In other words, what can be done to save the country and to open, even at the very last minute, a new path.

No matter what happens, we shall soon proceed to elections where everything will be ventured under conditions that may still change, as, for example, with a modification of the electoral law under pressure from the left.

The ND must win these elections. And it will win if, even at the very last minute, it adopts three equally indispensable preconditions. No one would object to the first one; the other two are much more difficult.

1. Today more than ever, the ND must demand full and genuine guarantees for impartial elections. If these guarantees are not forthcoming, the solution will be to abstain and to denounce the elections internationally. Mr Papandreou has ways to withhold these guarantees, but Mr Mitsotakis, too, has ways to impose them. The more adroit of the two will win and the struggle will be hard, because the weapon of abstention is not easy.

2. A second precondition is airtight unification in the ND and its conversion, even at the very last minute. So far, we were speaking of a renewal of the ND, but today we must speak of a conversion. What does this mean? This means that the ND must present itself as the bearer of the spirit of July 1974, that is, of a deep change in public life. I have explained its meaning many times. When the PASOK appropriates the expectations for a new society and when its fraudulent words still work magic, who is naive enough to believe that the struggle will be won with old-fashioned men, remedies and pseudo-visions? Henceforth, the only way to surely and decisively defeat the PASOK is a new regenerative attack coming from deep down, which will be passionately expressed and will convince the Greek people what the ND will implement in 1985 what it did not dare, what it did not even think of, in 1974. We need virtue and daring. Political tricks can no longer be used.

3. A third precondition is for Mr Karamanlis to take an energetic stance in favor of the ND. It is not difficult for me to know what his feelings are at the moment, to understand his sorrow and his disillusionment. But if he happens to read these pages, I ask him to believe that I am writing them in agony, which, I am sure, he shares with me. I have no reason and no desire to cause him bitterness. But I am, like any writer, like any thinking man and like any citizen, a small voice and I believe it is my duty to make it heard. If I sadden him, I ask to be forgiven.

What, then, should Mr Karamanlis do? No one asks him--and no one should ask him--to put himself at the head of the struggle. But he will commit the biggest mistake of his life if he withdraws and remains silent, or if he attempts to support the ND anew from an unseen position so as to organize the post-Karamanlis era and to propel his own men to the fore. Such timid, behind-the-scene actions will again bring the worst results. Mr Karamanlis, honored by the people as no other modern Greek, still has an outstanding debt vis-a-vis the country and vis-a-vis himself. He must explain to the Greek people as soon as possible what he did as president of the Republic to blunt the PASOK's governmental policies, and he must make special mention of the dangers inherent in such policies for our country. He must support the ND in the next elections, and he must give Mr Mitsotakis his help for its renewal. Not with a dry statement, but with warm speeches on television, which will show that he interposes himself between the country and the storm, and which will be all the more believable to the Greeks as it is obvious that he himself does not derive a personal gain from it.

Having lived his own legend, Mr Karamanlis must understand that it is his personal duty to agree to sacrifices and disinterest. Of course, it is his right to refuse. But then, he should not be surprised by the judgment of the people and of history. He can surely write his name in history. Just as surely, the adjective that will follow it is in his own hands.

It is said that Mr Karamanlis is well known for his sang-froid and his pride in making the right judgments. Let him recall the kind of climate that succeeded his two terms as prime minister and his one as president. And then, let him ponder: how will he end up his political life, which will be the image he will leave behind?

Nothing else! Even at the very last minute...

CSO: 3521/227-P

POLITICAL

GREECE

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS SEEN INFLUENCING FOREIGN POLICY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 24-25 Mar 85 pp 1, 15

[Article by Rikhardos Someritis: "Russia Considers Greece Lever for International Destabilization"]

[Excerpts] Paris--While Greece is plunging into a multidimensional and dangerous political and institutional crisis, the international surroundings--which directly but decisively influence internal developments--should be paid some attention by everyone. A difficult but general American-Soviet dialogue has been going on for many months on many levels. If the new Soviet leadership does not choose again the avenue of a cold war, this dialogue will sooner or later--with or without Europe's participation and control--lead to a new equilibrium on the main "fronts": European security, the Middle East and--possibly--Africa, Latin America and Central Asia.

No matter what conciliatory solutions are found by diplomats for a new coexistence, no one is envisioning--especially in Europe--any serious developments that could put in doubt the "faits accomplis" of Yalta. Many are those who believe that the Soviet interest in Greece has one sole purpose: to remind the other side that a departure from the 1944-1945 agreements endangers not "only" Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, but also the stability of the Atlantic alliance itself in its very important south-eastern flank. And, perhaps, even its center: Germany.

This simple observation, which no one doubts, means that the foreign experimentation conducted by the PASOK diplomacy could--if it gets out of hand--lead to an explosive situation whether or not there is an agreement between the Soviets and the Americans. Already today the attention with which foreigners are following internal Greek developments and facing the consequences of the new--at least parliamentary--alliance of Mr Papandreou with the "most pro-Soviet Communist part in the free world" should have awakened Greek interest.

There are indications that it has indeed. Mr Florakis may not be aware of it, but there have been insistent Greek messages to all the Western capitals which provide profuse explanations about PASOK's intentions, as well as its assurances that there are no plans to change the basic orientation of Greek foreign policy or to include KKE officials in a future government.

Now, the degree to which these assurances are convincing and the extent to which they correspond to a realistic appraisal of national independence, is another problem.

Critical Decisions

Together with eventual developments in the relations of the superpowers, the next three months will be decisive for Europe, its internal organization and its position in the world, as well as its intervention in "common" issues. This next period will witness the adoption or rejection of the "Ten" for the "European Union", that is, the decisive step toward the political unification of Western Europe hoped for by so many and looked upon with mistrust by others.

France, West Germany, and Italy, as well as many other countries, seem ready to proceed. It seems they are ready to adopt conciliatory positions, due to the common perception that the "European Union" must go forward whether some among the "Ten" are hesitant or are reluctant to do so.

For the time being (?) Greece is among those who reject the indispensable terms for essential unification. That is, the limitation to a minimum of the right of veto and the prospect of a common foreign policy that would include issues of European security.

Europe's Role

This means that, without an essential internal dialogue, Greece may soon be a member of the EEC, but not of Europe. It may participate in an organism that, if the "European Union" proceeds to the level of "Six" or "Seven" and not of "Ten", will lose its essential political meaning.

It is not clear whether the handling of these problems, as well as the purely internal political developments, take into account these international dimensions. It would not even be excessive to say that the inherent dangers seem to exercise an uncontrollable attraction on a large part of the present "progressive" political leadership.

CSO: 3521/224-P

ICELAND

POLITICAL

POLLS INDICATE GAINS BY PROGRESSIVE PARTY

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 3 Apr 85 p 35

[Text] The Progressive Party appears to have gained support during recent weeks, according to results from polls conducted by [the newspapers] NT and DV last weekend. The growth in support for the Social Democratic Party has halted at around 20 percent, according to the newspapers. For the remaining parties the two polls came up with results on gains or losses which were inconsistent.

According to poll results from NT, the Progressive Party had a support of 18.5 percent, with a gain of 3.5 percent over February's figure, the Social Democrats received 22.5 percent (-1 percent), Independence Party 34 percent (+1 percent), People's Alliance 13 percent (-1.5 percent), Leftist Socialist Alliance 4.5 percent (-1 percent) and the Women's List 7.5 percent (+1 percent).

In the figures given by DV, the Progressives now have 16.2 percent, which is an increase of 3 percent from the January poll conducted by the newspaper. The Social Democrats have 19.9 percent (0.2 percent), Independence Party 36.1 percent (-1.2 percent), People's Alliance 15.1 percent (+1.6 percent), the Leftist Socialist Alliance has 5.6 percent (-0.4 percent) and the Women's List 6.7 percent (-3.3 percent).

CSO: 3626/28

POLITICAL

ICELAND

PAPER ANALYZES POLL RESULTS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Mar 85 p 28

[Editorial: "Party Support and Government"]

[Text] MORGUNBLADID readers have now seen two installments from the recently completed Hagvangur opinion poll, indicating the relative popularity of the political parties on the one hand, and of the government on the other hand.

It is apparent from this opinion poll that there are big changes occurring within the electorate, especially just left of the middle sector, where the Social Democrats are experiencing rightist mutinies within their ranks. This, of course, continues to hack away at the Independence Party's following, compared to earlier polls; however, Independence Party support is still greater than it was at election time in 1983. The figures which this poll shows are not proofs of the assertion that the Independence Party is faring badly; experience, however, does show that the party tends not to receive the full portion of votes in the elections that is allotted to it in the opinion polls. The case is otherwise, however, with the ruling party, the Progressive Party. According to the poll, it has become the second smallest party, attracting a following that is smaller by half than at election time in 1983. These figures cannot be interpreted in any other way than as a serious setback for the prime minister's party.

The small following of the People's Alliance, which claims to be the most powerful government opposition party, shows that the party has not acquired the charisma to unfailingly attract those groups that are characterized by utmost unreasonableness. At about the time that the opinion poll was being taken, the news was going around that the District Members were taking over new centers of power inside the People's Alliance.

The Progressive Party, the People's Alliance and the Union of Socialists are the three parties to show a smaller following today than they did at election time in 1983, according to the opinion poll. The Social Democrats have fared the best since that time. Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson must be mighty happy about that, to see how quickly and enthusiastically the voters have reacted to his call for support. The Social Democrats have worked hard to support his positions; on the other hand, the Women's List has shown even

higher rates of success. This is why it is so amazing, when you look at the figures and see how very popular the Women's List has become. They are now the third largest party according to the opinion poll. In the light of the factors that have brought the Women's List into the public eye, such as their reactionary behavior on the radio issue, it does seem that the party has succeeded in appealing particularly to those who would like to see government paternalism at a maximum.

The poll showed that a majority of the people supported the government. Considering the popularity of the Women's List, it is worth noting that the government was marginally more popular among men than among women. It should not be too surprising that the government is less popular in Reykjavik than it is in the rest of the country. It is in the capital where the main force of civil servants live who feel that the government has been unfair to them.

These figures will hardly result in any direct changes on the political scene. They demonstrate, on the other hand, that more people ought to get on the ball besides the Social Democrats--particularly the Progressives and the People's Alliance. The smartest thing would be to take careful note of what is happening in the Progressive Party, which has hardly suffered through a worse period than the one that it is in now.

9584

CSO: 3626/25

POLITICAL

ICELAND

HANNIBALSSON ROCKS NORDIC CONFERENCE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Mar 85 p 28

[Editorial: "Hannibalsson and the Nordic Social Democrats"]

[Text] Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson's behavior at the Nordic Council has attracted a lot of attention. It is a very rare thing to witness, to see an international brotherhood of high-level socialists disagree as they have in this case. The attention of people abroad has been directed at Hannibalsson, since they have not at all been accustomed to see high-level socialists make statements other than those which would be appropriate in supporting their colleagues, the top socialists in other countries.

It was not what Hannibalsson said about the proposed nuclear-free-zone, or other Swedish arms sales, or about Finland's location at the borders of the Soviet Union, or about the importance of NATO for the Danes, Icelanders and Norwegians, that was the cause of the uproar among Nordic newspaper reporters last Wednesday. What was worth reporting about was that the solidarity among Nordic socialists might be cracking. Could it be that Hannibalsson will succeed in waking people up outside of Iceland's borders to the realization that Nordic high-level socialists change their opinions, depending on power positions, every time?

Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson has promised the Finns that he will never use the word "Finlandization" again. What words he prefers to choose in his editing of his own speeches will become apparent in the future. It should be repeated that the Finns have had the last word in understanding what it is to have insults thrown at them by Icelanders.

9584

CSO: 3626/25

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

IKV'S VAN PUTTEN GIVES VIEWS ON WAR, MISSILES

Interview of Van Putten

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 8 Feb 85 pp 12-16

[Interview with IKV [Interchurch Peace Council] Chairman Jan van Putten by Frenk van der Linden: "Don't Reproach Us That We in the IKV Do Not Have a Solution Either"]

[Text] "The position of the ICTO [Interchurch Committee for Bilateral Disarmament] implies the willingness to send millions of innocent people to kingdom come, if need be. I cannot call that humane." Chairman-to-be Jan van Putten is considerably less outspoken about the new ideas of the IKV. A political scientist who thinks that "off-handedly applying majority rule" does not make for democracy: "It is not yet clear to me how to solve this problem. Sorry."

Depends on how you look at it.

Yes and no.

Don't know.

And... you should never ever rule out anything.

Doesn't Jan van Putten want to show his cards, or doesn't he have any (yet)? At the risk of the interviewer being taken for a puppet of NATO, someone who trips up the peace movement, or the type that will start drooling over the cruise missile, here is the report of a sobering interview with the new IKV chairman.

[Question] The peace movement is on the defensive.

[Answer] "Our political successes are very meager, I'll admit that. Certainly internationally. But people who claim that the peace movement is in an impasse are talking one another into believing it. In the past few years, we have focused strongly on the struggle against the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands. That struggle was neither won nor lost; that

struggle is continuing. Personally, I believe that those weapons will not be stationed here. Regardless of how it ends, an enormous process of raising people's consciousness level has at any rate been started."

[Question] If you want to keep the peace movement from collapsing entirely if "those bastards" are stationed here later after all, then a "real political program" ([IKV Secretary] Faber) will have to be devised.

[Answer] "Well yes, you should attempt to go further than thinking about weapons. You should not be obsessed with that. You should wonder: what is its background, what are its origins, and how can you get rid of them? Well, its origins stem from the fact that there are two blocs opposing one another. So, you should make attempts to break through that bloc system--for which you need a well thought-out policy to relax strained relations."

[Question] Then why has no work been done in all those years on a properly constructed alternative policy? People have switched continually from one hot air balloon to another. The well-known political scientist Jan van Putten wrote about this in TROUW: "A movement which one year hits the road with the slogan 'Get rid of nuclear arms, starting with the Netherlands,' should not try to link up with the American 'freeze' movement the following year, and the year after that be willing to consider temporary deployment of cruise missiles on Dutch territory. This impairs credibility, especially among the masses which they have succeeded in mobilizing." [NRC HANDELSBLAD columnist] Heldring speaks of "strategies as disposables."

[Answer] "That switching has been a matter of ... yes, um, I do not want to use the term growing pains, but policy development is something one does have to learn. Along with ideas about cruise missiles, other things have been brought up for discussion as well, but those did not carry as much weight. Now we want to develop a real concept. Well, that is somewhat more difficult than protesting against something. We should think that through together very thoroughly."

Europe Occupied

What direction that pondering is taking has meanwhile already become clear. Mient Jan Faber points to the "occupation" of Europe as the root of the problem. Western Europe is occupied by the friendly Americans, Eastern Europe by the Soviets. In order to put an end to that situation, detente politics should be pursued, reacting to the cultural link between the peoples involved. Next to that, a finger should be raised continuously against the arms race. The IKV calls improving relations with the East Bloc "a wrench thrown into the arms race." At the end of last year, Fred van der Spek (PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party]) assessed in DE TIJD the train of thought as follows: "These goings-on with all those little plans create an extremely impulsive and opportunistic impression. Like: I have to do something, oh well, here goes nothing, as long as it is new."

[Question] A wonderful notion, then. But how do you realize that? With what means?

[Answer] "In the first place, you have to facilitate the exchange of people in all kinds of fields." With uncertainty: "And in the second place, maybe something can be done with trade relations.... But I cannot supervise that. I'm not enough of an expert."

[Question] Are you alluding to abandoning economic boycott measures by the West? Sanctions: do not use them?

[Answer] "Well ... we should not do that, no. There are those who think that it is helping. I wonder. In Eastern Europe, human rights are being trampled on in many respects, but whether you put an end to that with such means... I don't know."

[Question] So you think that economic sanctions do not bring respect for human rights and detente any nearer. You can say the same of what Western peace movements are doing: the encouraging of dissidents, of Charta [in Czechoslovakia] and of Solidarity [in Poland]. That is making the Russians furious, that is working to increase tension.

[Answer] "Could be. I am still getting my bearings on that. If one puts the priority on the security problem, one runs the risk of neglecting the aspect of human rights. And if one puts human rights in a primary position, one runs the risk of being destabilizing, through which international tension increases. It is not yet clear to me how to solve this problem. Sorry."

[Question] Another little practical problem: does this new Europe also imply a reunited Germany?

Van Putten thinks this question is unnecessary. "That is not in order, I think. Yes, with the Silesians it is. But I do not know at all whether this problem will arise in this new Europe."

[Question] Germany can remain divided?

[Answer] "Yes and no. Germany can remain divided, but that depends on what you are thinking of when you talk about this 'one' Europe."

[Question] And what are you thinking of when you talk about that?

[Answer] "I think that that is something about which one can hardly form an idea. There have been scores of people who have concerned themselves with that, plans have been made 20, 30 years ago, and, well...."

[Question] If the peace movement declares itself to be in favor of it, one would expect that it has answers to a number of essential questions about that, that it will bring in problem-solving elements.

[Answer] "A solution is not a solution until it is being supported in a broad sense," the political scientist philosophizes. "And who in the world has such a solution? Nobody. So do not reproach us that we do not have it either, allow us time. First, there should come an improvement in the

climate, that much is clear. Right now, even elementary agreements such as 'neither of the two blocs will be the first to use nuclear weapons' cannot be arrived at."

[Question] By the way: that Europe from which the occupying forces have disappeared, should that be a Europe with or without a nuclear force of its own?

Again that sober: "Don't know."

[Question] You still have to think about that as well?

[Answer] "Yes."

[Question] Nico Schouten, secretary of [action group] "Stop The N-[Neutron] Bomb," sees nothing in the talk about Europe, Europe: "We will not get one step ahead in the peace movement with Europeanism." Faber let it slip out: "All those people who were behind us, now of course are already involved again with the Eleven City Skating Race"[long-distance skating race on natural ice, held this year for the first time since 1963]. Do you think that it is possible to maintain the large size of the peace movement with that European notion?

[Answer] "Experience teaches that that is difficult. When something spectacular happens--such as a demonstration in The Hague--everybody is interested. But that's momentary. As soon as the political follow-up comes up for discussion, it is difficult to keep interest alive among people--even though they can still be mobilized. I notice that with myself as well, it is a universal human phenomenon."

Incorrect Version

Van Putten says he doubts whether this cabinet is democratically minded. "I will mention a couple of examples." (Starts to leaf through a folder)

[Question] I think that the examples are simple: nuclear energy, ignoring the result of the Broad Social Discussion [on nuclear energy]...

[Answer] "No, wait a second.... Oh well, it's not in here. I will try to do it off the top of my head. In the Queen's Speech [opening parliament], an incorrect version of affairs has been given. Shortly afterwards, TROUW disclosed that while many people had to accept salary decreases, the salaries for cabinet ministers went up. One can of course look at parliamentary democracy in a very narrow formal way: if parliament thinks something is all right, then it is in fact all right, but I go further than that. Parliamentary democracy also implies that you are honest, that you mind decency, ethics, and that you measure by one standard. The government is not doing that.

Furthermore, there was indeed that brushing off of the BMD [Broad Social Discussion]. And the fact that [Minister of Economic Affairs] Van Aardenne remained in office after having deceived parliament, according to the

committee of inquiry [into the bankruptcy of shipbuilding company RSV]. Then I say: what kind of loyalty to parliamentary democracy can one expect from the population, when these phenomena occur within such a short period of time? If one thinks that the population should respect the decision-making process within the cabinet and parliament, and if one wants to raise a warning finger against expressions of civil disobedience, then one should start as government and ruling parties by providing a good example. Off-handedly applying majority rule, that is not democracy. If one is really steeped in the spirit of democracy, one sometimes will act differently."

Four years ago, Van Putten devoted a provocative essay to this in NRC HANDELSBLAD. At that time, he wrote: "The question arises whether in the issue of nuclear energy, in which the majority and the minority are so sharply opposed, the majority decision is still the correct one, also from a democratic point of view, and whether in this case the majority should not give way to the minority. I personally am inclined to answer that question in the affirmative."

"I still think that way about it," he lets it be known. "If a nuclear power plant is put somewhere, you can avoid it only by moving. If it appears that a large number of people are against nuclear energy on the basis of deeply rooted objections, then one should avoid the construction of that kind of power plant, if at all possible. Certainly if there is a large part of the population which, in contrast to these impassioned opponents, is uninterested in the way in which the Netherlands is supplied with energy. And this is certainly true if there are acceptable alternatives."

Shocking Discovery

[Question] In the nuclear arms issue, you do not condemn civil disobedience either.

[Answer] "Well, now... that article was about nuclear energy, you know."

[Question] And what about this quotation? "As for me personally, the students to whom I teach political science sooner or later arrive at the shocking discovery that democratic decisionmaking has also led to, or at least has not prevented, the fact that the so-called free part of the world is also cluttered with lethal nuclear arms.... And then ... condemn civil disobedience? Many cannot do that anymore. Nor can I." You thus excused breaking the law.

[Answer] "Okay, that may be true. I find it hard to make a concrete statement about that now, I am still working on that. Look, when I wrote that I was in a different position from the one I am in now."

[Question] Because you are now IKV chairman, you have a different opinion?

[Answer] "I do not want to say that."

[Question] That's what it looks like.

[Answer] "As chairman of the IKV, I cannot go out on my own and make peremptory statements about such an important subject. The position of the IKV up to now is that one can not simultaneously be working along parliamentary lines and along illegal ones."

But if others do that, Van Putten will not disapprove, it appeared at an earlier moment in the conversation: "What you are seeing at the moment is that all kinds of people and groups of people are tending towards civil disobedience. I think that one should be active within the outline of parliamentary democracy for as long as possible, but in that case the cabinet should not make it unnecessarily hard for you to do so. And I am afraid that that is the case."

[Question] Radical parts of the peace movement are now united in BONK [Civil Disobedience and Non-cooperation]. BONK wants to "sabotage the clockwork of armaments to the bitter end." At a meeting last week--where IKV members were present as well--a proposal was made to occupy the parliament building. Road blocks, blockades of harbors and refusal to pay taxes came up for discussion as well. Somebody from BONK appeared to be willing to blow up NATO installations.

[Answer] "Ah... I do not think that I should pronounce a judgement in an approving or a disapproving sense about the forms of action of others. I... do not know whether I should do that."

[Question] It is precisely the silence of the IKV and the "Committee Cruise Missiles No" that is the reason for "setting up a campaign of action which really expresses resistance." The leadership of the peace movement is growing towards politics, supporters on the grass-roots level are growing away from it. The seeds of disruption?

[Answer] "Don't know, don't know."

Socialism: A Casual Slogan

Another subject, then?

The chairman is confident of a favorable effect from the popular petition, which will take place in the fall. "It will bring the issue back to the attention of a great many people and will have a radiating effect on the elections at the beginning of 1986." But he does remain cautious: "When the large demonstrations were being held, there were people who said: 'The Netherlands is not being governed in the streets.' Also, if the petition is before long a success, there will be people who say that. I think that if I had a seat in the Second Chamber or in the government, I would be inclined to say the same thing."

About relations with "The Hague" he says: "There are indeed people who claim that the peace movement should orient itself towards socialism, that is where there is hope for us. Well, there is not much to socialism as such."

It is a casual slogan. What is socialism anyway? Something like a just society in which people share fairly with one another. A very nice starting point, but on the issue of armament that does not say a thing. What does history teach us? That social democracy initially was opposed to armament, but that that changed later on.

I also think it is stupid as a peace movement to identify with socialism, because in so doing you alienate a lot of people whom you need very much.

As to the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal], it is divided and paralyzed over the issue of nuclear arms. Some have given up in disgust and have opted for a position as mayor. That is the beginning of dropping out. There are others in that party who say, if they are giving up the struggle, why should I continue? Too bad, because if there is one single party which can cause a turnabout in the pace and security policy, then it is the CDA."

[Question] So what is the conclusion from all this? That there should be a willingness to compromise on the part of the peace movement, as Faber appeared to be saying a couple of months ago? ("Everything is black, that attitude will no longer go. That provides us ultimately with nothing but a clear conscience, but no change in the political arena.")

Not that either: "Out of principle, I say no to the cruise missiles. And that should continue to be explained to the parties. One might say that 16 [cruise missiles] is less bad than 48 [the planned number], but that is not the way I see it. For me, 16 is just as bad as 48."

[Question] I will quote yet again the great helmsman Mient Jan [Faber]: "Political processes, especially in a society such as ours, always end in a compromise." He has accused the PvdA [Labor Party] of dogmatism: "A sterile no-vote will not work.... That is not pursuing politics. We should not be guilty of that type of laziness." The fact that Faber is teaching the PvdA its ABCs is peculiar, for that matter, because it is in fact the IKV that has continually been asking the PvdA to flatly say no to the cruise missiles. [Party] board member Bart Tromp said to me about this: "What it amounts to is: idiots, you should never have listened to me."

[Answer] "Um... I also wonder whether Faber would now still be saying the same thing to the PvdA. 'No' is the line of the IKV. I do not think that a party which says no can be reproached for anything by the IKV. And thus I am not going to do that."

[Question] Are you, just like he is, prepared to accept "for a while a couple of" missiles in the Netherlands, provided that it is an intermediate step in a policy with as its ultimate goal the removal of all nuclear arms from Europe?

[Answer] "Don't know. I will not make statements about that. There is a well-known slogan in The Hague: nothing is as permanent as the temporary."

"Moralizing" is what Van Putten thinks of himself when we are talking about the ICTO. In a comparison with this conservative peace movement he called the IKV "the most humane aspect." He explains: "It sounds a bit pretentious, but I do mean it. This is bound up with my view of the gospel, especially of Jesus Christ. He said of those who killed him, 'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they are doing.' And when he was in prison he forbade Peter to use the sword. Well, the IKV is not that far along yet, the IKV does not advocate total unilateral disarmament and non-violence.

But what is the ICTO doing? It is advocating bilateral disarmament, which has so far only resulted in more arms. Moreover, the ICTO position implies the willingness to send millions of innocent people to kingdom come, if need be. People are in the habit of speaking with abhorrence about the systematic way in which the Nazis killed Jews. But for some, including the ICTO, it appears to be more or less self-evident that we in the free West not only possess nuclear arms, but that we will possibly use them too--which will lead to even worse things than the murder of the Jews. And that I cannot call humane.

There is a very different mentality behind what the IKV wants. We do not want to sit like a miser on the treasures of the West, while invoking Christian and humanistic values and freedoms and so on, and put nuclear arms around it for protection."

Take Risks

[Question] The IKV is not opposed to conventional weapons. With those one can also kill millions of people these days. What is the difference?

[Answer] "It is a question of mentality. The ICTO is guilty of thinking in black and white, and an improper use of Christian values. We are more strongly prepared to talk with what is defined as the adversary. We also dare to take some risk: a unilateral step. After all, no Russian submarines have as yet been sighted in the IJsselmeer."

[Question] But now suppose that the Soviet Union simply continues expanding its arsenal of intermediate-range missiles. In the direction of 400, 500 SS-20s, say. Shouldn't the West then come up with a similar response?

It is the classical question, the question that is the foundation of the NATO dual decision [to station cruise missiles, and simultaneously negotiate] and of the present position of the Dutch government, and Jan van Putten gives a revealing answer to it: "Don't know. I am no armament specialist or strategist. As to um... I still have to get acquainted."

Political, Background, Views

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 8 Feb 85 p 14

[Article: "The Opinions of a Respected Political Scientist"]

[Text] "When you have been active in a Christian party for years, and your thinking and acting has been completely governed by an expressly avowed

Christian point of view, then it takes quite a bit to make the step towards the PvdA. After I was among the 'regretting voters' in the ARP [Antirevolutionary Party, one of the constituent parties of the CDA] in 1967, I resigned my membership in that party in 1971. It then took another 6 years before I could make myself a member of the PvdA. The way in which [CDA leader] Van Agt and his friends did in the Den Uyl cabinet shortly before the 1977 elections clinched the matter." (From one of his articles in TROUW, 3 February 1984).

Dr J. van Putten (49 years old), communicant member of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, and professor in political science at the Free University in Amsterdam, will one of these days succeed Dr Ben ter Veer as chairman of the Interchurch Peace Council [IKV]. (In order to prevent confusion: Mient Jan Faber is the secretary of the IKV.)

For years, he was a journalist: from 1960 until 1963 with DE ROTTERDAMMER, and after that until 1969 with the HAAGSCHE COURANT. Parliamentary editor Van Putten--who later on as a scientist was to publish in the daily DE TIJD--received the Prize for Daily Newspaper Journalism in 1965.

He could not get away from his studies in the social sciences. After graduating in 1969 with the thesis "So Many Churches, So Many Opinions" (still, and apparently perennially, topical), Van Putten started his scientific career. As a profile, here are some opinions that he has expressed over the years.

1971: Because of the large number of political parties, and the fact that only a few of them are forming the government, many citizens are far removed from the policy being pursued. An electoral threshold should be introduced, or a two-bloc, or better yet a two-party system should come about. Van Putten now: "I am no longer in favor of that electoral threshold. The opinions of the small parties on the Left and the Right should continue to make it through into parliament." And: "Because of the shifting to the right of the CDA we now tend towards a two-bloc system. A drawback now appears to be that the government parties completely back the cabinet, breaking through the dualism of parliament in so doing, and killing discussion in the Second Chamber."

1975: In order to increase popular influence on policy, and in order to decrease the pressure of the work with which the Second Chamber is burdened, there should be 15 democratically chosen "partial parliaments," in which representatives of action groups and interest groups can also sit. The partial parliaments will each concern themselves with a different area of policy and have a large amount of authority. The Second Chamber limits itself to the main lines of policy, the First Chamber is abolished. Van Putten: "When I see how decision-making in The Hague is occurring, I wonder whether it was such a bad idea."

1982: Abolition of the employer. Employee self-management. The workers should make the decision between investments and the size of wages themselves.

Because they have the responsibility for the company as a going concern, they will not continually give priority to their own pay check. Moreover, they will not readily fire one another.

Van Putten: "The labor unions are keeping the workers dumb: if the labor movement has a choice between more influence on the structural course of affairs inside a company and direct benefits for the wallets of its members, it usually opts--and this is tragic--for the wallet. If this had not been the course of things, not only responsibilities would have been distributed differently, but also the pain of unemployment."

Two years ago he regarded the increased costs in wages as one of the most important reasons for the crisis. Does he still look at it that way? "Don't know. That was the current opinion 2 years ago, wasn't it? I did not think it sounded implausible, you know."

Jan van Putten is regarded as a respected political scientist.

12568

CSO: 3614/67

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

ACTIVITIES OF ANTI-BOUTERSE SURINAMESE EXILES

Rotterdam HET VRIJE VOLK in Dutch 23 Feb 85 p 9

[Report of interview with Surinamese Resistance Leader Paul Somohardjo by William Kloppert: "Surinamese Resistance Spread to Rotterdam Cloister"; in Rotterdam; date of interview not given]

[Text] In the "Makmur" building at the Lange Hilleweg in Rotterdam, the headquarters of the "farmers' resistance" against the Bouterse regime led by the Javanese-Surinamese politician Paul Somohardjo, a lot of shuffleboard is being played.

Refugee couriers, guides, deserters and (primarily) Javanese and Hindustanis who helped members of Somohardjo's resistance movement hide--until they had to flee themselves--try to kill time with this ancient Dutch game, waiting for the "liberation," their return. Next Monday Bouterse will have been in power for 5 years.

Two old living room sets, the shuffleboard, a television set, a ping-pong table and a billiard table fill the recreation room, at one time the refectory of the St. Franciscus convent. The photograph of the royal family on the wall really doesn't make the place more pleasant. "Makmur" resembles in everything the atmosphere of a half-way house for refugees.

That is also the case on the upper floor, in the fifty small rooms where nuns used to live and where now the refugees have been housed--for the time being six families and about 40 single people. Destitute, they fled via neighboring French Guiana to Rotterdam; the Dutch cold keeps them in bed for long periods of time.

On the day of our visit to "Makmur"--the eve of the "Reflection on 5 Bouterse Years"--a Javanese-Surinamese couple is waiting in the hall. They have just entered the Netherlands independently, they have a little money and they are looking for a place to stay and for help in obtaining a residence permit. A few hours later they leave defeated: they have been screened and rejected.

"They weren't real refugees," Paul Somohardjo says. "We are not interested in offering shelter and help in getting a residence permit to just anyone." "Makmur" exists primarily for our people, and we only bring them over here

when there is no other alternative, when the danger is really too great over there. Our goal is to liberate Suriname, and to do that you need people over there, not here. We determine who comes and who doesn't come."

During the discussion with Somohardjo the drapes remain drawn and a radio continues to blare loud music into the room. Whoever tries to listen in on the conversation will only catch some bits and pieces. "Naturally," Somohardjo smiles, "this is not just a shelter for refugees. We also have our own security service here, our intelligence service and a logistics service. And the opposition knows that also."

Somohardjo: "The people here include the military--some of whom are officers--as well as policemen, farmers, and shopkeepers. Naturally some of them are sharpshooters, and they have to practice. Not here, however, not in Makmur. We let such a person join a rifle club, and a parachutist joins a parachutist club. We stay within the limits of the Dutch law."

Infiltration

The refugees who find shelter in "Makmur" are thoroughly screened because the danger of infiltration by Bouterse agents is not imaginary. "We are not too anxious to help people we don't know," says Somohardjo. "Treason is always possible; we are no longer as naive as in the past. At that time we quickly took in anyone who applied to our movement: nice to have you. How were we to know--in Suriname we didn't know about war and resistance, did we? But we have learned our lesson, also from Moluccans and former KNIL [pre-1950 Royal Dutch Indian Army] people. Our organization now consists of cells."

Treason almost cost Salam Paul Somohardjo--leader of the now illegal Penda Warina party ("left of center," the "cooperative idea") who has many followers primarily among Javanese plantation workers, farmers and trades people--his life once before. "I was involved in the failed counter coup of Rambocus. We had almost seized the power, without casualties; not one shot had been fired yet. But we made the mistake of sending someone to fetch Bouterse, and that person betrayed the matter." Somohardjo was tortured and was away in prison for 9 months. "And then I was fortunate enough to be allowed to attend the funeral of an uncle of mine. That's how I escaped the December murders of 1982."

Alert

After his escape to the Netherlands, his name, among others, was found on a "death list" taken during the occupation of the Surinamese Embassy. Last year an attack took place in Schiedam where, due to a mistake in identity not Paul but a brother of his was shot down. And just recently--all of the Netherlands was able to witness it--Paul Somohardjo was struck down by a Bouterse supporter during a direct television broadcast of the "Karel van der Graaf show."

Somohardjo: "Oh well, I put my faith in the Almighty. If my time is up, so be it. But I do remain alert. I never go anywhere alone. And if I have to die, then preferably not in the hands of my enemies. I am not afraid, but I don't like to see them triumphant. Nothing is as humiliating as being in the hands of the enemy."

Go into Hiding

The attack and the television incident are all the more reason for Somohardjo and his resistance movement to carefully screen those entering "Makmur." Therefore most of the refugees in this old cloister have been brought over to Rotterdam by the "farmers' resistance"--which operates autonomously alongside the Liberation Council--itself. Many are executive members of the Penda Warina and blindly trust Somohardjo (at one time the big "competitor" of the Surinamese leader of the Javanese, Soemita).

Somohardjo: "Naturally we prefer to leave our people over there. When we notice that our couriers or guides are in danger in Suriname, we first try to let them go into hiding in their own area. If that is too dangerous, we smuggle them over the border to French Guiana. The border is long, and naturally we have our own people at the examining posts also; we are infiltrated everywhere. In French Guiana we have agricultural land which our people can farm. They can remain active for us over there and return to Suriname right away when the time is ripe. When that will be? You'll know when it happens."

Only members of the resistance who are recognized in French Guiana also and are in great danger are directed to "Makmur" in Rotterdam by the Penda Warina. Somohardjo: "The possibility of our people being seized by Bouterse in French Guiana also unfortunately has increased now that he has been allowed to legally open a consulate in Cayenne. The area is full of people from his intelligence service."

Preparation

How big an opportunity does Somohardjo think there is of the resistance ousting away Bouterse, after all the failed attempts?

Somohardjo: "We do have a realistic chance. We are in close contact with our people there; that is promising. If you consider that we succeed in getting couriers into and out of the country every month, that means that the resistance is alive there. And we still manage to effectively support that resistance from here, from so far away."

Islam Brothers

Naturally some people are discouraged by earlier failures. Now things are a little quiet, but we need a longer period of time and better preparation for a successful attempt to oust Bouterse. Previously we didn't have any experience, but now we are in contact with people who can help us.

As to logistics, we can count on indirect aid; we are busy lobbying. Our Islam brothers in the Middle East are offering financial support. And if even the church now starts to rebel . . . The Netherlands ought to keep up the suspension of development aid a little longer. We're doing our best, but this time we won't leave it to fate."

When we ask him to express himself more clearly, Somohardjo smiles. He doesn't say exactly what is on his mind, but: "I'm a dangerous enemy for Bouterse. I can still move a great part of the population there. The Javanese are still faithful to me.

You know, we were against independence the way it was forced on us. The Javanese would lose their social security through that. They had always been exploited on the plantations--which as a matter of fact are now going to ruin. After independence they would only be able to receive 1 Suriname guilder per week as of their 70th birthday. /They/ could not pay the KLM [fares], like the rich who used to fly over to the Netherlands every 2 years in order to maintain their Dutch citizenship and social security.

Boat

Therefore I wanted to charter a boat at the time to bring the Javanese to the Netherlands and later bring them back to Suriname. It was not as much a matter of their Dutch citizenship, but of the social security, their legal security which would cease to exist. We felt we were being cheated; the agreement that contract laborers could return to Indonesia had not materialized either.

The people who wanted to go on the boat, the plantation workers, had deposited 100 Suriname guilders per person. We gave back all that money, 1¼ million Suriname guilders, when the trip did not materialize. Because of that, those people have particular faith in us. That's why I am dangerous for Bouterse, because I can still move that mass of people. "

Bodies

Supposedly Bouterse expressed his regret about the December murders before the United Nations commission. Allegedly he was not present when it happened.

Somohardjo, passionately: "A deceased person cannot speak. Of course we know that they would blame Horb for everything, since he is not alive any longer. But the people who are able to speak freely know exactly when and at what time Bouterse was there. One of Horb's bodyguards was here once; he personally had poured coffee for Bouterse during those murders. Of course Bouterse was there.

And the murdering, the disappearance of people, is still continuing now.

Not long ago someone from the Surinamese navy was here. He told us that on the ocean once he had had to throw two bodies overboard. I also reported that to the Organization of American States (OAS); I still have good contacts with it. Disappearances, tortures, intimidations--they are still happening in Suriname."

Sital

Is it really so difficult to get rid of Bouterse?

Somohardjo: "That is not the problem. We know exactly where Bouterse is at any time of the day, at what time he shaves, where his toothbrush is located, at what time he goes to see his girlfriend, everything. But it would not be of benefit to Suriname if only Bouterse were to leave. Bouterse isn't really the main problem--I'm not afraid of him; he sways with the prevailing winds. I would be more afraid of Sital, who is biding his time."

It would be good for the resistance to come from within. Therefore infiltration is a good strategy for us. And Bouterse may indeed be sending people to Brazil for military training, but our people go along and will also know how to manipulate those new weapons. But we prefer not to cause any damage. For the time being we are quite content with the development of our year of resistance thus far. Bouterse must take us into account, just as we must take him into account."

BVD [Internal Security Service]

Doesn't Somohardjo fear an attack of Bouterse sympathizers on "Makmur"?

Somohardjo: "We have Dutch legal protection here; we have good contacts with the police and the BVD. Moreover, our building is insured against vandalism at a replacement value of 4 million guilders. They would be doing us a favor, one might almost say. But we have never had any problems yet, and we don't want them. I haven't heard one complaint from the neighbors so far."

Rich Nuns

In the Surinamese world there are many rumors about the financing of "Makmur." One doesn't believe that the bank put up a guarantee so easily for the purchase amount of 365,000.-- Dutch guilders, or that the fixed charges can be met. It is believed that money was made on the boat trip to the Netherlands of the Javanese.

Somohardjo: I can easily refute that. That money of the plantation workers was reimbursed to the last penny; I already mentioned that. Do you think they would still be supporting us otherwise?

We simply were very lucky with this cloister. The city wanted to buy it, but it was too slow. Then we jumped in and were fortunate that the nuns

were part of a rich order and wanted to help us, refugees, for humanitarian reasons. The market value of the property was 1 million guilders; we were able to get it for 365,000.-- guilders.

And naturally the bank was not stupid; if we should no longer be able to pay the mortgage and interest, they would immediately own the property. That vandalism insurance for the replacement value was a different condition, of course. Moreover, we were able to convince them that we would get money in through our shops."

Sheikh

"We were simply lucky, and we still are. At this moment the value of the building has doubled already. A sheikh in Denmark wants to buy it for 900,000 guilders. Oh, all those stories that are going around--they're simply jealous that we, without a subsidy but by working day and night, were able to manage this."

The shops which supposedly sell products supplied by resistance people in exile in French Guiana meanwhile have been given up. "Makmur" does, however has its own garage and taylor's shop.

Somohardjo: "The number of products our people in Guiana were able to supply was too small and importing them became too expensive. Also, you didn't have much control over those shops, and many people were needed to run them. Possibly we'll try again later on."

Security Deposit

Rumors that refugees were paying a lot of money to obtain shelter in "Makmur" are also without any foundation according to Somohardjo. "We indeed ask a security deposit from people of whom we are not completely sure because we have to be responsible for their actions and also have to be responsible in the event they are deported. But as soon as they have their permanent residence permit they get that money back.

"Well, when you do something better than others who have been here for a long time already, you always get those types of stories. Our people here pay 200 guilders rent per month. That means 10,000 guilders and with that we take care of our fixed charges.

Transmitter

In addition, we receive donations; they go in a special pot. Yes, the liberation pot. The resistance work--the sending of couriers, the establishing of contacts, for example with anti-Castro Cubans whose transmitter we may possibly be allowed to use also--that costs a lot of money. We also bought three houses at auction for the families who now live in Makmur, for they cannot stay on here."

Somohardjo: "Oh, people who think that "Makmur" is a milch cow or a goldmine, who think that we exploit refugees, simply don't know what they're talking about. We have only one goal: to liberate our country and return there."

8700

CSO: 3614/77

POLITICAL

NORWAY

SOCIALIST, NONSOCIALIST GAP WIDENS AS CAMPAIGN STARTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Mar 85 p 13

[Article by Bjorn Lindahl, DN correspondent in Oslo: "Norwegian Election Campaign Begins--Gap Is Greater Than Ever"]

[Text] With a one-week interval, there will be elections this fall in Sweden and Norway. During the past year the two countries' parties have developed into being almost symmetrical. But in Norway it is the opposite, there it is the nonsocialist parties which will defend their position in government.

The Labor Party congress over the weekend is the starting gun for the Norwegian election campaign. On Friday the government presented its long term plan for 1986-1989. It is just as much an economic prognosis as a political manifesto. That lays the groundwork for both the socialist and the nonsocialist blocs' election programs, and the battle can begin.

In the struggle between the two candidates for prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland and Kare Willoch, all the other parties have been forced to choose sides.

Finally there was the Liberal Party, a green-liberal party which has been in search of its soul ever since the party was split down the middle over the EC referendum. After having shuttled back and forth between the blocs, the party formally adhered a few months ago to the Labor Party.

Young Cuckoo

If the Liberals thought that they were going to get any advance promises from the Labor Party about ministerial posts they were mistaken. As soon as the party chose sides everyone lost interest and the result in the opinion polls was a drop from 4.5 percent to 2.5 percent. If the party does not get more votes than that it will fall out of the Storting, and the seven parties will then be six.

In Sweden there has been a development in another direction, at the moment that the Center Party took KDS [Christian Democratic Union] under its wing. The Norwegian equivalent of KDS is the Christian People's Party, and it is the third largest party in the country, with its nine percent. Seen in a European perspective that is not abnormally large. The Center Party may discover that it is bringing up a young cuckoo.

Thereby there are just two parties to choose between in Norway and Sweden, but an opinion poll would probably show that the people's party--the Conservatives in both countries--and the Progressive Party consist of largely the same groups of voters.

Since Norwegians elect their politicians for four years, it is only every twelfth year that there are two elections together in Sweden and Norway. The election this fall is a unique possibility to compare the politicians' arguments in the two countries. Already election issues have begun to spill over the borders. When leading Social Democrats in Sweden began to revalue their views on advertising TV the Norwegians were forced to do the same.

Good Cooperation

But there are also differences. The nonsocialist parties have succeeded in cooperating significantly better in Norway and have stronger ground to stand on than four years ago. Then it was not even clear whether they could form a government together. Now they have managed to get through almost an entire Storting period without the cooperation breaking down, and for two years the middle parties have participated in the government.

The most enthusiastic to join up was the Center Party, but they are the ones who have gained the least from the cooperation. In environmental policy their own minister Rakel Surlien has been run over several times. It has been about which rivers are to be developed, the continued use of the smelting works at Sulitjelma which spreads heavy emissions over Swedish national parks, and the chemical emissions from the Titania firm which threaten the fishing banks off south Norway.

Party leader Johan J. Jakobsen was urged to become bolder during the Center Party congress last week. The most highly valued contribution during the congress was from one of the party's security policy critics in the Storting, Lars Velsand:

"It is wrong to speak of cooperation within the government, the right word is that it is a battle!"

But the political reality is that the debate died out in the two middle parties on the question of whether they should participate in the government or not. It is now clear.

Worse Than a Pariah

The only big problem for an eventual nonsocialist government after the election is if it must rely on the Progressive Party to get a majority in the Storting.

The leader of the Progressive Party, Carl I. Hagen, is worse than a pariah for the Christian People's Party, and he did not make himself any more popular by saying that at the first opportunity he would cause the fall of a nonsocialist three-party government and install a purely Conservative Government instead.

But so long as the situation does not arise the Progressive Party has no greater roll to play than the Liberal Party. As in the last election, most of the attention will be focused on Kare and Gro.

Gro Harlem Brundtland's strength is that she welded the Labor Party together during the four years in the opposition. No less than 20,000 party members participated in shaping this year's election platform. None did as Gro Harlem Brundtland and sat in on the security policy questions and tried to find solutions which would bring the party together.

What one could object to is that the unity behind the banners has happened more because of discipline than inspiration, and most of her speeches still sound as though they were written on a word processing machine.

Kare Willoch's discipline is more refined but just as hard. His greatest weakness is perhaps his caution. He lacks the will for thoroughgoing changes which other conservative leaders, such as Reagan and Thatcher, have. He is a man who buys a half-bottle of wine when there is to be a party. During government conferences there are no more coffee cakes than just enough. The same stinginess characterizes the policies of the entire government. A devaluation of 16 percent would be unthinkable for Willoch. The Nordic Council meeting on Iceland showed that he does not yet agree with Sweden. No, devaluations happen by at the most two percent, and are called technical adjustments in Norway.

But a policy which only consists of fine adjustments wins no enthusiasm. Norway has an economic freedom of action which is unique in the world. But it still has not been utilized.

"Our most important criticism of the government is that it has not used the possibilities for releasing the creative forces which can lay the foundation for new growth and progress," said Gro Harlem Brundtland when she opened the Labor Party Congress.

Luke Warm Water

The voters are going to have a choice between remaining in the luke warm bath water or turning on the taps again. But then they would be taking the risk

of both a cold shower and a scalding, because in many areas it is a moment of breaking.

The most important is the tax policy, and here Norway is confronting its greatest reform since 1970. All are agreed that today's system has many disadvantages, and that is also unfair.

It taxes work very hard, while it has one of Europe's lowest taxes on property and capital. The unlimited right to make deductions has stimulated people to borrow for their own consumption, and those with the highest income taxes can take the most advantages of it.

A tax commission across party lines several months ago put forth a proposal for a drastically changed system.

It would include that a large part of the tax would be calculated on gross income before deductions are made, a trebling of the housing tax and that most deductions be terminated. In return the taxes would be lowered overall.

After a number of internal conflicts the Labor Party has backed this proposal, and they are trying to get the middle parties with them. The Conservative Party is risking standing alone against the proposal.

Pension Age

The idea of the reform is that tax pressure should not rise, but on election day there will be many who would rather have a deduction in their hand than an uncertain general tax reduction.

The other large question of conflict seems rather antiquated to Swedish eyes. It concerns whether the pension age should be lowered. Norway still has 67 as the pension age. The Labor Party advocates lowering the pension age to 64, but only for wage earners. LO [Confederation of Trade Unions] demands a limit at 62. Farmers and fishermen naturally do not want to be left out. The nonsocialist parties were only able to agree that the elderly should be able to work until 70 if they want to.

Unemployment and health care lines are other definite themes. But despite persistent attempts the Labor Party has not succeeded in deriving the political gains that they should have since the worsening in those areas due to the nonsocialists taking over. Now it appears as though at least unemployment is on its way down again.

Wrong Balance

In order to win government power the Labor Party should already show better opinion figures than what they do. The nonsocialist bloc is leading with

50.5 against 47 percent in a recent opinion poll. If the voters are asked which bloc they believe will win the difference becomes even greater, 45 for the nonsocialists against 34 for the socialists.

To predict the outcome would, however, be still more difficult this year than previously. If the Labor Party wants many reforms that does not apply to the election system, which in many ways is unfair. Since there is no equalization mandate the largest parties are favored. It is sufficient with 44 percent of the votes, for example, for the Labor Party to get a simple majority in the Storting.

The differences between the blocs are not as great, but it has happened several times that the balance has landed on the wrong side. In 1965 and 1969 the nonsocialists got a majority in the Storting without having the most votes, and in the elections of 1973 and 1977 it was the opposite.

The Labor Party has opposed all changes. As a countermove the nonsocialists reestablished the possibility to bargain with the remaining votes in the different voting districts by entering "electoral pacts." That did not require a change in the constitution and neutralized some of the problems of the small parties even though it was not especially democratic. A vote for one party can help in a representative to the Storting from another party.

9287

CSO: 3650/212

18 April 1985

POLITICAL

SWITZERLAND

GOVERNMENT POSITION ON UNESCO CRISIS ANALYZED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 23 Feb 85 p 23

[Text] Contrary to Bern's expectation, the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO did not mobilize reform proponents within the organization but intensified even further the crisis that had been aggravated by the secretary general and the majority supporting him. Switzerland's withdrawal is certainly not likely to take place immediately. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs is now discussing even more seriously than ever before this step as an option which until recently the administration had considered scarcely conceivable.

Following the U.S. announcement of a possible withdrawal from UNESCO and the U.S.'s later decision to do so, Switzerland, as a member of this UN special organization, undertook its own internal investigation of the situation. In 1984 two parliamentary inquiries gave the Federal Council the opportunity to present the Swiss stance on the developments in UNESCO.

Critical Membership

At that time the central government had emphasized that it had understood the reasons why the U.S. had felt compelled to take the steps it had. And the Federal Council recalled that Switzerland was an early and unfortunately often a solitary figure at UNESCO general conferences who came out and opposed programs that it considered to have overstepped the organization's mission established in the statutes. The head of the Swiss delegation was the only one who had taken a stand against entrusting UNESCO with working out the details of the controversial world information and communication regulation and opposed attempts to impair the freedoms of speech and of the press by individual member states. In discussions with Swiss diplomats, the often inconsistent behavior of the Western nations who in the past had practiced laissez-faire for too long and had indulged the stubborn secretary general, was often regretfully referred to. This spotty interest by some and the exaggerated wish to compromise by others is now taking its toll.

In its reply to parliamentary inquiries, the Federal Council explained at the time that it was, however, not drawing the same conclusions as the U.S. although Switzerland shared its analysis to a large degree. Bern did not intend

to question Switzerland's membership in UNESCO. Last year, the central government held more the view that Switzerland could play a useful role in the day-to-day efforts to initiate a list of pressing reforms such as budget cuts and program reductions within the organization and in cooperation with states that shared the Swiss viewpoint.

Growing Annoyance

Basically nothing has changed in this evaluation of the situation, even following the results of the latest special session of the executive council, which were described by Bern as the worst possible. However, the long held trust regarding UNESCO's ability to regenerate itself is noticeably making way to pessimism. Annoyance is growing in the Department of Foreign Affairs over the collision course that the secretary general and the majority supporting him in the executive council are steering. As yet it has proven a false hope that the withdrawal of the U.S. and the threat of other states' withdrawal would strengthen the resolve for reform within the organization as was the case after the American withdrawal from the International Labor Organization. The responsible parties are aware that with a further disintegration of UNESCO as a result of the deterioration of responsible working conditions, the perseverance that to date has been considered meaningful would hardly be justifiable at home or abroad.

In any case, the responsible parties have yet to decide what concrete political conclusions Switzerland may draw from the clearly negative present situation. The varying evaluation and decisionmaking factors are certainly well known. But how they will be individually weighed and measures against each other is still a matter for the internal decisionmaking process.

Political Dilemma

It goes without saying that the Department of Foreign Affairs is facing a matter of brinksmanship, in which it would like to avoid prejudicing the UN vote in the upcoming year because of measures taken or omissions in UNESCO. As the Foreign Ministry emphasized, although a withdrawal from UNESCO advocated by opponents to the UN membership was duly scrapped, further policies concerning UNESCO will not be allowed to be dictated by electoral considerations on the UN referendum. On the other hand, the responsible parties in the EDA do not want to rush anything only to be exposed to in-house reproaches that the Federal Council is protecting UNESCO because of the UN.

Faced with this dilemma, the Swiss would like to at least extend the deliberation period of UNESCO general conference, which will take place this fall in Sofia. Federal Councilman Aubert will probably intentionally not raise the subject of a possible Swiss withdrawal to the General Assembly of the national Swiss UNESCO commission in Liestal because, as is said in his circle, although he does not want to create any false optimism, he will not leave any stone unturned that could make this extreme solution unnecessary. The EDA [Federal Department of Foreign Affairs] clearly knows that, without a doubt, the responsible parties' room for negotiation will be smaller. The wait-and-see policy presented publically then as well as now is under pressure to succeed and is therefore inevitably subject to a deadline. If the political perversion

of UNESCO's scientific, cultural, and educational mission is not visibly checked at the next session of the executive council in May and especially in the general conference this autumn, then most probably a readjustment of the Swiss UNESCO policies will be unavoidable.

Lobbying Efforts

In the meantime, Swiss diplomats will not idly stand by and watch the developments in UNESCO. Through talks, there are efforts to try to convince even the delegations from the Third World states of the necessity of a return to UNESCO's true mission. Its useful and meritorious founding work, especially in the developing countries, is also jeopardized by a further uncontrolled political confrontation. Although initiatives of Swiss diplomacy to date to exert a restraining influence on Secretary General M'Bow have not met any success, consideration is being given in the central office to new attempts to inform the stubborn Senegalese of Switzerland's highest political authorities' deep concern about the fate of UNESCO.

Whether and at what time the cooperation of the Swiss can no longer be justified in this organization, will have to be independently decided upon ultimately by the Federal Council based on the proposals by the Department of Foreign Affairs. The behavior of those states whose persistence to date was justification for Bern's argument that it was trying to work within the organization with like-minded groups to introduce an improvement will also influence the time of a possible threat or announcement of a withdrawal. Switzerland likes to steer a middle course internationally and as a small nation it correctly does not overestimate the influence of its foreign policy initiatives. However, if the situation were to come to a head, Switzerland would certainly not be adverse to seeing a joint withdrawal from UNESCO by various European nations because then the erosion of UNESCO's universal character would be obvious. This character is a vital prerequisite for Switzerland's cooperation in international organizations, especially due to the question of neutrality.

12348

CSO: 3620/285

POLITICAL

SWITZERLAND

BRUNNER ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, NEUTRALITY, PEACE POLICY

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 28 Feb 85 pp 25-26

[Article by "Lz": "The Small Neutral State Within the East-West Area of Tension--State Secretary Brunner's Policy Statement"]

[Text] Tuesday evening at Zurich University, a talk by Edouard Brunner, state secretary in the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of "Neutrality in the East-West Conflict," centered on basic principles of Swiss neutrality policy. Among other things, Brunner once again touched upon the possibility of our country's participation in verification of arms control agreements. The state secretary's lecture was part of a series organized by the Swiss Institute for Foreign Affairs Research, devoted to analyzing the relationships between the two power blocs and to determine prospects for the future.

Code of Conduct as a Basis for Mutual Trust

In his introduction, Brunner characterized the differences between East and West as still being the crucial conflict of our times. These differences, which according to him are based on the widely differing societal systems and the partially antagonistic national interests, could at any time result in direct confrontation or could manifest themselves in painful events in "nerve-end" regions. Even though, he continued, both superpowers have a monopoly on individual weapon systems, neither is able to exert airtight control over the world situation. In Brunner's opinion, such examples as Vietnam and Afghanistan are proof that neither the United States nor the USSR are able to win a conventional war against a people's militia.

The East-West conflict, he added, develops dynamics of its own which frequently defy identification. It would hardly be correct to characterize it in terms of tension and detente, which not always reflect the true state of affairs. Rather, he said, one might refer to it as a process of ups and downs.

A basic precondition for any success in the efforts to achieve arms control is an improvement in relations on the most comprehensive scale possible. The type of dialogue conducted during the recent Mid-East talks in Vienna might be suitable for improving the climate between the two opponents in the

global power struggle. The state secretary would consider it a useful power struggle. The state secretary would consider it a useful point of departure to construct a list of questions on which the superpowers might agree and on which they would recognize a mutual interest. It might thereafter be conceivable that gradually, in open and frankly conducted talks and negotiations, a code of conduct might emerge which would reinforce and extend a relationship of mutual trust among the states.

International Appreciation of Swiss Neutrality

Against the background of his emerging ideas on the bipolar power struggle, Brunner described the role of the small neutral state of Switzerland. Our country, even though unequivocally belonging to the group of Western democracies, is neutral. Our neutrality is generally recognized and internationally appreciated, which incidentally has not always been the case. It took great efforts to achieve this position after World War II. Switzerland's foreign relations are oriented toward maintaining a balance. There is, however, no economic neutrality.

Brunner reminded his audience that in view of our constitution there is no such thing as a moral neutrality for our citizens or media. In contrast to the situation in totalitarian regimes, freedom of opinion and of the press in Switzerland are part of personal and political freedom, for which the state cannot and must not take responsibility in its dealings with other states.

The state secretary spoke against any policy of issuing "moralizing or condemnatory statements" on the part of Switzerland, but at the same time he made it clear that there is a need for clear and unambiguous declarations by the government in cases of violations of international law, freedom or human rights. There would be no change in these basic principles even if Switzerland were to join the United Nations.

No Peace Policy Without Armed Forces

In the world of today, he said, our policy of continuous and armed neutrality is confronted with a perpetual challenge. It is therefore necessary to reexamine and redefine our position whenever the situation warrants. The most important basic condition of a credible neutrality, he indicated, is the firm determination to defend this neutrality, with force of arms if necessary. Based on this, there is no such thing as neutrality without armed forces. However, without a national defense a policy of peace could not exist either. State Secretary Brunner obviously addressed these thoughts to groups intending to point out a contradiction between security and peace policy. He did however recognize the fact that modern weapons technologies cause new considerations to be brought to bear. Thus the Upper House of the Federal Assembly seems inclined to think that in defense against cruise missiles the right to survival of the population takes precedence over shooting down the missiles with all subsequent, hardly imaginable damage.

Effective Efforts Toward the Preservation of Peace

But our neutrality, he said, must also be oriented toward initiating effective efforts toward the maintenance of peace. In this regard, Switzerland's policy of offering its good services would provide it with a wide scope of activity. The CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), apart from its rescue operations and protecting power mandates, is the only multilateral East-West forum open to participation by neutral countries as well. Brunner emphasized the value of cooperation between neutral and noncommitted states, which however does in no way signify policy agreement. Nevertheless, compromises are possible. Switzerland, he added, has always taken care in such relationships not simply to assume a "middleman" position, but rather has always expressed its own views in an unambiguous manner.

Even though our country can exert very limited influence upon the disarmament process, it can nevertheless contribute by finding and presenting realistic approaches toward the solution of specific problems. In this respect the neutral states could play a much bigger part than they have in the past. However, in those cases they would not be merely offering their good offices at all times, but rather create conditions in which they could make recommendations when problems are nearing the discussion stage.

In this connection, Brunner--who had talked about the same problem ten days ago in a TV interview--once again dealt with the problem of verification, i.e., the control of trust-generating measures or agreements on arms limitation. Even though the Conference on Trust and Security Generating Measures and Arms Reduction in Europe had not yet specifically dealt with verification, he stated that there is already intensive discussion of these problems in many member states. Austria in particular has done some preliminary work on this. The verification problem, he added, is an intellectual challenge for our country as well. However, the difficulties involved must not be underestimated. Particularly delicate questions would arise, especially in case of violations of agreements. Brunner is of the opinion that a body yet to be constituted could keep books on the observance of measures arrived at by treaty. However, these questions and additional ones would require further detailed study. At the present moment, the only action which can be taken is to provide food for thought. Brunner also mentioned Swiss efforts to elaborate a verification system for the chemical weapons area.

In closing, Brunner states that apart from dealing with day-to-day problems, consideration must be given to the challenges of the future; they must be analyzed as far as possible and various approaches to their solution must be elaborated as part of foreign policy planning.

Judgment on Relations With UNESCO to be Made in September

In the subsequent discussion, which was extremely animated, the state secretary gave his opinion on a great variety of subjects. Questioned on the U.S. Star Wars concept, he felt that this problem area would be the most

important item during the forthcoming negotiations between the superpowers in Geneva. Brunner also addressed the question of the Swiss position with regard to UNESCO and the present crisis confronting that organization. He stated that a basic evaluation of this situation could not take place until September, and that it would deal primarily with financial considerations. Having given an outline of the differences in the practice of Swedish and Swiss neutrality, Brunner dealt with the question of a possible refusal to join the UN. The state secretary was of the opinion that no matter how the vote on this would turn out, the political debate on it should take a form which would permit the outcome to reflect a unified position.

9273

CSO: 3620/292

18 April 1985

POLITICAL

TURKEY

MUMCU GUIDELINES FOR CONTEMPORARY TURKISH SOCIALISM

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Feb 85 pp 1, 11

[Article by Ugur Mumcu in the column "Observation": "Political Option"]

[Text] There is a new fashion among some of our leftist intellectuals. It is a trend towards "proclaiming oneself a socialist" without criticizing the "Turkish-style capitalism" ANAP [Motherland Party] is employing.

There is a truism: "You can't add apples and pears." In political science, it is "adding apples and pears" to always conjure up "1930's statism" when speaking of "statism and interventionism" and to equate opposition to today's "Turkish-style capitalism" with "Jacobinism, authoritarianism and single-partyism."

Let me first underscore these points:

The "statism" and "interventionism" that are disliked and criticized today comprised an economic policy that saved Turkey from the world economic crisis of 1929. Those were years when "interventionist" tendencies were growing in the West and states were taking over the running of economies. The renowned British economist Keynes gained fame during these years with his "interventionist" views. Keynes' thinking on economic regulation by the state and President Roosevelt's reform program in the United States called the "New Deal" are examples of how liberal capitalism gone awry can be taken in hand and rehabilitated by the state.

Keynesian theory had been adopted by Hitler's national socialist administration prior to World War II. However, Keynesian theory in its most concentrated and pervasive form has been implemented by governments that could be called social democratic or "democratic socialist." These examples show that economic programs must be dealt with not just as an "economic model" alone but as a "political system" as well.

An economic model nowadays is meaningful only in a political context. "Statist" views in the "leftist" tradition based on a single-party concept, therefore, are not democratic to us. We consider pluralist democracy necessary. What kind of political framework is an economic model going to be based on? We consider this important.

Political concepts are a matter of time and place. Every concept takes on flavor and substance in the process in which it occurs. The Keynesian view, for example, can be the source of inspiration for Hitler and democratic socialist administrations both. The political framework is, therefore, very important.

It has now become a "must" for us to remind our market-economist leftists who are today killing time with futile ideological debates over such things as "statism versus market economy" that state interventionism, which was employed for the benefit of exporting companies at the time of Hitler, is also one of the primary methods of very "liberal" administrations.

This is why we are trying to explain to those who ask "Then what is the alternative?" that the option is not just economic, but first of all political.

Political liberalism has flourished historically in conjunction with economic liberalism. This development has been closely allied with the institutions of individualist philosophy and belief in Christian societies. It is probably impossible today to speak of "economic liberalism" in a world of multinational corporations and holding companies that have become revolving doors to political administrations. Attempts have been made to put limits on the monopolistic structure of capitalism through "antimonopoly" laws in the countries considered the "father" of capitalism. Turkey, having entered the process of integration with world capitalism through the IMF prescriptions, has joined this new economic order very poorly prepared.

Prime examples of this lack of preparation are the banks that succumbed to payment difficulties, the "play-boy" managers of these banks and the model of permissiveness that made brokers out of street bums and caused firms to fail.

The new model, called the "monetarist system," did not come about just because of its economic side. The system appeared on the agenda as the economic sidekick of a "political model." It was dreamed up as a counterweight to the "militarization" process of economies worldwide. This system, the brain child of American Professor Milton Friedman, has a previous record, does it not, in the ruthless capitalism of the 19th century and the world economic crisis of 1929?

It has previous convictions also in Brazil, Argentina and Chile whose models collapsed all in a row.

Milton Friedman and his economic views represent the option of British economist John Maynard Keynes, not Karl Marx. And Friedman's politics must be sought in the thinking of all liberal ideologists, led by Adam Smith.

Modern socialist thought concentrates on how the "plus value" is to be shared among the working classes and strata rather than mechanical nationalization in single-party systems. Strong unionism in public and private workplaces, democratic socialist parties integrated with this unionism and a "pluralism" whose first priority is organization by democratic means from bottom to top and top to bottom are, therefore, the primary ways and means of the option that stands opposite the Friedman model.

The option for today is a socialist program heavy on the democratic side. From this standpoint, the alternative to the Friedman model is equivalent to the aspirations of democracy.

POLITICAL

TURKEY

DOGAN URGES SODEP 'GOVERNMENT ALTERNATIVE' DYNAMISM

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Feb 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Yalcin Dogan in the column "From Ankara": "A Strong Safehouse: SODEP"]

[Text] Ankara - Complete peace reigns at the headquarters of the Social Democracy Party (SODEP), the "best government alternative." Looking at this calm, composed staff with no desire to jump into the fray any time soon, one can't help but think, "What kind of a candidate for office is this party?" Things are so "calm" that if it weren't for Erdal Inonu's trips, one would be tempted to say, "There is a party named SODEP. I wonder what it's doing."

The headquarters staff may be composed of knowledgeable men, may leave other parties far behind in literacy and may be keeping close tabs on Turkey and the rest of the world through books and the media. And all of this may be extremely useful. Nevertheless, their job in keeping up with events is to "produce policy," to establish direct liaison with every sector in Turkey. Nope, no such atmosphere has prevailed at headquarters for months. There are only General Chairman Erdal Inonu's trips around the country.

Inonu is establishing direct liaison with the organization on these trips. He hosts dinners in the evenings and makes the rounds of the tables, both getting acquainted with his organization and, by asking people questions individually, trying to find out what they think. He is trying to gauge the pulse of the organization through questions about the party, about the world and national problems. The party headquarters staff except for General Chairman Inonu, though, is downright relaxed, going about in what we used to call "peace and tranquillity."

There is, however, one argument that has stirred them up in recent weeks: To change or not to change the party bylaws. This is the topic of the day in SODEP. Some of the members favor the bylaw amendment. Their rationale is "to improve the organization's relations with headquarters." According to the present bylaws, the general chairman "appoints" his deputies and the general secretary from among the members elected at the party convention to the central decision-making and executive board. Those who want to amend the bylaws set out from the notion: "We are a social democratic party and, to have a dynamic party structure, we ought to ensure that the organization is represented in the top party organs." They therefore advance an idea favoring "election, not appointment" of deputy chairmen and the general secretary. It is thought that organization-headquarters relations

will run smoother this way. Those favoring amendment propose the formation of two separate organs, one a 40-member body and the other a 15-member body, for this purpose. The 40-member body "needs to have continuous oversight powers on behalf of the organization" over the 15-member central executive board.

SODEP headquarters sent out a circular to the 67 provincial organizations on 30 July 1984. This circular asked the question: "What are your views on bylaw amendment?" Replies to this question came back from only 17 provinces. Regardless of whether the views were positive or negative, it is more important in our opinion that only 17 provinces responded. What the provincial organizations need is for the party to be "shaken up" by more than the bylaw debate and to "produce policy" as a result.

The headquarters majority is opposed to the bylaw amendment. In a vote at headquarters, for example, the bylaw amendment was defeated by a vote of 26 to 9. And why not? If a convention were to be held, how many of those sitting on the party decision-making and executive board today would be reelected, I wonder? Now they are sitting comfortably -- as if the "best government alternative" had nothing to do with them!

A political party that is the "government alternative" ought to be setting Turkey's agenda. First it has to know the present agenda in detail. Then it has to "impose a new agenda" on society along the lines of its own world view. This is what the business of "producing policy" is all about.

Instead of such madness as the backbiting we have seen so often before, picking a fight here and there and, when Erdal Inonu remembers a member's name, taking that member's side, SODEP's job today is "to impose a new agenda" on Turkey.

And, for this kind of imperative to materialize, it is necessary that the "safe house" atmosphere in SODEP be dispersed and more dynamism be injected.

8349

CSO: 3554/102

POLITICAL

TURKEY

FORUM STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF ISLAM'S SOCIAL ROLE

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 27 Feb 85 p 1

[Article by Fatih Agan: "Islam Was Yesterday and Will Be Tomorrow"]

[Text] ANKARA BUREAU - An open forum in Ankara sponsored by OGRETMEN DUNYASI DERGISI [Teacher's World Magazine] debated the topic "Secular Education in Turkey."

Panelists were poet, writer and educator M. Akif Inan, OGRETMEN DUNYASI DERGISI editor Sati Erisen, retired general and educator O. Gungor Feyzioglu, former Turkish Language Association chairman Serafettin Turan and former Minister of National Education Fehmi Yavuz. Zeki Sarihan, also an OGRETMEN DUNYASI DERGISI editor, was moderator. A large crowd, up to half of them "pro-religion" and many "anti-religion," in the words of moderator Sarihan, attended the open forum, held at the Arts Association.

To open the forum, panelists were asked first to define secularism.

"Secularism Is to Be Human"

Sati Erisen, Serafettin Turan and Fehmi Yavuz defined secularism in general as "non-religious, free of religious concerns, the totality of nonreligious values, and a way of life given form within this framework," while retired General Feyzioglu suggested it was necessary to understand secularism as "to be human," as defined by Ataturk.

Opposing these definitions, Akif Inan stressed the need to define secularism as the Western regimes which are its source define it. Accordingly, secularism is "a system in which the state is organized outside religion and which guarantees religion the perpetuation of its existence under its own rules with strictly no interference by the state," Inan said.

Is Religious Education Necessary

In the second part of the forum, the panelists expressed their views on the question: "Is it the duty of the state to provide religious education for citizens?"

On this topic, Feyzioglu claimed that "if the religious information that the people need is not provided by the state in the schools, persons lacking a scholarly approach (?) would carry out this task and this would be detrimental to society" and argued that "the state must teach religious subjects to the students in the schools for the development of modern society."

Erisen, Turan and Yavuz all took a less than serious and scholarly approach, crediting to Islam myths without factual basis and pouring out their venom, as it were, upon Islam in a sarcastic way.

The panelists who characterized the compulsory classes in Islam taught in the schools of Turkey as required by the 1982 Constitution as an element of coercion said it was necessary that these classes not be taught. The three panelists said that graduates of the imam preacher schools, established for the purpose of training people to wash the dead and perform the functions of imam in the mosques, always try to get into the universities instead of performing these tasks and thus give rise to a threatening situation by going into careers such as lawyers, doctors and engineers. Then, taking it upon themselves to interpret -- incorrectly and without reverence -- certain verses of the Koran, the panelists claimed that the danger (?) had reached extensive proportions as a result of universal religious education. The three panelists contended that religious education within the family -- for those who wished -- was sufficient and called for discontinuation of religious classes for children below age 18 and of the imam preacher schools.

The few Muslims in the audience reacted to the panelists' denigration of Islam, while others showed their approval.

"No Religion-Free Society in History"

Speaking on this subject, Akif Inan introduced his remarks by saying, "Time out of mind, religion has been an influential institution in the flow of events in history, in the rise and spread of civilizations, in the emergence of literature, art and philosophy and, even more so, in the formation of concepts of fatherland and country." He went on to say:

"History and geography to date have failed to record one single religion-free society. There have been individuals without religion, but no society has been recorded without some belief, attachment to some kind of creed, even if absurd. States that recognize this fact have come to the conclusion that religious education is necessary.

"Prior to the advent of laicism in the West, all education, not just religious education, was under the control and discipline of the Catholic Church. The Church perpetuated instability and changeable attitudes through dogmas suited to itself. The Catholic Church, for this reason, caused centuries of religious and sectarian strife. The Church was an obstacle to free thought and freedom of conscience. Religious life in the West was at an impasse for this reason.

"Islam was not like this. Islam allows everyone the freedom of his own belief and thought. The freedom of thought that the West saw as idealism was inherent in Islam. But this was not the case in the West. The Church, in fact, had put chains on the freedom of conscience.

"For this reason, the West, in order to put an end to this way of thinking, made the church into a social institution with no authority over the state or society but which could pursue its activities independently under its own rules. That is, legal reform occurred in which the state became a separate institution and religion, a separate social institution. This is secularism."

"Don't Be Afraid of Islam"

Noting that the panelists who called for elimination of religious education and the imam preacher schools may have expressed their personal thoughts since they hold a nonreligious view," Inan asserted that this was contrary to the wishes of the country. As for the claim that the family is sufficient for religious education, Inan asked, "Who will give the family its religious training?" To the claim that religion can be taught without the imam preacher schools, he replied, "If the medical faculties were eliminated, would the law faculties train doctors?"

The panelists answered written questions from the audience in the final portion of the forum. Erisen, Turan and Yavuz were again the ones heckled by the audience for their disdain of Islam. When Fehmi Yavuz referred to "phony" teachers, Lutfi Dogan, a former minister of state and head of the Department of Religious Affairs [Ecevit government, 1978] in the now banned Republican Peoples Party, who was in the audience, shouted, "In that case (meaning like you), all teachers are phony."

Akif Inan's answers to questions directed to him went over like a lead balloon with the other panelists, but drew ovations from the Muslims in the audience. Inan said that disdain of Islam stemmed from fear. "Don't be afraid of Islam. Islam was here yesterday and it will be here tomorrow," he said.

The open forum in which it was four against one in the debate of two views was concluded by moderator Zeki Sarihan with these comments:

"Two views have been debated here. Naturally, two different opinions have been voiced. But despite the failure to get together on opinions, one good thing has happened, and that is that 'pro-religionists' and 'anti-religionists' were able to get together in this hall and discuss a topic in a civilized fashion."

8349
3554/102

MILITARY

DENMARK

POLL FINDS STRONG SUPPORT FOR ARMED DEFENSE OF COUNTRY

Seventy-Five Percent Support

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Mar 85 p 6

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] The Danish Bureau of Statistics and the Social Research Institute have determined that 75.8 percent of all Danes support defense while only 5.5 percent have given up in advance.

Over three-quarters of the Danish people think that Denmark is worth defending from a military assault, according to a survey published by the Defense Center for Leadership.

The opinion poll was taken by the Danish Bureau of Statistics and the Social Research Institute in connection with the so-called omnibus surveys in which a representative selection of people over the age of 16 answer a long list of questions.

There were a number of questions in the surveys for May 1975, October 1976, October 1978, May 1980, October 1982 and October 1984 concerning people's resolve to defend the country.

According to the report that has now been issued by the Defense Leadership School, 75.8 percent of those questioned in 1984 felt that conditions in Denmark are worth defending against a military attack while 5.5 percent definitely disagreed. Some 68.6 percent were convinced that Denmark should have a military defense system and 55.4 percent thought Denmark should resist an attack. In the survey 68.8 percent were prepared to make an effort themselves while 10.3 percent said they would not lift a finger.

Some 39.0 percent said defense helps guarantee peace for Denmark; 44.1 percent said defense is necessary to preserve Denmark as an independent country; 36.4 percent said military defense is necessary so the country can get its views across internationally; and finally, 7.9 percent said defense should be stronger while 56.8 percent said it is already big enough and strong enough.

"The results of the survey are encouraging but not surprising," Defense Minister Hans Engell told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

"In the present situation, when there has been a lot of debate about Danish defense efforts, it is very satisfying that such a large majority of the people are willing to speak out in support of the Danish defense system. The big influx of recruits for the Home Guard in recent years documents that the people are willing to act on their convictions.

"The results of the survey will evoke a response among people outside Denmark who have questioned Danish defense resolve," said Hans Engell.

Paper Comments on Poll

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Mar 85 p 10

[Editorial: "Popular Estimation of Defense System"]

[Text] Satisfaction with the Danish defense system is greater than one might think from the public debate. There is a sizable defense resolve among the population and that means there is also a considerable willingness to make sacrifices. A majority of the Danish people think that in its present shape our defense system is an adequate response to the threats posed by the international situation. To sum up briefly, it can be said that the broad political agreement on our defense that was expressed most recently in connection with the defense agreement in the summer of 1984 is matched by a broad popular agreement.

This can be shown by the opinion poll that has just been released. The form of the questions and the responses that were given leave no doubt that Danish defense is one of the social institutions people consider worth keeping. The political agitation for unilateral Danish arms reduction that has gone on has not led to a loss of popular support for defense.

If the opinion poll is compared to other measurable quantities, such as applications to the armed forces--whether we are talking about volunteering for service in the ranks or for the regular army and officer training--the picture might emerge of the Danish defense system in a position where it is not worth the trouble to concern ourselves with it politically or in terms of the debate.

But that is a superficial picture. When the last defense agreement was reached there were clear indications that the terms of the agreement were hard for people in defense to swallow. They were also hard to swallow for the politicians who think that Denmark's security depends to a large extent on the opportunities of the defense system to live up to the national and international obligations involved in our NATO membership. The defense agreement was reached primarily because in a politically stormy period it served a purpose to demonstrate that a substantial part of Denmark's security policy

still rests on a broad political foundation. But it serves no purpose to try to conceal the fact that the agreement that was reached can meet the needs of the defense system in the future only to an inadequate extent. Nor does it serve any purpose to hide the fact that the next defense agreement will have to take a harder look at the problems affecting the armed forces. Here we are thinking in particular of the sharply rising expenses that are occurring in concert with the technically advanced weapons systems that are necessary to maintain the deterrent effect of defense.

The defense minister has just taken the initiative to appoint a so-called analysis group. Its most important task will be to preserve the people's defense resolve while combining it with an understanding that the Danish defense system must also keep up with the times. This is difficult just now. The next defense agreement will not be as cheap.

Minister Rejects U.S. Charges

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Mar 85 p 9

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] "I have no doubt that our allies will live up to their promises if the situation demands," the defense minister said.

"The criticism has overshot the target," said Defense Minister Hans Engell in a comment on the somber predictions in the American newspaper INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE that Denmark's NATO partners would let us down if war broke out.

In the opinion of reporter John C. Ausland Denmark does not take its role as guardian of the Baltic Sea very seriously. He calls the Danish defense budget one of the most modest in NATO and says the Danes are poor alliance partners.

"Denmark does far too little to prepare for the reception of reinforcements from the NATO allies. Some American and British forces have been earmarked for the relief of Denmark but there are no plans to store supplies for them. American NATO chief Bernard Rogers proposes sending an American division to Denmark in his preparedness plan, but since there are no materiel depots for them, the plan will not cause the Russians to lose much sleep," the article said.

Defense Minister Hans Engell conceded that the Danish defense budget, which is 2.4 percent of the national budget, is the third lowest in NATO, with only Canada and Luxembourg having a lower percentage.

"The low percentage is due to the fact that the defense budget is regulated according to a system that is unique in the NATO context, but means that we get more out of the money," said the defense minister, who added:

"We maintain a level of incident preparedness that would give us time to build up our full military force and in the years ahead we will adopt measures that will increase the fighting strength of our mobilization forces.

"In these years the agreements Denmark has made will be augmented with measures in a number of areas that we will have every reason to be satisfied with.

"When it comes to shelters for the airplanes of assisting forces there are a number of projects to be financed by the mutual infrastructure program that will be carried out in the years ahead," said Hans Engell, who concluded:

"I feel Denmark has been active and positive in connection with setting up facilities for allied reinforcements and I think the criticism overshot the mark. The talks I have had with allied political and military leaders did not include any halfhearted promises about reinforcements and military cooperation. This is not just a matter of helping their friends, it involves their own security interests and I have no doubt that our allies will live up to their promises if the situation demands."

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CSO: 3613/132

MILITARY

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FRANCO-GERMAN COMBAT HELICOPTER SPECIFICATIONS REFINED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Jan 85 pp 21-33

[Article by Erhard Ickenroth: "PAH-2/HAP/HAC-3G; Franco-German Helicopter Program"]

[Text] A Franco-German government agreement on 29 May 1984 started the development phase of a very ambitious helicopter program that will probably last until 1996. An antitank helicopter, PAH-2, is to be developed for German needs, a support and attach helicopter, HAP, and an antitank helicopter, HAC-3G, for French ones. The BWB [Federal Office for Defense Technology and Procurement] Construction Director, Engineer (FH) Erhard Ickenroth, explains in the following article the peculiarities of the program regarding technology, government and industry organization, as well as equipment components and subsystems.

In the early 70's Germany and France began joint development of the HOT anti-tank system for helicopters that was integrated into the French Gazelle and the German PAH-1 antitank helicopters. On the basis of favorable experiences made with this and other joint Franco-German projects the two countries signed in 1976 a government-level agreement that initiated research on a second generation antitank helicopter.

After the acceptance of a joint military concept of a Franco-German antitank helicopter, an agreement on 16 October 1979 opened the definition phase. Based on the results of the definition phase and bilaterally determined general specifications dated 22 November 1983 a government agreement regarding a joint development phase of an antitank helicopter was signed on 29 May 1984. The development phase agreed upon commenced on 1 June 1984 and is to be concluded by 1996 according to current plans.

Three Versions

The aim of the program is the development of an helicopter in the following versions:

--An antitank helicopter (PAH-2) for the German Army with the HOT weapon systems to include facilities for installing a third generation antitank rocket

system (PARS 3). The Stinger air-to-air rocket is to be the self-defense weapons. Either the U.S. TADS/PNVS or Eurovisionics is to be used for day and night combat.

--A support and security helicopter (HAP) for the French Army, armed with a 30 mm cannon and the Matra AATCP [air-to-air very short range] rocket system, and 68 mm rockets with HUD [head up display] and mast-mounted sighting.

--An antitank helicopter (HAC-3G) with the PARS 3 weapon system for the French Army. For day and night combat French optics or Eurovisionics are to be used.

The following requirements serve as basis;

--212 PAH-2 for Germany

--75 HAP and 140 HAC-3G for France.

The first series of helicopters are to be delivered to the contractors as follows:

HAP starting in mid-1992, PAH-2 in mid-1993, and HAC-3G beginning mid-1996.

A Base Helicopter

The three national models are based on a joint base version. This base helicopter will be built in such a fashion that the three requested versions can be obtained through installation of various mission packages.

It has the following characteristics:

Unloaded weight--about 2,500 kg

Installed power (NN/INA): 2 x 90 kw

Main rotor diameter: 13 m

Tail rotor diameter: 2.7 m

Offset tandem cockpit

Rigid three wheel landing gear with drive wheel

Crash tolerant design

Double steering (can be flown from front and rear seats)

Most Modern Technologies

The newest technologies are to be used in this helicopter.

Some typical examples:

- Jointless main rotor built of FWW fiber compound.
- Modern aerodynamics in the fiber compound rotor blade.
- Spheriflex tail rotor with fiber compound blades.
- Weight optimized, vibration proof main engine with power takeoff for driving generators while rotors are stationary.
- Technologically ambitious but simple and modular dual shaft MTM 385R engine.
- Aerodynamically optimized engine installation to include IR suppression.
- Optimal modular configuration through the use of advanced construction methods and combinations of materials--besides fiber compounds new, super-strong aluminum alloys will be used.
- Redundant hydraulic, electrical, and fuel systems, autopilot, etc.
- Modern and flexible system design in optics through consistent use of a redundant data bus system (MIL-Bus 1553B),
- Integrated diagnostic and control system.

Development work on the joint base model is to be divided qualitatively and quantitatively between France and Germany at 50 percent each on the body, propulsion, and equipment. Included are ground and flight trials and the preparation of the three helicopter versions for series production, as well as the definition of subsequent phases of series preparation and series production.




Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the basis helicopter, the base model for the various versions.

Four experimental models of the basic version have been ordered. On the one hand they are to demonstrate the flight characteristics and capabilities, as well as the integration of the motors, on the other they serve to prove the modular configuration (pilot behind, gunner in the front in the PAH-2, or pilot in the front, gunner in the rear in the case of HAP and HAC-3G). These experimental models are to be flying by 1988.

For the PAH-2 optics a solicitation of bids will be announced 1989/1990, on the basis of which the series model will be selected. For the French, use a European optical system has been decided upon a priori.

The national mission equipment packages (MAP) will be developed and financed by each country.

The development costs for the entire Franco-German project have been set upper limits by the government agreement. Should the proposals of the industry exceed these limits, other solutions must be found (possibly with several partners) that will permit adherence to the cost limit.

Organization

For program execution the following decisions have been made:

--FRG is pilot nation.

--The organization on the government side consists of:

A steering committee, consisting of a co-president from each country. It makes its decisions unanimously;

An executive agency to the BWB. The representative of the executive agency is the PAH-2 program manager. The executive agency is the sole negotiator with industry; it concludes appropriate contracts according to German law and German procedural regulations, and oversees their performance.

Organization on the industrial side:

--MBB, Ottobrunn is general contractor;

--Aerospatiale, Marignane is co-contractor;

--Contractor for the engine is MTU-Turbomeca GmbH. The engine manufacturer delivers the engines the general contractor through the executive agency;

--For development of the HAP and HAC-3G mission equipment packages the French side will conclude contracts with appropriate French firms. The mission equipment packages thus developed are transferred through the executive agency to the general contractor for installation into the basic helicopter.

--For development of the mission equipment package for the PAH-2 the project manager will conclude an appropriate contract with German industry;

--Due to the limits placed on development resources the design to cost method will be used and the entire development will basically be contracted out on the basis of fixed prices. To meet this target some so-called pre-development contracts were needed. They coordinate the overall planning, definition of individual and total specifications, as well as the start time of critical developments. These contracts run from 1 June 1984 to 30 June 1985.

Bids for Equipment

On the basis of specifications defined and admitted by the executive agency a solicitation for bids will be conducted in Germany and France, possibly also in the European area for the following equipment components/subsystems.

1. System management

- Data bus
- Central computer, RTU
- Basic software
- Basic transmitters-sensors

2. Avionics

- Flight control
- Navigation system (inertial platform, Doppler, computer, etc.)
- Measuring devices for low speeds
- Radio sounders, transmitter/sensors, etc.

3. Man-machine interface

- Symbol generator
- Multifunctional displays
- Multifunctional keyboards
- Display and service equipment

4. Flight control

5. Basic cockpit equipment

6. Landing gear

7. Hydraulics

8. Electrical supply, electrical systems

9. Fuel system
10. Climate control
11. De-icing
12. Power transmission (main and tail drives)
13. Engine regulation and supervision
14. Radio/radio navigation
15. ECM/warning devices.

After presentation of specifications a final decision will be made whether these sub-systems are advertised. The solicitations are to begin in late 1984 and are to close in the second quarter of 1985.

It is planned to conclude the main development contracts in 1985 on the basis of fixed costs; the intention is also to integrate firm experiments, service trials and troop trials so as to save further time and resources.

Flight trials in the industry are scheduled to begin in early 1988 and the entire trial period is to be concluded in late 1990.

Table of Comparisons

	<u>PAH-2</u>	<u>HAP</u>	<u>HAC-3G</u>
Starting weight		5,000 kg	
Installed capacity		2 x 900 kW	
Maximum cruising speed	250 km/h	280 km/h	260 km/h
Flight time		2.5 hours + 20 min reserve	
Hovering altitude without ground effect	2,000 m at ISH+10	1,000 m at 25°C	
Climbing speed		10 m/sec	
Armament	8 HOT 4 Stinger Provisions for PARS 3	nose-mounted cannon Mistral air-to-air or unguided rockets	8 PARS 3

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CSO: 3620/287

MILITARY

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FIRST MULTI-PURPOSE WEAPONS SYSTEM NOW AVAILABLE FOR TORNADO

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Jan 85 pp 68-76

[Article by Wolfgang Flume: "The MW-1 Weapons System"]

[Text] On 22 November 1984 the German Luftwaffe received its first MW-1 weapons system for its Tornado fighter. Munitions especially developed for the Tornado were thus put in service. With the MW-1 weapons system surface targets are to be engaged with high accuracy and much greater efficiency that has been possible with conventional weapons. For the first time WEHRTECHNIK gives a detailed overview of the MW-1 along with its currently available or still developing submunitions.

The Tornado, according to one-time Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt the most expensive defense project since the birth of Christ, is often charged with being a technically very successful airplane but having armaments (especially against surface targets) that in no way correspond to the capabilities of the aircraft. There is often talk of "antiquated iron bombs" of the kind used more than 40 years ago in World War II and on which the Tornado still depends.

Admittedly, the criticism is not quite unjustified. Not only do the press offices of aircraft firms that participated in developing the Tornado like to publish pictures depicting the Tornado with as large a weapons load as possible, i.e., a large number of bombs, in order to demonstrate the Tornado's high load capacity; the Luftwaffe admits that its ammunition inventory consists more or less of conventional ammunition for the Tornado, mostly high-explosive bombs or the BL-755 scatter bomb against armored targets. At the same time, however, it is pointed out that the Tornado can deliver this ordnance in greater quantities, with much greater accuracy, and under all weather conditions. The effort per sortie per target is thus claimed to be much lower, with an additional bonus of reduced threat to crew and aircraft compared to older airplanes such as the F-4.

To the credit of the planners it must be said that the Tornado's action against air-to-ground targets (strike) has from the very beginning been designed by the German side to take place with two weapons systems that were to be developed simultaneously with the aircraft--the MW-1 multi-purpose weapons

system--called also STREBO scatter bomb or the DB-1 Boelkow Dispenser in the early stages of development--against area targets, and the JUMBO, a TV-guided standoff missile against high-value, stationary targets such as bridges and bunkers. However, the JUMBO program was discontinued as early as 1975 after five years of preliminary development and one year of development since foreign partners could not be found and the project threatened to become too expensive; moreover, the TV-guided head made the use of the missile in all weather conditions impossible. The decision to scrap the JUMBO is still regretted by many since in the interim NATO has not been able to develop such a long-distance weapon against presumably well-defended targets.

However, the development of the MW-1 was not stopped, and thus the Luftwaffe was able to take delivery of the first MW-1 system on 22 November for the 31st "Boelcke" fighter bomber wing at Noervenich. Thus the MW-1 is delivered by and large "on schedule," i.e., roughly corresponding to the introduction of the Tornado in the Luftwaffe, although initially it is only equipped with antiarmor submunition. Submunitions for use against airfields is scheduled to follow in late 1987.

Along with international talks regarding development of the Tornado attack craft optimized for air-to-ground missions in late 60's the apparatus branch of MBB began its first studies of a weapons system, at the time still called the "scatter bomb" (STREBO). It was to be used in low flight over the target area and was to contain submunitions optimized for use against two surface targets--armor concentrations and (somewhat later) airfields. The munitions were to be stored in a container/dispenser (thus the other original designation BD-1, Boelkow Dispenser). The ejection of the munitions, the caliber, and other measurements were to be standardized to the point that the container could be identical for all classes of ammunition. (Since the MW-1 as a unit is already a "munition" the munitions to be ejected from the MW-1 container are more appropriately called submunitions.)

MBB, up to the mid-70's still primarily an experimental firm in the weapons sector, was in the late 70's brought with a more or less strong support from the BMVg [Federal Defense Ministry] into cooperation with Diehl, a firm having great experiences in large-scale ammunition production. The two firms founded in 1976 the Raketen-Technik-Gesellschaft RTG, headquartered in Schrobenhausen, to tackle the problems of unguided rockets (rocket systems), end phase guided missiles, and bomb distribution systems. On the basis of this task the RTG is also, for example, the chief national firm for building the MLRS-I under license, to include the development of the AT-2 warheads. Since the mother firms MBB and Diehl in the meantime found other partners abroad, the RTG was not included in the development of end phase guided submunitions for MLRS (MLRS, Phase III); Diehl participates with Martin Marietta in the MDTT (which won the bid), MBB works as part of the Euromissile Dynamics Group with Hughes.

1977 Development Contract

On 1 July 1977 the BWB [Federal Office for Defense Technology and Procurement] concluded with MBB, later with RTG, a contract to develop the multi-purpose

MW-1 weapon, including submunitions. In mid-1977 the contract was transferred to the RTG. At the time the assumption was that the project would conclude in about 1981, a target that could not be met for many reasons. For example, some of the performance demands for some categories of submunitions were so high that in part basic research had to be conducted. There were also changes in the adapter on the aircraft (bomb lock)--all together led to certain delays.

The development contract included development of the MW-1 container and submunitions for the two main target groups:

--Main target group I: Antitank efforts with KB-44, MIFF and MUSA submunitions;

--Main target group II: Action against airfields with STABO, MUSPA, and ASW submunitions,

In the meantime about \$500 million were expended on the MW-1 system. Development of the ASW anti-shelter weapon was interrupted in 1981 for budgetary reasons.

Table 1. Targets to be Engaged by MW-1

Target Categories, First Priority

Airfields (Main target group II)

- Starting and landing paths, runways
- Aircraft shelters and other airfield construction
- Unprotected material and soft targets

Armored and Mechanized Units (Main target group I)

- In attack formation
- In march formation

Target Categories, Second Priority (Main target group I)

- Armored and mechanized forces in assembly areas
- Unfortified positions and command installations
- Firing positions
- Transportation facilities
- Supply facilities
- Troop concentrations

With the development contract RTG became the system leader for the MW-1 program, i.e., the management firm responsible for planning, program management, development, testing, experiments, or [operational research] and product support. Since the MW-1 has remained a national program--attempts at internationalization failed--the RTG management team of some 20 persons is relatively small, the development and now the manufacture itself were undertaken by the mother firms or component suppliers. Within the system-wide responsibility of RTG the MBB and Diehl divide the responsibility for development along the following lines:

--MBB: MW-1 container and among submunitions of main target group I: MIFF (KB-44 warhead) as well as the ejection mechanism; main target group II: STABO and MUSPA;

--Diehl: KB-44 and MUSA (and at a later time partial responsibility for the STABO).

The submunition categories of Main target group I have since 1980 had priority in the development, since they were begun earlier and could be developed with smaller costs; the development of the submunitions for the Main target group II is thus lagging somewhat.

With regard to the ASW anti-shelter weapon there is hope that in 1985 again resources will be allocated for a shorter definition phase, so that this submunition for Main target group II could also be ready by about 1990.

Series Contract 1984

On 31 August 1984 the RTG received the first production contract for series preparation and delivery of 344 MW-1 containers loaded with submunitions for the main target group I. The contract was worth just about DM 700 million. Through certain advanced measures it could be achieved that delivery began already in November 1984; it is to last until late 1988.

For the manufacture of the 344 containers RTG in 1983 issued on behalf of the BWB a solicitation for bids. Evaluation by RTG and BWB showed that the Diehl and MBB mother firms could build more cost effectively than their competitors. Reasons for the poor outcome of the competitors might perhaps be the fact that not all of the responding firms had experience with the manufacture of submunition components, or, since the components often contain explosives, they did not have the appropriately secured manufacturing areas.

The distribution of manufacture of submunitions corresponds roughly to that in the development. The container itself is built by the MBB. Due to its use by the Tornado at high subsonic speed it must be built according to classical aircraft manufacturing rules.

Further contracts will follow the first delivery of 344 containers with submunition categories of main target group I. Some five years ago the BMVg still spoke of plans for acquiring 2,000 MW-1; now it is only about 1,400 (including about two-thirds for main target group II). In addition, there will be an Italian order of 100 MW-1, including 10 with submunitions for main target group I and 90 with main target group II submunitions; a contract to that effect was signed with Italy in October 1984. The first MW-1 for the Italian air force are to be delivered in 1989.

Containers

Each MW-1 container set has four container segments. Each loaded segment will be stored in a government-supplied transportation and storage container (TULBEH) built by SGH in Hamburg. The container in turn lies on a shockproof pallet. Every five years the containers, especially the submunitions, stored in depots on Tornado bases will be inspected. The RTG warranty extends for ten years,

as is the rule with ammunition; the total useable lifespan should be approximately 20 years, with possible maintenance and repairs after ten years.

Thus MW-1 containers will not fly under the Tornado for training, nor even training containers. The latter are used for loading practice in the course of which each container element is individually attached to the Multi Weapon Carriage System (MWCS) developed by the MBB (this is a multipurpose adapter under the fuselage) with the help of a Steinbock or MJ-4 loading device. The slightly conical segments 1 and 4 are identical in form, as are the box-like segments 2 and 3, merely the adapter needs are different. Each container set is 1.32 m wide, 0.65 m high, and has a total length of 5.3 m. Loaded, a MW-1 container set (also called combat set) weighs up to 4,600 kilograms, of this about 3,400 kg account for the submunition, with some 1,000 kg being explosives. Each segment has 28 tubes of 132 mm caliber, so that every MW-1 has 112 tubes. After the ejection of the submunitions the four empty segments can be jettisoned within 0.9 seconds, beginning understandably with the rearmost. The front container, in particular, had to be shaped aerodynamically so that it would not hit the aircraft after jettison.

The segments have been designed for onetime use, the assumption being that in a real situation there would not be enough time to reload the segments while maintaining safety requirements. Also, reusable segments that would hang under the Tornado on its return flight would have reduced the operating radius of the aircraft. With a MW-1 container the Tornado can still fly at up to 600 knots, i.e., just under the sound barrier, and the flying characteristics with container attached are said to be even better than without it.

Coverage 500 m Wide

In contrast to the original title "scatter bomb" (STREBO) the MW-1 is definitely a precision weapon brought at a high speed to the target by the Tornado. The target is an area, not a point target, and there the MW-1 submunitions will take effect. The MW-1 use is guided by the weapons system officer; for example, he can on his Head Up Display see as an orientation the starting line of the area to be covered with the submunitions. At the release of the submunition the Tornado flies extremely low (about 100 meters), the area covered is up to 500 m in width, 250 m on each side of the flight path. The length of the field varies from 180 to 2,500 m. The optimum length depends on the target and on the submunition, in the case of the KB-44, for example, it is 180 m. This optimal length is fed into the onboard computer during the loading of the MW-1 on the Tornado; if needed, the weapons systems officer can change it in flight.

The submunitions are distributed over the target area very evenly; that is feasible, among other things, by differing ejection speeds. The highest ejection speeds are in the front segment, more than 100 m/sec, the lowest in the rear one at about 20 m/sec. Thus the submunitions of the front container are thrown to the edge of the field, while the rear ones hit the ground in the middle of the field, i.e., practically under the aircraft. The ejection speed differs to an unimportant degree according to the differing weight of the KB-44, MIFF, and MUSA/MUSPA submunitions. The STABO alone has a somewhat narrower scattering pattern achieved by lower ejection speeds. The electrically released ejection takes place without recoil, since the pyrotechnical ejection mechanism is located in the middle of the munition tube and

releases submunitions simultaneously to both sides. The device has a differing number of disk drives to obtain varying ejection speeds. The ejection tubes have outside covers that are ejected simultaneously with the submunitions, whereby three small securing pins are shaved off.

Six Combat Sets

Each tube can contain two STABO or ASW, six MUSA/MUSPA, eight MIFF or 42 KB-44. Since the front and rear container segments are slightly conical, the number of the submunitions in their tubes is slightly lower. According to the kind of target the submunitions are combined into different configurations, called combat sets. For example, there are the following five combat sets:

- A. MIFF and KB-44, the so-called Mix I, for use against armored forces. Each segment contains both MIFF and KB-44;
- B. All segments and tubes loaded with KB-44--more than 4,500 KB-44 per combat set--for use against armored vehicles;
- C. MUSA alone for action against semi-hard and soft targets, such as aircraft concentrations, command facilities, etc.;
- D. A mixture (Mix II) consisting of MUSA, MUSPA, and MIFF for action against airfields;
- E. STABO alone for destruction of landing paths and runways;
- F. The later addition of ASW combat set.

To date the combat sets A to C have been tested on E-91 near Meppen with full ejections of inert ammunition, so that their introduction has been approved. The use of submunition mixtures, whether as a so-called mix from one combat aircraft or as uniform loads from several aircraft, promises to have a considerably improved effect. For example, submunitions of the combat set D prevent for a certain period the repair of landing and takeoff paths destroyed by the STABO combat set.

For the MW-1 the following already mentioned six submunition categories have been or will be developed: KB-44, MIFF and MUSA for the Main target group I, antitank action, STABO, MUSPA and later ASW for Main target group II, anti-airfield action. Each submunition has a manufacturer's name, and an official, often not easily understood Bundeswehr nomenclature which is given in parentheses.

Bomblet KB-44 (Bomb, antitank, shaped charge)

The KB-44, about 0.6 kg in weight, is named for its 44 mm caliber. It is a shaped charge bomblet with a standoff plunger that extends into the shaped charge cone and extends only after the munition is ejected from the container. The high density of bomblets in the container tube is further achieved by the

fact that the plunger of a bomblet also extends somewhat into [the cavity of] the bomblet in front. From one tube three clusters of seven KB-44 are ejected to each side, the clusters separate in the air pyrotechnically when a cutting device cuts through the steel band joining the KB-44. In the air the bomblet is stabilized by a six stabilizers opening to the rear. A small wind generator is extended to the side and loads the ignition generator. The shaped charge is ignited when the plunger hits an object. Should the KB-44 tumble since, say, the stabilizers have failed, the bomblet is ignited by a special element reacting to the hit on the ground.

MIFF (Mine Flat Flat, Antitank)

Like all the other submunitions (with the exception of KB-44) the 3.4 kg antitank mine MIFF has a caliber of 132 mm. In one tube 2 x 4 MIFF are loaded. Each mine contains two flat conical shaped charges with opposing directions, with the cones being filled with foam. Between the shaped charges is the igniter, imbedded in the explosive charge. The ignition condenser is charged by onboard electronics; the ignition mechanism is activated after a pin is released laterally by a spring after ejection from the tube. The mine tumbles through the air to ground. Immediately thereafter a ring releases lateral springs that position the mine in such a fashion that one flat charge points upward. Only now is the mine live. It explodes when two sensors indicate that a tank is rolling over the mine. These sensors also insure that a mine detonation will not cause other nearby mines to explode. This is also an insurance against clearing demolitions; further safeguards against mechanical clearing and lifting are also integrated. After a certain period of time the mines self-destruct.

Multi-fragmentation Mine With Active Sensor MUSA (Grenade, Multipurpose, Fragmentation)

The 4.5 kg MUSA is a multifragmentation grenade for engaging soft and semi-hardened targets. Before ejection the condenser is loaded by onboard electronics, the MUSA becomes live after leaving the tube when a safety pin is released. After a short flight a stabilization chute opens and also brakes the fall. Once the mine is on the ground a positioning aid (laterally extending springs as in the MIFF) open so that the mine is positioned upright. A time fuse with preset timing then explodes the entire minefield, with the heavy metal pellets placed around the MUSA charge penetrating light armor or, in the case of MUSPA, destroy aircraft.

Multi-fragmentation Mine With Passive and Active Sensor MUSPA (Mine, Anti-personnel, Fragmentation)

The construction of the MUSPA resembles that of the MUSA, but it has a different ignition system, since it is designed to serve as a submunition of the main target group II against airfields. Once the mine is on the ground, an acoustical homing sensor reacts to taxiing and starting aircraft and causes the mine to detonate. Clearing is very difficult, especially since the MUSPA is used only together with the MUSA and MIFF in the so-called Mix I. At first all MUSA explode at a given time, when MIFF prevent clearing of the area by vehicles, and occasionally MUSPA explode, either spontaneously or in case of taxiing or

starting aircraft. This is especially designed to prevent rapid repairs of landing and rollways destroyed by the STABO.

Starting Path Bomb STABO (Bomb, Explosive, Armor-piercing, Shaped Charge)

In the case of the approximately 17 kg STABO--two per tube--a hood in the rear is removed by the ejection mechanism shortly after ejection, so that a parachute can open. The parachute stabilizes and slows the STABO so that it falls rather steeply. Then a cover on the head is blasted off, a spring operated pin is released and primes the two charges once it touches the ground. The first charge, a shaped charge, penetrates the concrete or asphalt of the runway, then a second charge, housed in the rear, narrower part of the STABO--is shot through the hole in the runway and explodes after a certain ignition delay practically like a demolition charge in the ground under the concrete; earth and concrete are thrown upward. In a STABO mission--here the Tornado flies at the lowest altitude alongside the runway and the mostly parallel taxiways--many craters are caused in the runways. Thus the repair of a starting runway of at least 1,000 m will be much more difficult for maintenance personnel than in the case of only a few, even if larger craters, such as those caused by the DURANDAL.

STABO is still under development; part of the plant qualification has been concluded. The testing of an ejection of live STRABO as a prerequisite for introduction is to take place in April 1986 at the American Eglin Air Force Base.

Anti-Shelter Weapon ASW

The ASW is to have the same effect that the STABO has against concrete and asphalt areas on aircraft shelters built of concrete and having additional earth protection. Development of the ASW, probably the technically most ambitious MW-1 submunition was frozen in 1981, but its definition is to begin anew in 1985. According to the state of development to date the ASW is to have a spring-operated stabilization system opening after ejection. Once the weapon hits the ground, a motor ignites, the earth is pushed aside, and the ASW meets the outside shelter wall. There a tandem charge like that of the STABO is lit--the concrete is penetrated by a shaped charge, a followup charge enters the shelter, explodes, and destroys the aircraft in the shelter with pre-formed fragments. Should the ASW not encounter ground cover but the armored shelter door, the tandem charge is ignited immediately.

As a result of the new definition phase other action principles should be selected, such as operations based on kinetic energy.

Submunition for Other Systems

The MW-1 was developed especially for Tornado, thus the relatively large dimensions of the container segments. Already under former Luftwaffe chief of staff, Lt Gen Limberg attempts were made to find foreign partners or users for the MW-1 program, with primary consideration for the Tornado partners Great

Britain and Italy, as well as for the U.S. The nations, however, went their own way, merely Italy will buy the MW-1. Great Britain developed the JP-233 for action against airfields, first with the U.S., now alone. In the U.S., a kinetically operated runway munition BKEP is being developed. The British development has the advantage that it can be used in various aircraft models after certain modifications. MW-1, because of the big and heavy container, could at most be used with the F-4, F-111, and A-10. This led to early thoughts in the MBB to develop smaller containers for MW-1 submunitions, first called the MW-X, later the Container Weapon System (CWS) or Modular Dispenser System (MDS). In part these are freely flying or even self-propelled containers so that the carrying aircraft no longer have to fly over target--the containers have become standoff weapons.

These thoughts will be included in the planned SR-SOM, i.e., the short-range standoff weapon, but it must be considered that such freely operating dispensers or missiles must have a very accurate navigation system or a remote control device, and thus will be considerably more expensive than the MW-1. An advantage of these weapons is a reduction of the threat to the carrying aircraft; it no longer has to fly like the Tornado with the MW-1 over the probably well-defended target area.

Standoff Module--the Better Solution?

From the SR-SOM but also from the long-range standoff module LR-SOM MW-1 submunitions are to be ejected, but also other submunitions that are partly already in the state of development in the industry. This includes, for example, the antitank directional LASSO mine (an acoustical sensor aims the mine at a passing tank and fires a shaped charge), or the ALADIN incendiary/explosive submunition.

The question is if and when end phase-guided submunitions are to be used with the MW-1 or the SR-SOM and LR-SOM to achieve a higher number of hits. This munition will in any case be expensive. It will then be an arithmetic problem to figure what will be more cost effective--conventional inexpensive or guided expensive ammunition. For example, it must be calculated if one combat set of some 200 ASW of which only a small number will hit and destroy shelters is more cost effective than a smaller number of end phase guided ASW that destroy a larger number of shelters. Or--in the case of a KB-44 combat set, assuming even distribution, one bomblet is distributed per a 20 square meter area. Is that enough to destroy the enemy tanks in the target area, or would a guided submunition be more appropriate, since it would have a much greater accuracy, and, due to its larger caliber, also a greater destructive probability?

But: MW-1 Available Now

Such indispensable considerations should not prevent, however, the delivery of an adequate number of the MW-1 weapons system with available or developed submunitions for the Tornados of the Luftwaffe. The guided submunition, fully suitable for the Middle European battlefield, cannot be available before the 90's.

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

NEW TORNADOES TO CLOSE RECONNAISSANCE, GROUND ATTACK GAP

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Mar 85 pp 1, 2

[Article by fy: "Luftwaffe Wants to Acquire Another 40 Tornados; Gap in Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare; Costs DM 3.7 Billion"]

[Text] Bonn, 1 March. For a total amount of DM 3.7 billion the Luftwaffe wants to acquire another 40 Tornado aircraft. They are to be equipped with infrared and video cameras, as well as electronic equipment in order to close one of the most sensitive gaps of the Bundeswehr--the currently totally inadequate tactical reconnaissance. Of equal importance to this equipment is arming the aircraft to enable them to suppress enemy air defense systems and to disturb or suppress his command, communication, and fire control system. The closing of this gap that the Bundeswehr has had up to now in this area was described as the area for concentrated attention in Luftwaffe equipment for the next few years in the armament planning survey adopted last year. Within the survey it was concluded that the decision about acquiring such systems should be made early this year.

At the present time the Luftwaffe has about 80 flying reconnaissance systems, F-4 Phantoms. They have optical and infrared cameras, side-looking and on-board radar, but no armament and no electronic warfare equipment. Their reconnaissance equipment is also largely obsolescent. The Luftwaffe has allocated four squadrons of 15 planes each to NATO. By the early 90s it will be unable to continue to do this, due to wear and tear and expected aircraft losses. To meet its mission the Luftwaffe, needs according to recognized research a total of 120 aircraft, equipped for the reconnaissance/fighter bomber mission combination. It is believed that the current gap can be closed with the acquisition of 40 specially equipped Tornados.

The need to modernize friendly "penetrating reconnaissance" is, according to Bundeswehr judgment, due to the qualitative and quantitative improvements by the Warsaw Pact over the last decades. Attention is drawn especially to the increased mobility of all forces, the much improved night combat capability, the extremely dense air defense, as well as the highly effective radio-electronic warfare ability of the Warsaw Pact forces. The Bundeswehr needs the projected aircraft for action against

enemy air defense positions, and command and communication installations, but also for supplementing long-range reconnaissance through precise situation, target, and weapons effect reconnaissance in all weather conditions. The aircraft are also needed to shelter the fighter bomber Tornado version of the Luftwaffe from enemy electronic warfare.

In addition to the Tornado, further purchases of the F-4 Phantom, as well as purchases of the F-1, F-18, and F-20, were considered, as these aircraft could meet this mission. All these aircraft had the disadvantage that, unlike the Tornado, they do not have terrain flight radar and thus can hardly be used jointly with Tornado fighter bomber squadrons, since they have only a limited low-level flight capability. Except for the F-18 and the F-4 (which was eliminated by the mere fact that it has not been built since 1978 and cannot be adequately modernized) all the aircraft also have only one engine, causing further risks. There are additional shortcomings with respect to range and loading capacity.

According to current plans the first sums for developing the 40 aircraft will be needed as soon as 1985. This presupposes that the budget and defense committees of the Bundestag will approve the procurement project by the end of this year at the latest. The decisive document that establishes the requirements is "Tactical Development." This has been released by the Luftwaffe chief of staff for cosignature to departments sharing the responsibility for aircraft procurement, and is currently in the hands of the armaments department. As soon as it has been completed, "Tactical Development" is transmitted through the Bundeswehr chief of staff to State Secretary Timmermann. This must take place in the next few weeks if the requirements for the project are to be submitted to the finance minister for fiscal year 1986 by the mid-April deadline. The agreement of the budget committee is needed even before the summer recess if development funds for the ECR (Electronic Combat Reconnaissance) version of the Tornados, amounting to some DM 140 million, are to be released on schedule.

The budget department of the defense ministry has investigated the financing of the armaments project amounting to DM 3.7 billion in current prices, and has certified it to be feasible. However, the project is not yet quite wrapped up. The largest part of the sum is to be obtained from the approximately DM 3 billion allocation that the Luftwaffe received for tactical reconnaissance systems within the Bundeswehr Plan 86. However, since these resources were only planned for use in 1991, and now are needed already in 1986 for the planned procurement program, replanning and allocation shifts within the Luftwaffe armament plan will be necessary. Further resources of some DM 700 million will come from German claims on Great Britain, derived from the joint production of the Tornado. Finally, the new project can also be fed from savings of about half a million mark that have been realized in the current Tornado procurement program of 320 aircraft, since the rate of inflation and price developments have been less than had been assumed in the defense ministry's financial planning.

9240

CSO: 3620/293

MILITARY

FINLAND

SOCIALIST PARTY ACTS TO 'DEDRAMATIZE' MILITARY POLICY PLANNING

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Feb 85 p 8

[Article: "Social Democrats Do No Want Dramatics in Defense Debate"]

[Text] In the opinion of the Social Democrats there is no need in Finland to establish a mini-defense committee for considering defense appropriations or a super committee for promoting new security policy lines as proposed by Defense Minister Veikko Pihlajamaki (Center Party member). The SDP wants to transfer communication between the politicians and the Army and the defense debate to an advisory committee subordinate to the Defense Ministry so that no dramatics will be connected with its work.

This was the argument used by Secretary Erkki Liikanen on Wednesday to justify the proposal made on Thursday by the SDP's Executive Committee that instead of a new committee the defense debate should be conducted in an advisory committee with a 3-year commission, which would include representatives of the government and the opposition parties as well as the defense forces.

According to Liikanen, such an advisory committee could debate primary issues of defense policy as well as make proposals and issue statements on defense force matters and also on defense appropriations if unanimity on these issues is reached. The SDP has not precisely defined what the advisory committee it wants should do. The mandate and size of the advisory committee will remain for the Defense Ministry to consider.

Defense Minister Pihlajamaki did not yet want to take a stand on the SDP's proposal since it had not yet been presented in writing to the ministry and the issue has not been discussed in the ministry. Pihlajamaki has adopted a cautiously positive attitude toward the Social Democrats' idea since he himself has wanted a continuation of the discussion between politicians and the defense forces in some kind of an organ. "The name of the organ is a matter of indifference," stated Pihlajamaki.

Liikanen estimated that the idea of an advisory committee will not be rejected in the other parties.

According to Liikanen, the SDP adheres to the fact that foreign and security policy leadership belongs to the president. The Social Democratic Party does not consider it necessary to initiate a discussion on the interpretations of

the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact or to commence building hypotheses of Finland's threat factors in any kind of organ.

One reason to propose an advisory committee in place of a regular committee was according to Liikanen the fact that defense committees have become kind of super committees, around which dramatics are emphasized. This is what the SDP wants to avoid.

Some amazement at the SDP's negative stand toward a new defense committee has been expressed since the party's chairman, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa, has previously talked about a new committee in a positive vein.

Several reasons have been given for the SDP's negative stand. President Mauno Koivisto has adopted a cautious attitude toward a new committee at the least and a number of Social Democrats have taken a very negative attitude toward the "generals' money-automat" for compiling proposals for appropriations. The ranks of the SDP and the committee began to split already in the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee and apparently the party did not want a repeat of this situation. Also the SDP did not want to end up in a situation in a new defense committee in which others only test to what degree the SDP is ready to give money to the Army. Perhaps the Social Democrats also wanted to protect the president and the government from a situation in which a harmonious decision on defense funds for the near future is not reached in a new committee.

The model for the advisory committee proposed by the SDP was obtained from the Foreign Ministry, under the jurisdiction of which an advisory committee on economic relations with developing countries, Talke, makes recommendations on development aid funds. The SDP is aiming at something similar in the area of defense policy.

10576

CSO: 3617/82

MILITARY

FINLAND

FINLAND'S AIR FORCE LARGELY IMMUNE FROM PILOT DRAIN PROBLEM

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 11 Mar 85 pp 1, 6

[Article by Stig Kankkonen: "Pilot Flight Only a Memory"]

[Text] Tikkakoski--It takes almost 7 years and millions of marks for the air force to educate one single officer through operational training. Still in the middle of the 1970's that investment in many cases benefitted civilian employers. But no longer. Investments to make the air force attractive have succeeded and the pilot flight has been stopped.

Naturally much of what the air force has done can not be discussed. But it is clear that Finland's airspace is carefully guarded hour after hour, day after day, month after month and year after year. It is also clear that the guarding is needed. On an average, once a day an aircraft takes off to protect the borders of the country against something which looks like it will be a border violation.

That the system functions was shown by the Enare incident.

'Every Day an Intercept Mission'

Every second Finland's airspace is guarded. Fliers are always ready within minutes to be in the air if Finland's airspace is violated or threatened. Including just now as you read this.

The Enare incident shows that the system functions. Only 9 minutes after the missile was observed on the radar an aircraft was in the air and the chase was underway. The incident was the latest in which the input of the air force became generally known. But the fact is that on the average there is one intercept mission per day! A mission caused by the fact that the country's airspace is violated or about to be violated.

In order that the system should function a comprehensive organization is required. With the different organizations of the air force there are fully 4,000 people working today. Of those about 300 are officers or special officers, about 1,000 are appointed officers, about 1,800 are conscripts and about 1,000 are civilians.

Acceptable Minimum Level

"About today's air force we can say that in personnel and material we are at an acceptable minimum level. In practice that means that we can carry out the tasks which are placed on us by the most rational and efficient use of resources," explained Major Lars- Olof Fredriksson, information officer of the air force.

"The training that we provide for our personnel is on a good international level."

Briefly, the situation according to Fredriksson is satisfactory with a plus after it. But it has not always been thus. For no longer than 10 years ago the air force had a problem. After training requiring many years and many million marks the fliers sought private employment, and the turnover of personnel was great. One could almost say there was chaos.

"That condition has been definitely over for several years. Today the fliers are happy in the air force and there is absolutely no longer any talk of leaving," emphasized Fredriksson.

Three factors made it possible to change the situation, according to Major Lars-Olof Fredriksson: pay adjustments, better material and better motivation.

"All the factors have caused the personnel today to have a very positive attitude toward their work. Pay for pilots is no longer so incomparable with the civilian sector as it still was in the middle of the 70's. Improvements in material lets us work more effectively, and that gives satisfaction."

Motivated Fliers

"Last but absolutely not least I will emphasize that our boys are now very motivated. They experience their work as meaningful and important," said Fredriksson.

Compared with, for example, Sweden and Norway, the investments have led to an enviable situation for the Finnish Air Force. In Sweden and Norway they speak about departures to civilian jobs as almost a catastrophe. In Finland they no longer have that problem.

"We are rather well off, considering that we are a little air force with very limited resources," confirmed Fredriksson.

But it is all not rosy and gold. Especially now when it concerns guarding and readiness.

Because of the scant resources the alert points of the guard must alternate. They do not therefore have the capacity to cover the entire country

but invest in different parts of the country at different times.

The reason why they could so quickly get a plane in the air in connection with the Enare incident at the end of December last year could therefore be that the alert point in the readiness just then was in Lappland. Major Lars-Olof Fredriksson would not comment on this point.

"On the other hand I can say that we never in any way emphasize Lappland. That part of the country is treated as any other part."

It may be by chance that readiness in Lappland was especially high during the Enare incident. The fact is in any case that they could react quickly. The fact also is that the entire incident made the general impression of the air force more positive. Many more Finns believe that the air force should be strengthened. That attitude is naturally applauded within the air force, but has probably caused a certain irritation within other military branches.

"I will not comment on that. For us it is pleasant that the attitude toward the air force is as positive as it is now," says Major Lars-Olof Fredriksson.

9287

CSO: 3650/212

MILITARY

FINLAND

SDP PAPER, MINORITY CP ORGAN ON DEFENSE PANEL ISSUE

SDP Stand Explained

Helsinki SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI in Finnish 21 Feb 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Advisory Committee As Civilian Auxiliary"]

[Text] In early last December the SDP [Social Democratic Party] announced that "the Social Democrats do not feel that it is necessary at this point" to appoint a new parliamentary defense committee for the fourth time in succession. The Social Democrats at that time felt that the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee had provided a long-range framework for the development of our defense policy with its proposals.

The Third Committee drew up plans for the next 15 years. Only 4 years have passed since then. Therefore, there would be nothing for a new committee to do and, as the Social Democrats see it, a committee is not needed to distribute military appropriations.

There were other arguments too behind the SDP's December position paper. Experiences with the committees have not been only favorable. Especially the speculative debate on security policy engaged in about the Third Defense Committee. This is useless and gives rise to a drama surrounding security policy matters that is easily misunderstood outside our borders, where there are otherwise difficulties in understanding the real nature of our parliamentary and committee systems.

In our form of government the leadership of foreign and security policy is the responsibility of the president. The ministerial level has its own official organizations for the preparation of affairs. There is a high-level defense council in the country and both foreign affairs and defense committees in Parliament. The preparatory and decisionmaking machinery is in fine shape.

The SDP has nevertheless now proposed the appointment of a parliamentary advisory committee. According to the SDP, an advisory committee meeting at certain prescribed times could engage in defense policy discussion and issue statements and recommendations. Similar organs can be found in several state administration sectors.

The Social Democrats' proposal is to be understood in the sense that the SDP does not want to prevent an exchange of opinions between the military and civilians, nor to dodge participation in the development of the administrative domain of defense policy. This would be impossible for the country's biggest party. The advisory committee would be a Defense Ministry auxiliary body. This proposal may receive support. To be sure, we still have to ask ourselves whether military officials are so detached from our society that a fringe organization like an advisory committee is needed in addition to the existing channels for communicating and exerting influence.

Communist Paper Attacks SDP

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 22 Feb 85 p 2

[Editorial: "The SDP Proposal"]

[Text] The SDP leadership has proposed the appointment of an advisory committee subject to the Defense Ministry in place of a parliamentary defense committee.

Even earlier, Defense Minister Veikko Pihlajaniemi proposed the appointment of a reduced defense committee, primarily to consider Army appropriation needs.

Both proposals share one and the same thing: the desire to avoid engaging in a security policy debate and to chiefly concentrate on recommending Army procurement programs in accordance with the wishes of the generals.

We know that President Koivisto is not very enthused over the appointment of a new, broad-based parliamentary defense committee. Evidently the reason for both the SDP and the defense minister's proposals is to reach mutual understanding with the president.

It is certainly clear that the conclusions with regard to security policy brought on by the deployment of Euromissiles are inescapable from the standpoint of Finland, even if a parliamentary defense committee is not appointed to draw such conclusions.

It seems as though the SDP proposal is stillborn, even if it were to be realized.

11466
CSO: 3617/89

MILITARY

FINLAND

BRIEFS

STRIKE THREATENS AIR FORCE MAINTENANCE--The Air Force's service and maintenance work is being threatened by a strike scheduled for 11 March. On Thursday the SAK [Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions] affiliated Aviation Industry Union issued a labor stoppage warning, according to which the approximately 250 members of the union in the service of the Air Force's maintenance depots will strike unless an agreement on a new labor contract is reached. A possible strike will hinder the operations of the Air Force according to the union. The Aviation Industry Union has presented a 3-year package on working and wage conditions to the Defense Ministry. In the civilian area the union has reached an agreement with Finnair on a similar contract. Deviating from previous practice the Defense Ministry, however, did not at this time want to conclude a similar agreement for the Air Force according to the Aviation Industry Union. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Feb 85 p 9] 10576

MILITARY

GREECE

BRIEFS

ARTEMIS' GERMAN-MADE PARTS--They told us the other day during the parade [of 25 March] that the anti-aircraft gun "Artemis 30" was a product of "Greek hands." However, I have found out that it is made of parts completely manufactured abroad. Mostly Germany. For instance, its two barrels are made by the well known firm "Mauser." Its ammunition comes from another German company. Its radar system is manufactured by the Siemens company, its base is also foreign, while the firing control system is made by a...Swedish firm. All this is being said in the interest of correctness. [Excerpt] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28 Mar 85 p 4 from "Notebook column signed by "Tilefos"]

CSO: 3521/228

MILITARY

NETHERLANDS

OPINION POLL ON DEFENSE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 14 Mar 85 p 3

[Text]

The Hague, March 14 - Some 35 per cent of Dutch people reject nuclear weapons, 25 per cent accept them, 23 per cent are unsure and 17 per cent answer 'illogically' when asked their opinion, according to results of a survey published in an official journal for defence ministry staff today.

The survey was commissioned by the ministry's information service and conducted by the Amsterdam-based National Institute for Public Opinion (NIPO) which questioned representative samples of between 800 and 1,200 people on defence issues.

Results of similar surveys conducted since 1978 are also published in the journal and show that public rejection of nuclear weapons was at a low of 21 per cent in early 1978 and peaked at 38 per cent in 1981.

Acceptance of nuclear weapons was at a low of 16 per cent in 1978 before peaking last year at 25 per cent while the proportion of those unsure has fallen to its current low of 23 per cent from a peak of 33 per cent in 1978 and 1979.

Cruise Missiles

A separate 1985 survey showed that 40 per cent of people would consider a Dutch decision to site cruise missiles to be bad, compared with 38 per cent in 1983 and 44 per cent in 1982. Some 16 per cent would consider such a decision to be good as against 11 per cent in 1982 and 18 per cent in 1984.

Some 39 per cent would regret a decision to site cruise missiles but would consider it acceptable, as against 36 per cent in 1981 and 42 per cent in 1983. The remaining respondents expressed no opinion on this issue.

In 1984 forty-two per cent of respondents considered the Dutch armed forces to be 'a necessity' down from 52 per cent in 1982 and 51 per cent in 1978, while 35 per cent considered them 'a necessary evil', compared with 37 per cent in 1978 and 30 per cent in 1982.

Six per cent of respondents in 1984 considered the armed forces to be 'completely superfluous' as against three per cent in 1978 and nine per cent in 1982. Ten per cent said the armed forces were 'hardly necessary' compared with eight per cent in 1978 and nine per cent in 1982. The remainder expressed no opinion.

Public acceptance of Dutch Nato membership was running at 76 per cent last year which compared with a low point since 1974 of 69 per cent in 1981 and a peak of 78 per cent in 1982.

Full results of the survey and a detailed commentary are published in today's edition of 'Defensie krant' which is published by the defence ministry's information service.

CSO: 3600/14

MILITARY

NETHERLANDS

EXPERT SAYS DUTCH DO NOT NEED EUROPEAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 5 Mar 85 p 7

Text In September of last year at the International Air Show in Farnborough, England, State Secretary for Defense Van Houwelingen announced that the Dutch government was considering joining the EFA European Fighter Aircraft program. Within the framework of this program, a group of five European NATO countries (Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) are at this moment preparing a study on the practicability of developing and producing a new European fighter aircraft for the end of this century and the start of the next. This study is to be completed this month. At that time the current participants and any new participants such as the Netherlands will have to make their final decision on whether or not they want to go ahead with the next stage of the project.

In his announcement the state secretary did not mention what it might cost the Netherlands in the end to join the EFA program. This is not surprising, since if you accept the West German Air Force's provisional--rather optimistic--target figures, you will arrive at a total purchase cost of between 14 and 17.5 billion guilders for the 200-250 aircraft the state secretary spoke of. No small sum, to be sure.

For that reason alone, before we decide to join the program and thus take the first step towards acquiring the EFA, it would perhaps not be unreasonable to consider whether we need the EFA, as well as what possible alternatives there are.

An Old Discussion

The Netherlands, you see, needs it much less than the five countries named above. It is only in 1991 that the Royal Air Force will have all 213 General Dynamics F-16's (less losses). These will replace 243 aircraft of the previous generation and will have to serve at least until the end of this century.

If nothing changes, then the tendency to acquire fewer and fewer aircraft will in all probability continue; certainly that is likely given the purchase cost

noted above, and despite the number of planes the state secretary proposed. Fewer and fewer aircraft are having to carry out more and more difficult tasks (providing air support to land and sea forces, and defending air space in the central sector, which happens to be precisely the opposite order of priority as in the EFA program). In the long run this tendency to acquire fewer aircraft will by itself make it impossible to carry out those tasks properly.

We also have to ask ourselves whether it is not high time to revive the old discussion about division of labor/specialization within NATO. Agreements with allies--possibly with individual allies--are preferable to unilaterally refusing assigned missions.

One obvious alternative would be to wait for the results of this discussion and not to join the EFA program now. That also has the advantage that in a few years we would be able to choose with less risk from what is available then or soon will be: an EFA or one or more similar projects from European aircraft manufacturers, such as the Swedish Gripen and the Israeli Lavi. However, one might also consider converting the F-16's which are already in service or coming in service into the advanced F-16E version. This would lengthen their operational life.

Tested

A less obvious but potentially far more interesting alternative would be--parallel with the discussion of division of labor/specialization within NATO--to investigate the possibility of developing and producing a totally new aircraft, designed specifically for the task that devolved on us out of this discussion. That sounds more ambitious than it actually has to be.

Various relatively small but respected teams of aircraft designers working independently (i.e. not associated with an aircraft manufacturer) have designs for such aircraft on the drawing board and in many cases have even tested them in model form (which is more than can be said of the EFA so far). These designs have been studied thoroughly by the U.S. and several European air forces, among others, but they hesitate to show their interest in a more concrete form.

Why? Is it because these designs are not good enough, too expensive, or too complicated? On the contrary, they are described as outstanding, in some cases even as a high point in the technology. Their price is between a tenth and a third of the possible purchase price of an EFA. And they are as complicated as they have to be to carry out their mission optimally. No, they suffer from what the Americans call the NIH syndrome: Not Invented Here.

In addition, these designs do not at all toe the line of bigger-better-more expensive (and thus fewer) that so many air forces compulsively adhere to. In this case the designers did not opt for a weapon system that is as complex, technologically advanced, and capable as possible--and thus also as expensive as possible. Such an aircraft is designed for disparate missions but at the same time is difficult to maintain and repair. They opted for a weapon system that is as complex, technologically advanced, and capable as necessary--and thus also

as cheap as possible. Such an aircraft is designed for just one mission but at the same time is also outstanding in respect to maintenance and repair. And who opts for that?

SAFE

Such an aircraft, which for the sake of simplicity we will refer to as SAFE (Small Advanced Fighter for Europe) could be developed and produced in cooperation with a small number of smaller NATO countries, in two main parts.

The aircraft itself (the body) could be developed and produced by the local aircraft industry (Fokker, for instance), employing a team of aircraft designers operating independently. Here it would be possible to make use of technological knowledge we already have (working with artificial materials, for instance) or of technological knowledge available elsewhere, which could be imported.

The--primarily electronic--equipment (the content) would have to be based as far as possible on already existing and proven systems. Thanks to increasing standardization and modularization, this ought to present few problems. For this a great deal would have to be imported directly or produced under license.

A SAFE would be employed as in the American high-low mix, a mixture, that is, of more capable and less capable aircraft. In the case of the United States, these are F-15's and F-16's respectively. Such a mix, however, can be employed not just within one air force but also among the air forces of (several members of) NATO. The smaller NATO countries' SAFE could form an outstanding "low" part of such a mix, beside the "high" part composed of the next generation of fighters from the larger NATO countries.

The final result of this alternative might be that in the future, for a considerably smaller amount of money compared to the EFA purchase, the Netherlands would obtain a larger number of aircraft, which would be designed to carry out one task optimally.

12593

CSO: 3614/78

MILITARY

SPAIN

POWER OF OLD GUARD ERODES AS FIVE GENERALS RETIRE

Madrid ABC in Spanish 16 Feb 85 p 20

[Article by Vera Gil]

[Text] The next 11 months will mark a change in generations in the army. As five lieutenant generals move into Group B, three with the rank of captain, the highest military posts will be filled with a new generation of officers who have never been to war and most of whom are from the Zaragoza Academy.

The past 2 years have been years of extraordinary mobility in the main military command posts. Between 1 January 1983 and 31 December 1984, a total of 16 lieutenant generals have gone into the reserves, signifying an almost complete change in the Captaincies General, the High Council of the Army and other top-ranking military organs.

At the present time, there are 14 lieutenant generals on active duty, but 5 of them will transfer to Group B this year. These 5 (along with Army Chief of Staff (JEME) Jose Saenz de Tejada and the general director of the Civil Guard, Jose Antonio Saenz de Santa Maria, whose assignments have been extended even though they are now in Group B) are part of the last group of commanding officers who actively participated in the war. Their immediate successors now come from the Zaragoza Military Academy.

Of the five lieutenant generals who move into the group of retirement posts in 1985, three hold the rank of captain general: Juan Vicente Izquierdo, captain general of the 6th Military Region (Burgos); Manuel Vallespin Gonzalez Valdes, captain general of the 3d Military Region (Valencia), and Jose Perez Inigo, captain general of the Canary Islands and head of the Area Unified Command. Also moving into Group B are army lieutenant generals Juan Cano Hevia, director of the Advanced Army School, and Ricardo Castillo del Rio, currently chief of the High Council of Military Justice.

These replacements have given rise to logical anticipation among generals inasmuch as once the transfers are made, there will commence a much more relaxed, much less dynamic period with respect to promotions, partly

motivated by gradual application of the Staff Law, which sets the maximum number of lieutenant generals for the regular army at ten.

For the coming promotions, nevertheless, some 40 division generals are available, and 7 of these will also move into Group B this year unless promoted. This group of 7 includes the current inspector general of the National Police, Felix Alcala Galiano, and the military governors of Madrid, Huesca, Mallorca and Tenerife, Antonio Eleta Sequera, Antonio Sanz Ridruejo, Luis Miranda Rodriguez and Eduardo Gomez-Acebo Rodil, respectively.

However, it would not appear that these division generals will be the ones with the greatest possibility of moving up to the posts remaining vacant at the top, even though any one of them might be favorably looked upon by the hierarchy. Although months are left and although it is not known precisely how many promotions the military is ready to grant, a number of names are already being mentioned, including the head of the Joint Defense Staff, Gen Miguel Iniguez del Moral (who could be promoted for the 6th Military Region); the deputy army chief of the Canary Islands and military governor of Las Palmas, Eduardo Cazorla Martinez; the deputy army chief of staff and secretary of the High Council, Eloy Rovira Montero; and the current director of the technical staff of the Ministry of Defense, Francisco Veguillas Elices.

Whoever is promoted in the end, the fact is that they will be generals trained at the General Academy, men whom Minister Narciso Serra will entrust with the highest responsibilities, often relating to the completion of important projects on reforms underway, including -- and most importantly -- the one deriving from the META modernization plan.

To this new generation of commanding officers, which some define as being pro-NATO, belong six of the current lieutenant generals, recently promoted, who were the first of their class in the respective branches. These six are Gustavo Urrutia Gracia, Fernando Gautier Larrainzar, Fernando Rodriguez Ventosa, Baldomero Hernandez Carreras and Jose Buhigues Gomez, captains general of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th and 7th military regions respectively, and Ricardo Escribano Igarza, currently a member of the High Council of Military Justice.

However, the changes do not only affect the army. In 1985, one admiral and three lieutenant generals of the air force will also retire. Also to move into Group B, on 21 February, to be precise, Adm Angel Liberal Lucini, chief of the Defense Staff (JEMAD), recently had his assignment extended by the government, however, meaning that he will not move into Group B.

In the navy, only Adm Joaquin Contreras Franco, captain general of the Cantabrico Maritime Zone, located in El Ferrol, will move into the reserve this year.

Regarding the air force, the changes will affect Lt Gen Miguel Martinez Vara del Rey y Teus, chief of the Combat Air Command of the 1st Military Region (Madrid); Lt Gen Tomas Juarez Redondo, chief of the Transport Air Command and the 3d Air Region (Zaragoza); and Lt Gen Jesus Bengoechea Baamondo, currently commanding officer of personnel of the army air corps.

Also retiring in 1985 are VAdm Ramon Alvarez-Maldonado Muela, director of military naval construction, and army air corps Div Gen Galbe Pueyo.

The new generation of men replacing the lieutenant generals and admirals retiring could remain in the top posts until 1988, along with others born between 1923 and 1924, who may be considered with the same possibilities. In the Ministry of Defense, the impression is one of satisfaction and it is thought that the newly promoted men will have enough time to carry out reforms.

11,464

CSO: 3548/101

MILITARY

SPAIN

ARMORED VEHICLES MODERNIZATION PROGRAM DETAILED

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 10 Feb 85 p 17

[Article by Fermin Gallego Serra]

[Text] In our country, the only armored unit is the Brunete Division and actually only one of its two brigades is truly armored (Briac XII), while the other is a mechanized infantry brigade, the 11th. Only in the case of war would the division have a third brigade, following the American organic plan.

However, it is a well-known fact that the number of AMX-30 tanks that the Santa Barbara enterprise built with a French patent is very limited and that, from the very beginning, there have been major transmission problems. Furthermore, recovery tanks, bought directly from France, are limited to 12 units.

As a result, the army has shown great interest in the modernization and expansion of its vehicle fleet, finding a favorable response in the General Directorate of Arms and Materiel, which is about to decide who will win the Lince Program, choosing between five different foreign technology bids. The model chosen must be made in Spain almost totally and some 350 units will be manufactured, with the possibility of exporting a greater number without restrictions.

However, after the "Flick affair" -- one of the bidders is related to the group (precisely the one which well-informed sources say has the greatest possibility of winning the contract), there has been a delay in the decision. It is almost certain that it will be necessary to wait for the approval of the Joint Strategic Plan by the Cabinet in order to gain time. It should be recalled, in this connection, that the plan will not be signed in March, as originally planned. Rather, there will be a delay of months, which sources close to the Ministry of Defense attribute to changes made resulting from the signing of the cooperation treaty between Libya and Morocco.

Nevertheless, this has not stood in the way of a very recent order placed with the European consortium Euromissile for 250 Milan light antitank missile launchers, as well as a number of training units and 28 operative missiles, along with other dummies for training. This will ensure an effective defense against tanks, almost nonexistent to date, and the equipment will take the place of the antiquated 106 recoilless cannons still in use in the different units specializing in this form of combat and especially the staff company of the Asturias 31 Regiment which, because it belongs to the previously mentioned Briac XII, requires great capacity in this type of combat.

Another matter pending is the purchase of a yet undetermined number of the new models of the E21 engineer vehicles, LP "bridgelaunchers" and "R" recovery vehicles, all based on the M47E2, which at the time was presented by Talbot and now being tested in Toledo and Madrid. In this case, interesting modifications will enable the army to recycle the M47's for noncombat uses, thereby avoiding major expenditures that would be required by the purchase of these machines made abroad. The firm of Villaverde, which assures the possibility of exports as soon as the army standardizes and acquires them, has proceeded to adapt the M47's to the diesel engine, modernizing them and increasing their range, while equipping them with bulldozer blades, a derrick, hole digger, capstans and everything needed to carry out the missions for which they were designed.

Perhaps the most substantial element in the process of adapting the only armored division in the army (once the Lince tank matter is decided) has to do with the heavy antitank weapon. Actually, if one wants Briac to fight "faster, harder and farther away," it must have a long-range antitank missile which, mounted on a tank, will enable it to accompany the wave of tanks in the front line of fire in order to protect them from ambushes. These missiles must be capable of piercing armor nearly 400 mm thick at a distance of 4,000 meters under any conditions. Two models are competing: the European "Hot" and the American "Tow," both well-tested and effective, belonging to the so-called second generation. When the negotiation of counteroffers and prices has concluded, both could be adapted to a model made by Talbot based on the light M21, called the "Cazador," which has a semi-retractile turret, preventing the loader from having to be exposed to enemy fire. Once again, this firm has shown a cheaper alternative by recycling a tank, the M21, obsolete for other uses, and adapting it to the greater range of the diesels and the different missile variations ("Tua" for "Tow" in two tubes) and "Hako," which could carry the "Hots" in four tubes. This may be another of the contracts to be revealed after the approval of the PEC, thereby making an important contribution to the Meta plan for modernizing the armed forces in general and the armored units in particular.

Two important pieces of news were recently announced relating to this topic and expanding its significance: on the one hand, the coming incorporation of 22 Spanish engineers from different industries in the sector into the

two teams working simultaneously in France and Germany on the same third-generation antitank missile. This is a project for the 1990's, capable of facing the new types of armor at distances of up to 4,000 meters, but unlike those already in existence, the path is remote-controlled from the time of firing. The gunner no longer has to continue aiming until the instant of impact. The great advantage of the "Trigat," as the study is called, is that multiple firing is possible, essential in the European theater of operations, given the enormous numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact tanks.

The latest information refers to the Santa Barbara enterprise, connected with the INI [National Institute of Industry], which is already beginning testing of the new 155-39 cannon, the "San Carlos," on the firing range. The weapon is totally Spanish and results are positive. It was initially a towed weapon, but in the near future, it is to be placed on a caterpillar chassis, as is the case of other similar weapons made in Europe. Although the weapon will not be used exclusively by the armored units, there can be no doubt that those are the units that will make the very best use of it.

11,464

CSO: 3548/101

ECONOMIC

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NORDIC COUNTRIES' YOUNG FARMERS PESSIMISTIC ON FUTURE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 10 Mar 85 p 18

[Article by Inger Blomqvist: "Young Nordic Farmers Feel Great Hopelessness"]

[Text] Young farmers from Sweden, Norway and Denmark were interviewed at an agricultural conference for young farmers on Iceland last week arranged by NSU [Nordic Joint Organization for Youth Work]. "The climate in Sweden is clearly hostile to agriculture and we youths feel a great hopelessness confronted by a profession which today is valued so little and which besides is less and less profitable." So said 23-year-old Ove Karlsson from Norrbotten. He is facing the decision as to whether to take over the home farm or work at something else--and the choice is difficult.

"I am fond of the home farm but still I am in doubt. The greatest worry is the uncertain economy and perhaps also fear of sitting alone out on the land without social contacts as one farm after the other goes under and is abandoned."

It is also very uncertain to plan production in today's Sweden because the political decision-makers decide everything very quickly in their heads.

"I know that many young people today feel doubt about the decisions they must make. We know the good sides of agriculture, but the negative sides have a tendency to outweigh, and still we know how important agriculture is both for supplies of food and to keep the countryside alive.

"And we also know that it is not just the beginners who have problems, but practically all farmers. Interest rates have shot up and overproduction has put prices down while production costs are always rising.

"The farmer has so far been stubborn and tried to adjust to the situation by producing more and reducing production costs, but now that no longer works. Agriculture is standing still, and the generation shift will be impossible if the elderly are to get anything for their work.

"It is not remarkable that most occupational illnesses today are found among the farm population. They are psychological illnesses and allergies, caused by economic and other worries.

"At the same time we know that agriculture is very important, and we wish for a better and more correct information program for the public to correct attitudes. The public should be made to understand that the farmer is not the consumer's opponent--on the contrary. It is an honor for the farmer to produce quality goods but the economy forces us to produce goods which are not always the best for the consumer."

Ove Karlsson is at home in a right large farm with 50 milk cows. He says that the goal of most young farmers is to take over the home farm, but that requires a better economic profitability and a solution to the balance problem so that the surplus does not just hit the economy of the farmer.

It is also important to be able to meet the threat of a damaged environment and to have a sufficiently differentiated production that it encourages employment--meaning invest in different combinations of production.

Not the least in importance is that the farmer should see himself as a businessman and not as an obnoxious individual in the eyes of people and politicians.

Sivert Dombu, 25-year-old agricultural student from Meldal in northern Norway is not completely pessimistic about a future as a farmer.

He expects to work a few years before he takes over a farm of 17 hectares with 24 milk cows and a number of other animals.

What worries him and many other young farmers in Norway today is the shortage of women in the countryside. There are many single farmers alone because the girls have largely moved to the cities where the jobs are. In a number of counties there are 50 women to 100 men in the age group 20-30, while in Oslo there are 111 women to 100 men.

Sivert says that men can not force girls out in the country when they can not offer better conditions, and still know that all who can would prefer to live in the country than in the cities. Being a farmer's wife means low status, low pay and few social contacts.

"It is tough to be a farmer in today's Norway, but we are not as hard pressed as they are in Sweden. Norway has few large farms. Only 9,400 of the 110,000 farms are over 20 hectares. Most are 10 hectares and have milk cows and cultivate some grain."

Sivert says that for his part he is quite satisfied but he knows that many young people are worried about the future even though the political climate is not hostile to agriculture in Norway.

"If one can manage, he can be effective," says Eskild Johnsen, a young Danish farmer.

Eskild is a milk producer, and was hit like all the other Danish farmers last year by the quota system. The Danish quota system says that the farmers may deliver 95 percent of their 1983 production.

For Eskild that means that he must reduce from 328,000 kg of milk to 308,000 kg--a decline of 20,000 kg or a reduced protective cover by 20-30,000 kroner.

Eskild says that he just found himself in the system and adapted to it, and hopes to get an additional quota from someone who quits. The system within EC is such that Denmark as a whole is regarded as one dairy, and has got a certain quota which is then divided up among the farmers in the country.

As he said, Eskild hopes for a larger quota so that he can fill all of his stalls. He now has 50 cows after slaughtering 10 percent, but he has room for 6 more, and he believes that with 56 cows he can manage quite well economically.

On the farm he grows grain and different feeds for the cows. He is not so gloomy about the situation, despite the wages, oil and other costs constantly rising while the prices for agricultural products remain in place.

"If one has reasonable production he can manage, although his profits are not great. On the other hand it looks very gloomy for newly established farmers and for those who will now establish themselves in farming. Nobody can afford to buy a farm, and that means that development stops!"

9287

CSO: 3650/212

18 April 1985

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FURTHER SHUTDOWNS IN SIGHT FOR OIL REFINERIES

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 9 Feb 85 p 13

/Article by Gerd Achilles: "The Great Dying Among Refineries"/

/Text/ The German market seems to mean a great deal to British BP. How else could one explain the fact that its local representative, Hellmuth Buddenberg, is always successful in his fundraising flights to London. About DM 2 billion--counting all subsidies such as capital reduction, a waiver of claims, takeover of installations, and direct subsidies--is what the "parent," the British Petroleum Company, has so far given to its German subsidiary, which after an initial flourish is now fading. Buddenberg just announced a new retreat maneuver costing about DM 500 million, which he tried to sell in an incomparable PR action as an entrepreneurial achievement: in order to save 6,000 jobs, another 1,000 would have to be eliminated.

Thus every seventh employee of the German BP will have to contribute to this rescue operation. This will enable the German BP to close down its refineries in Hamburg-Finkenwerder and in Huenxe near Dinslaken, releasing about 800 employees; in addition, the refinery in Ingolstadt, operated jointly with Agip, is being re-equipped, furnished with upgrading installations and connected by pipeline with the BP refinery in Vohburg. That also leaves too many employees.

As the saying has it, one can argue eloquently about questions of style, but less so about the force of facts. And from this aspect, the BP decision is understandable, because a loss of DM 170 million can be absorbed once, as in the business year 1984, but not as a steady burden. This is what processing would bring about in the near, foreseeable future, since the excess capacity of all German refineries cost the oil industry billions per year--more than 20 billion in the last 5 years.

The problem is simple: crude oil use has been dropping continually due to economy measures and importation of semifinished products, and in recent years, it dropped even faster than refining capacities. In 1981, the German market still had 31 refineries with a capacity of 143.4 million tons. However, during the same year only 85.1 million tons of crude oil were processed--this corresponds to 57.1 percent of capacity utilization. But despite the subsequent rapid decrease in capacity, at the end of 1984 the unfavorable ratio had changed little. In the remaining 23 refineries the distillation capacity for crude oil

was 105.3 million tons. However, only 71 million tons were processed, which means a utilization rate of only a little more than 60 percent. This cannot be called a reduction in losses.

For this reason, the central offices of the oil industry had no doubts about further shutdowns. Even before the BP decision, Mobil surprised everyone by shutting down the most modern German refinery in Wilhelmshaven. Meanwhile IG Chemie fears that further reduction decisions will be made in the near future. Evidently, the oil companies have finally come to the conclusion that distilling capacities must be divided and maintained on a regional basis, not according to companies. This, of course, requires cooperation, a hurdle that has yet to be crossed.

Market observers doubt that the trade union's fear is already justified; that fear being that further shutdowns would endanger manufacturing security in the FRG, bringing about increased dependence on foreign refinery sites. However, this situation could occur if the ratio between crude oil consumption and processing capacity should change decisively--for instance, through newly-rising consumption figures. Consumption and capacity are still approximately in balance, wherein secondary processing capacities might be especially important for judging supply security. The growth in conversion capacities--with whose help heavy products such as heavy heating oil can be converted into light products--now holds a one-third share of the capacity of atmospheric distillation. Thus adaptation in product output to the changed structure of demand has improved noticeably. The increased use of other primary energy such as coal, gas and nuclear fuel can thus be much better absorbed by the oil industry. The German market--and this takes us back to BP London's willingness to make sacrifices--will remain the most interesting one in Europe for years to come. Buddenberg is of the opinion that whoever controls sales here can now easily buy ahead abroad, and that is how he conducts his business policy. Of course, this attitude is partly forced upon him by the fact that, due to the lack of German production, he as a "have-not on the spot" has nothing to process.

The more refineries are built abroad, the more international competition in semifinished products intensifies, the more his advantage is growing in not having to process at the high German cost level. This will go well as long as the German market is liberalized. This is not expected to change, at least within the European Community, and there BP is well-supplied with refineries.

Should the battlefield actually shift more and more to the trade side and product availability play a lesser role, then Buddenberg has several aces up his sleeve. His spectacular purchase of Gelsenberg, and reorganization of trade under the Strohmeyer umbrella including an efficient network of gas stations, are advantages which the other oil companies will yet have to balance. That such preparations are in full swing is shown, among other things, by the grade rumor about closer cooperation between Mobil and the Haniel Handel GmbH, possibly even through capital exchange. The battle for a share in this market is not over by far. Of all the oil companies, BP suffered most in this restructuring and adaptation, since the balancing factor, i.e., surpluses from domestic production, which make these procedures more muted in other companies, will be available to them also in the future, albeit at an increasingly lower volume. This lower volume is not only the result of falling market prices, but also due to the greediness of the federal states which increase their price-adjusting quota at regular intervals, while exploration costs keep rising.

ECONOMIC

ICELAND

ICELANDERS SEE INFLATION AS BIGGEST CONCERN

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 16 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] Inflation is Iceland's biggest problem today, according to 19 percent of the respondents in a recent Hagvangu opinion poll. "General economic conditions" were named as the biggest problem by 13.6 percent, and "waste of natural resources" by 10.7 percent.

In six opinion polls conducted by Hagvangu since April 1983, inflation has shown up four times as the biggest problem. However, it came up in third place in April, 1984, and last September and equal number of respondents counted inflation and waste of natural resources as the biggest problem.

The current opinion poll also indicated that 23.5 percent thought that it was possible to solve this problem to a considerable degree in the next few years, 36.6 percent thought it could be solved to some degree, 12 percent to a small degree, 13.4 percent not at all, and 14.2 percent responded that they did not know whether it could be solved.

The question asked was as follows: "What do you think is the major issue of concern for Icelanders today?" We reprint below a summary of the responses, compared with previous polls.

	Feb85	Sep/Oct84	Jul84	Apr84	Nov83	Apr83
Inflation	19.0	10.3	12.0	12.4	29.5	37.2
Economic conditions	13.6	8.5	10.3	19.8	13.6	22.3
Waste of resources	10.7	10.3	10.9	15.9	7.7	8.1
Low salaries	7.2	9.9	8.7	7.3		
Demands	5.0					
Alcohol and addictive substances	4.3					

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

TRADE AGREEMENT TO PHASE OUT EXPORT INCENTIVES

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 27 Feb 85 p 4

[Text] Turkey is heading for exports without incentives. According to the bilateral textile agreement signed in Washington with the United States day before yesterday, Turkey agreed to phase out on a 5-year schedule the three basic subsidies it offers to exporters. In return, the United States lifted the 16 percent-17 percent compensation duty it has been applying to Turkish textile products since 21 December. Officials pointed out that the 5-year timetable that Turkey adopted covers all export goods, not just textiles. Thus, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Turkey will no longer be able to apply export incentives to exports to the 86 GATT member nations, not just the United States.

In accordance with the agreement reached between the U.S. Department of Commerce and Ekrem Pakdemirli, under secretary for the Treasury and Foreign Trade, Turkey will phase out its three incentive measures, which are: tax rebates, reduction of corporation tax category by 20 percent of export earnings, and two- and four-point transfers made to the exporter from the Resource Use Support Fund. Pakdemirli gave the timetable for the phase-out to U.S. officials in the form of a "letter of intent." The United States announced that Turkey would assume the status of "agreement nation" as of 25 February.

The official announcement of the agreement, signed by Ekrem Pakdemirli and Ambassador William Brock, will be made by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal on 4 March.

Pakdemirli: "All Exports Included"

Treasury and Foreign Trade Under Secretary Ekrem Pakdemirli pointed out in a statement in Washington that incentives would be discontinued on all remaining export products. "It does not affect textiles alone, seeing that is a general agreement," he said.

At the press conference held after the signing ceremony, Pakdemirli said that the agreement was in Turkey's favor and would allow exports to the United States to reach \$500 million by 1986.

Era of Exports Without Incentives

Meanwhile, the view is gaining strength that non-incentive exports from Turkey will apply to the 86 member nations of GATT, not just the United States. Former Minister of State for Foreign Economic Affairs Sermet Refik Pasin said that it was natural under the GATT structure for the agreement to apply to all member nations. He said:

"The basic principle of the GATT treaty requires this. Privileges granted one country that is a member of the organization cannot be withheld from another."

A foreign ministry official who did not wish to be identified said that the phase-out of incentives was spelled out in detail in the bilateral agreement reached with the United States and that a general agreement had been reached for other GATT nations. "These countries will pose no problem for us as long as there is no question of unfair subsidies' being applied," he said.

8349

CSO: 3554/104

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

PUBLIC SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY REGISTERS RAPID RISE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Feb 85 p 9

[Text] ECONOMIC SERVICE - The low productivity of the SEE's [State Economic Enterprises] is always grist for the debate mills in Turkey. However, research done by the State Institute of Statistics [SIS], based on results of the quarterly survey of the manufacturing industry, shows that increases in productivity in public sector industry since 1981 have outstripped increases in the private sector manufacturing industry.

Results of a study appearing in the National Productivity Center [NPC] journal, VERIMLILIK [Productivity], indicate that the productivity index by number of hours worked, with 1981 representing 100, rose in the public sector to 145 in the first quarter of 1984, while it was 130 in the private sector. Productivity based on average number of workers rather than hours worked rose to 150 in the first quarter of 1984 for the public sector, the 1981 indicator again being 100, but was 134 for the private sector.

"Productivity per hour worked" in the study, conducted by NPC expert Enver Kaya, is derived by dividing the gross production value at fixed prices by the total work-hours. "Productivity per capita" is derived by dividing gross production value by the average number of workers. The SIS wholesale price index, with base 1981=100, is used to deflate production values.

The results of the productivity indexes, one of the most closely watched indicators in all developed industrialized economies but less influential in Turkey, show that the claim that productivity is negligible in the Turkish public sector did not hold true in the 1981-1984 period. Interestingly, the public sector, at least in recent years, has been more successful than the private sector at increasing workforce productivity.

Comparison of sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry shows that the private sector had larger productivity gains only in the "rock- and earth-based industry" and the "metal basic industry" and that the public sector dominated other industries including textiles.

Factors in Productivity Improvement

Activity	%
1. Plant investment in capital, equipment and processing	72
2. Interest and support by superiors	61
3. Good financing control and information flow systems	45
4. Good inter-worker relations	38
5. Good communications	35
6. Competition among middle-level managers in all departments	34
7. Competent personnel in manufacturing and industrial engineering matters	29
8. Coordination and cooperation among departments	27
9. Management and supervisory training	23
10. Organization-wide, systematic approach to productivity improvement	22
11. Workforce training	20
12. Incentives and awards	14

Source: Data taken by the NPC journal VERIMLILIK from a study conducted in the United States.

Labor Productivity Indexes for Manufacturing Industry

Year	Productivity Per Hour Worked			Productivity Per Capita		
	Public	Private	Total	Public	Private	Total
1981 (average)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1982 "	134.4	112.8	122.8	136.9	106.4	124.7
1983 "	139.8	122.4	128.3	141.0	124.6	130.2
1984 (first quarter)	145.1	130.4	133.3	150.0	133.6	137.1

Source: NPC journal VERIMLILIK 1984/3, p 110.

8349

CSO: 3554/104

18 April 1985

ENERGY

FINLAND

FINNS, SOVIETS DISCUSS ENERGY POLICY

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 12 Mar 85 p 12

[Article by BJI: "Energy Seminar--Nuclear Power Best"]

[Text] Seen from the national economy, nuclear power is a more advantageous alternative than coal energy. That conclusion was drawn by division chief Taisto Turunen when yesterday he presented the comparative investigation of the Ministry of Trade and Industry at a seminar which was arranged in Esbo by the Finnish-Soviet Society.

According to the report nuclear power is somewhat more advantageous than coal power independent of whether the general economic growth is fast or slow and independent of whether energy prices are stable or rising. In April 1983 the production costs for one kilowatt hour of electricity were 16 p in a nuclear power plant and 19 p in a coal power plant.

8 and 5 Billion Marks

In the comparative investigation they began with the assumption that the life of nuclear and coal power plants were 25 years. Further that a 1,000 MW nuclear power plant would contain an investment of 8 billion marks, while a corresponding coal power plant would cost 5 billion. Operating costs were estimated for a nuclear power plant at about 60 marks/MWh and in a coal power plant at about 130 marks/MWh. Operating costs also include expenses for waste, while demolition of the nuclear power plant also included in the investment costs.

Decision at the Right Time!

Turunen confirmed that a nuclear power plant requires large investments, while the alternative coal power or peat power includes large fuel costs.

In general one does not associate such large risks with a power plant investment, but it is important in any case that the project is ready at the right

time. If a 1,000 MW nuclear power plant is completed too early, the costs go up during the first years to about 300 million marks per year (interest costs minus saved coal costs). To advance the decision so long that one is forced to cover the increased electric consumption with new coal power would again cause direct additional costs of at least 200 million marks per year, said Turunen.

Nuclear Power Cleanest

Professor Antero Jahkola dealt with the influence of different energy forms on the environment. His conclusion was that considering different power plants we can realize all the alternatives which can be proposed in Finland in a satisfactory way from an environmental standpoint.

The use of fossil fuels, however, pollutes the environment for a longer time and affects the climate. The fossil fuel with the least negative effect on the environment is natural gas. And the cleanest of all forms of energy, both in influence on the atmosphere and the ecology, is nuclear power, he concluded.

630 Billion Cubic Meters of Gas

Director K. A. Vardanian from Sojuzgasexport spoke about natural gas and maintained that the Soviet Union's production this year will be 630 billion cubic meters. Since deliveries were begun in 1974 Finland has now bought fully 9 billion cubic meters, with a high point in 1979 of 992 cubic meters.

In 1983 natural gas was 19 percent of the world's energy balance, or 1,329 billion tons of oil equivalent, said Vardanian. The United States, which has 6 percent of the world's gas discoveries, used in 1983 32 percent of the gas which was produced in the world. The corresponding figure in West Europe was 5.3 and 14.

The Soviet Union is the world's largest gas exporter, with 30 percent of the international trade.

9287

CSO: 3650/212

ENERGY

NORWAY

SINKING SEA FLOOR THREATENS NATURAL GAS EXPORTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Mar 85 p 4

[Article by Flemming Dahl]

[Text] Stavanger--20 March. Reduced Deliveries to Continent

The oil companies operating in the Ekofisk Field fear that they will not be able to fulfill their obligations for deliveries of gas to customers on the Continent next winter. According to information received by AFTENPOSTEN, provisional estimates indicate that the deliveries may be up to 20 percent less than contracted.

This is connected with the fact that the sea bottom on Ekofisk has sunk. Continued sinking may place the field installations in danger, and as a countermeasure, there is being considered the maintaining of some pressure in the underground reservoir by pumping back a part of the gas which comes up together with the Ekofisk oil.

Phillips Petroleum, the company which is the responsible operator on Ekofisk, supposedly in January made its customers on the Continent aware of the danger of reduced deliveries. According to informed sources, it is assumed that this coming summer Phillips will be able to provide more information as to how great a possible reduction there may be.

Experts with whom AFTENPOSTEN has been in contact believe that pumping gas in may lead to increased oil production, but not so great a one as would allow increased income from oil to match the lost gas income. Therefore, both the Ekofisk companies and the Norwegian treasury would have their anticipated profits reduced.

Statfjord Gas No Alternative

The Ekofisk companies have made an abortive attempt to acquire alternative gas from the Statfjord Field, AFTENPOSTEN has learned. They wish to protect their customers against being hurt as a result of a possible reduction of gas production on the Ekofisk Field, by using Statfjord gas.

The Ekofisk operator, Phillips Petroleum, received a negative answer from both Mobil and Statoil--the present and future operators on Statfjord--when a query was directed earlier in the winter.

Mobil and Statoil supposedly said that they cannot deliver more gas than the amount earlier contracted for by customers on the Continent. The deliveries of Statfjord gas to the Continent are for the first time to take place in the fall.

The Statfjord gas is to be sent to Ekofisk through the Statpipe pipeline system, from where--together with the Ekofisk gas--it is to go further to Emden in West Germany through the Norpipe system.

Other Gas Fields Checked

The Oil Directorate has requested operator companies on the continental shelf to check to what extent the sea bottom on the developed oil and gas fields has sunk. This is a result of the confirmed sinkings of the sea bottom on the Ekofisk Field.

Since Christmas, several methods have been used on the Ekofisk Field in order to determine how much the sea bottom has sunk, and how rapid it is continuing to sink. So far, the latest method which has been applied involves measurements with the aid of American satellites. Experts have said that satellite measurements may provide results with an accuracy of plus or minus one centimeter.

CSO: 3639/99-P

OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

BODSTROM ON USSR BALTIC DISPUTE--"The government has no interest at all in giving away Swedish waters in the Baltic to the Soviet Union. Our standpoint is that the sea border should be drawn midway between the Soviet mainland and the Swedish islands Gotland, Faro and Gotska Sandon." Thus declared Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom on Monday [25 March] to the Riksdag in response to an interpellation from Conservative Party member Jens Eriksson. [Text]
[Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Mar 85 p 8]

CSO: 3650/218

END